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I Spit Upon the Noble:  
The Epicurean Critique of Love of Honor and the Origins of Modernity 
 
Abstract 
 
Modern liberal democracies regard “pursuit of happiness” as one of the fundamental 
rights that governments are instituted to protect—but modern political thought has comparatively 
little to say about happiness itself. The modern view seems to suggest that happiness is 
something we ought to pursue in private, which would demote politics to an instrumental role. 
To understand and critique this view, I study one alternative—the philosophy of Epicurus, the 
ancient theorist of happiness in private life. 
Epicurus taught that the life of hēdonē or “pleasure” was the life of eudaimonia or 
“happiness.” He advised his followers to “live unnoticed”—that is, to shun political participation 
on account of its coercive, unpleasant character. Epicurus’ philosophy is often thought to be 
plainly anti-political. I argue—based on my study of Epicurean fragments and of the poem of 
Lucretius—that Epicureanism is, in fact, intensely political. Its hedonistic theory of the good is 
designed so as to deprecate love of honor and desire for public recognition: “I spit upon the 
iv 
 
noble,” Epicurus declares, “when it provides no pleasure.” Similarly, his physical theory 
describes a universe offering no support and no guidance for human politics. “Justice” has no 
intrinsic connection to the human end; it is a word we use to describe agreements for the sake of 
mutual advantage. Gone is the splendor of moral virtue, as depicted in Plato and Aristotle.  
I argue that early modern thought is in constant dialogue with Epicurean political 
philosophy. The moderns can, in general, be said to share Epicurus’ hostility to “the noble”—
which they disparage as “pride” or “vainglory.” The more radical among them entertain 
Epicurus’ notion of an indifferent universe, and his account of human political origins. This is 
not, however, in order to advocate a return to an Epicurean policy of philosophic withdrawal. 
The modern strategy, as epitomized by Hobbes, is to attempt to solve the problems associated 
with political justice by advocating for the general adoption of a democratized form of hedonism. 
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PART ONE: 
EPICUREAN POLITICAL PHILOSOPHY 
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Chapter I: The City and the Garden 
Epicurus was one of the most important philosophers of the Hellenistic period, and the 
school of philosophy he founded—the Epicurean—was one of the most influential and enduring 
schools of Greek and Roman antiquity.
1
 Epicurean philosophy provides a systematic account of 
many of the topics traditionally addressed by the ancient schools: what we know and the 
conditions of our knowledge; the physical world and our place within it; life’s purpose and the 
way to attain happiness; the soul, the afterlife, and the nature of the gods. The Epicurean school 
is not, however, generally thought of as having made an important contribution to political 
philosophy.   
 The purpose of this essay will be to argue that it has—that Epicurus and his followers put 
forward a distinctive political philosophy of considerable intrinsic interest and real historical 
influence. In the course of making this claim, I will analyze the dismissive arguments against 
Epicurean political philosophy, and offer my own interpretation of the surviving texts of the 
Epicurean school. I hope to show that these texts need to be understood against the background 
of ancient political thought—and the Socratic tradition, in particular. I will highlight significant 
areas of agreement between Epicurus and Socrates, while showing exactly where and why 
                                                             
1  
Where available, quotations from the fragments of Epicurus are derived from the 
translations and texts provided by A.A. Long and D.N. Sedley, The Hellenistic Philosophers 
(hereafter LS, with section and text numbers indicated). I note cases in which I depart from Long 
and Sedley’s translations. I also supply references to the Greek text and translation of R.D. Hicks’ 
Loeb edition of Diogenes Laertius’ Lives of Eminent Philosophers (hereafter DL). Quotations 
from Lucretius are taken from Cyril Bailey, Titi Lucreti Cari De Rerum Natura Libri Sex 
(hereafter DRN). I note cases in which I depart from Bailey's translation. I have consulted the 
selections from Lucretius' poem provided in LS and provide references where available. I have 
also consulted W.H.D. Rouse’s Loeb edition of Lucretius, On the Nature of Things (revised by 
M.F. Smith), and Walter Englert’s verse translation. 
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Epicurus departs from the Socratic consensus and proposes an alternative way of understanding 
the political things. 
  To give an overview of my interpretation: I find that Epicurus makes important 
contributions to political philosophy in two general areas. The first follows from his ethics, the 
second, from his physics. In ethics, Epicurus attacks “love of honor” with a vigor and 
comprehensiveness which were unparalleled in ancient thought. The attack on love of honor 
provides the context for the vehement denunciation of “the noble” (to kalon) which I have taken 
for the first part of my title: Epicurus once declared, “I spit upon the noble, when it provides no 
pleasure.” He furthermore appears to have devoted substantial effort to the task of showing that 
“the noble” as such never provides authentic pleasure. This—much more than outright 
hedonism—is what distinguishes Epicurus from Socrates and the Socratic tradition. It is his first 
major contribution to political thought. 
In physics, Epicurus rejects any account of “purpose” in the natural world. His opposition 
to teleology leads him, in particular, to reject any attempt to find in nature a “guide” for human 
political affairs. There is no “plan laid up in heaven” which we can use as a paradigm for 
understanding politics or for ordering political life. In essential agreement with the pre-Socratics, 
Epicurus regards currently existing political arrangements as products of a long process driven 
by chance and necessity. He denies that any “political exercise of reason” could shake the grip of 
chance and necessity on human affairs—even in the best of circumstances. The only “freedom” 
that can truly be said to exist in this world is the freedom of the solitary philosopher. 
I will explore these arguments in detail in later chapters. For the time being, it is 
important to note that, for all the intrinsic interest of its arguments, Epicurean philosophy would 
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have been little more than a historical footnote, if it had not been for the rediscovery of a 
manuscript of the Epicurean poem of Lucretius by Poggio Bracciolini in 1417 A.D. This Latin 
poem, composed in the mid-1
st
 century B.C. and entitled De rerum natura or “On the Nature of 
Things,” remains our best surviving resource for Epicurean philosophy. In my essay, I will show 
how the history of this poem’s reception helps to elucidate many of the claims I am making 
regarding the political character of Epicurean philosophy. It is a remarkable fact that many of the 
humanists who encountered Lucretius in the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries took interest in 
DRN as a political text, and Epicureanism as a political system of thought. 
In the writings of humanists such as Lorenzo Valla, Desiderius Erasmus, and Thomas 
More, one finds a generally favorable reassessment of Epicurean ethical hedonism. I contend that 
there are important reasons for this sympathetic “revival” of Epicurean ethics. The humanists 
perceived that Epicureanism could be brought to bear on what was arguably the central 
intellectual issue of the renaissance: Is it possible—or even desirable—to revive an ancient, 
pagan account of virtue within the contemporary Christian religious and moral context?   
The humanists seem to have taken seriously an idea once suggested by Augustine: there 
may be potential for agreement and common cause between Christians and Epicureans, 
particularly as regards the critique of “love of honor”—that is to say, what the Christian might 
call “the vice of pride.” To be sure, there are many tenets of Epicurean philosophy—just as there 
are many tenets of every ancient school of philosophy—to which no orthodox Christian believer 
could give his assent. Even so, it seemed possible to contemplate a narrowly political revival of 
selected Epicurean ideas as part of an eclectic strategy to counter some of the worst—but most 
appealing—elements in pagan political thought.   
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The definitive example of this strategy, I contend, is Thomas More’s Utopia. I read 
More’s playful dialogue as a serious attempt to grapple with important questions of political 
philosophy. The Utopians have constructed a beautiful commonwealth—and though they 
initially lack Christian revelation, they are not unreceptive to it. Furthermore, the Utopians are 
emphatically “Epicurean,” in the sense of pursuing an openly hedonistic ethical philosophy—
albeit one constrained by a few very important articles of faith. Most importantly, the Utopians 
disdain the “false” pleasures of wealth, conquest and glory. In this way, Utopia seems to test the 
notion that Epicurean and Christian ideas might make limited common cause against a 
“pagan”—but all too popular—account of virtue which places undue emphasis on material 
success and worldly honor and glory. 
Epicureanism has a second important role to play in the history of political thought. The 
Epicurean denial of purposive nature found willing ears among the radical thinkers of the 
sixteenth and seventeenth centuries who envisaged a break, not only with the mainstream of 
classical political thought, but with orthodox Christianity as well. The key figures in this 
movement—foremost among them, Niccolò Machiavelli and Thomas Hobbes—demonstrated a 
real and sustained interest in the poem of Lucretius, and in Epicurean philosophy more generally. 
Perhaps Epicurus' account of an indifferent universe seemed to them to provide a credible 
alternative to the well-ordered cosmos of Aristotelian and Scholastic philosophy. In any case, 
they were clearly inclined to agree with Epicurus’ denial of the classical view that “man is by 
nature a political animal.” But the practical conclusions that Machiavelli and Hobbes drew from 
the denial of nature as guide were contrary, in most respects, to those envisaged by Epicurus. 
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Nature’s silence does not justify a policy of moderate hedonism and withdrawal from political 
life. Rather, it seems to empower us to impose our own vision on the formless chaos. 
As the preceding brief overview may suggest, I view Epicureanism as a philosophy 
which contains significant internal tensions. The most important of these is the tension between a 
moderate ethical hedonism on the one hand, and the infinite and purposeless physical universe 
on the other. At the very least, the history of the divergent ways in which pieces of the Epicurean 
system were recovered and appropriated should prepare us to anticipate the following questions: 
What are the fundamental premises of Epicurean philosophy? Does Epicurus' ethics imply his 
physics? Does his physics imply his ethics? Are the two even compatible with one another? In 
what sense is Epicurean philosophy a “system” at all? 
The only fair way to begin to explore these questions is to start with Epicurus himself. 
Epicurus was a citizen of Athens, born to Athenian parents in 341 B.C. He spent his childhood in 
the Athenian colony of Samos. He appears to have exhibited an early interest in philosophy. At 
the age of eighteen he was sent to Athens for the obligatory two-year term of military service. 
Subsequently, he traveled the Aegean. At this time, he established philosophical communities at 
Mytilene and Lampsacus. He would remain in contact with some of his early converts for the 
rest of his life. In 307-306 B.C. he returned to Athens, where he established a community known 
as “the Garden” (ho kēpos), a short distance outside the city walls.2 He lived and taught in the 
Garden for the rest of his life, dying in 270 B.C. 
                                                             
2  
See LS vol. I, p. 4, for a diagram showing the likely location of the Garden in relation to 
other philosophical schools and familiar Athenian landmarks. 
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 Epicurus possibly intended to impart a deliberate lesson by situating his school outside 
the walls of the city. The choice stands in contrast to Socrates’ preference for the Agora, and the 
Stoics’ preference for the bustling Porch. The practice of Epicurean philosophy seems from the 
beginning to have been associated with a policy of withdrawal and nonparticipation in political 
life. Epicurus told his followers to “live unnoticed” (lathē biosas), and advised them “do not 
engage in politics” (mē politeusthai). This seemingly “apolitical” stance makes it possible to 
doubt whether he really had a political philosophy. I argue that he did; but the best arguments 
against this view deserve to be considered. The philosophical roots of Epicurean nonparticipation 
will be discussed in chapter two; for the time being, I will limit myself to the observation that 
Socrates, too, avoided any sort of political participation, and seems to have thought that political 
participation was incompatible with political philosophy—except, perhaps, in the best of all 
regimes.
3
 
The deeper objection to my argument is that the Epicurean system appears to lack any 
account of the best regime—or even “the regime” as such. This, more than any other feature, is 
what distinguishes Epicureanism from the various schools of Socratic political philosophy. Still, 
the mere fact that Epicurus was silent on the regime does not prove that he was not a political 
philosopher—only that he was not a political philosopher on the same model as the Socratics.4 
                                                             
3  For example, see Socrates’ statement in Plato, Apology, 31c-32a: “if someone who really 
fights for the just is going to preserve himself even for a short time, it is necessary for him to 
lead a private rather than a public life.” For further discussion of this issue, see chapter two. 
4  
To take a modern example, Hobbes also expresses indifference to important parts of 
classical regime theory. See, for example, Leviathan XIX. 
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I argue that Epicurus is a political philosopher in the sense that he places a high value on 
the proper understanding of political things. His surviving writings—scanty though they may 
be—show a clear interest in many of the traditional themes of political philosophy. The Kuriai 
doxai or “Principal Doctrines” —a collection of maxims—contains more entries referring to 
“justice” than to any other single topic.5 Furthermore, Epicurus’ surviving Letter to Herodotus 
contains an account of the origin of language and of other cultural innovations.
 6
 The origins of 
political community appear to have been a major area of interest for the school: the subject is 
discussed in the surviving portions of Epicurus’ Peri phuseōs (On Nature), book XXVIII, as well 
as in fragments of a book by Epicurus’ student Hermarchus, and in the second half of DRN, 
book V.
7
 Nor should we be surprised that the Epicureans devote this level of attention to politics. 
Epicurean philosophy is essentially concerned with the question of how we as human beings can 
acquire lasting happiness—and the pursuit of happiness, even if it does not require politics, is 
nonetheless deeply influenced by the fact that virtually all of us reside in political communities. 
So long as we define “political philosophy” sufficiently broadly, it would seem that Epicurus is a 
political philosopher. 
A different sort of objection to my thesis can be made. Perhaps “physics,” or the study of 
nature, is the primary element in the Epicurean system. Cicero’s famous account of the “Socratic 
                                                             
5  
As is noted by James H. Nichols, Epicurean Political Philosophy: The De Rerum Natura 
of Lucretius, p. 16 n.4. 
6  
See the Letter to Herodotus, DL X.75-76 (LS 19A). 
7  See David N. Sedley, “Epicurus, On Nature, Book XXVIII,” Cronache Ercolanesi 3 
(1973), pp. 5-83; see also Hermarchus, Against Timocrates, quoted in Porphyry, On Abstinence 
I.7.1-I.9.4 (LS 22M) and I.10.1-I.12.7 (LS 22N); and DRN V.925-ff. 
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turn” in philosophy credits Socrates with “bringing philosophy down from the heavens and into 
the city.”8 Perhaps the pre-Socratic and Socratic approaches are opposed. At any rate, there are 
some indications that “inquiry into nature” is the overarching goal of Epicurean philosophy. 
Epicurus titled his magnum opus Peri phuseōs, or “On Nature.” Similarly, Lucretius titled his 
poem De rerum natura, or “On the Nature of Things.” Do these works represent a return to a 
pre-Socratic model in which philosophy is preoccupied with “the heavenly things,” but 
indifferent to the human ones? 
Such an interpretation finds little support in the content of surviving Epicurean texts. The 
Epicurean account of the physical world is rife with political implications, as I shall show in 
chapters three and four. Furthermore, Epicurus situates his physical theory within the context of 
the human end, which is pleasure. This leads him to take a seemingly mercenary attitude towards 
scientific truth. He declares that he is willing to accept multiple explanations for a single physical 
event. “Exclusion of myth,” he declares, “is the sole condition necessary.”9 In fact, multiple 
explanations may be preferable, in the sense that, taken together, they are more likely to 
persuade than any single explanation would be. This means, however, that Epicurus is concerned 
with physical inquiry, not so much for the sake of discovering physical truth, as for the effects of 
physical inquiry upon our quality of life.
10
 
Epicurean philosophy is therapeutic in character and intention. Epicurus described 
philosophy as “[the] activity which by arguments and discussions brings about the happy life.” 
                                                             
8  
Cicero, Tusculan Disputations V.4. 
9  
Letter to Pythocles, DL X.97. See also Letter to Pythocles, DL X.85 and 104. 
10  
For further discussion, see Nichols, Epicurean Political Philosophy, pp. 13-20. 
10 
 
This is not—or not primarily—because philosophy is itself pleasant, but rather because our 
natural state as human beings is characterized by a pervasive anxiety which is the result of 
unfounded fears. The purpose of philosophy is to investigate the sources of these fears: the false 
opinions most people conceive regarding death, the afterlife, and their own natural needs. These 
false opinions are a sickness of the mind, for which Epicurean philosophy provides the cure—by 
showing that they are groundless. This extinguishes the deep-seated feelings of anxiety that 
Epicurus regards as the proximate cause of most, if not all, human suffering. When false opinion 
is eliminated, we can enjoy the ataraxia or “tranquility”—more literally, perhaps, the “absence 
of disturbance”—which Epicurus describes as the greatest of all pleasures 
As befits a therapeutic philosophy, Epicurean teachings are easily memorized, and can be 
easily recalled in times of need. The best example is the famous “fourfold cure,” or 
tetrapharmakon, that subsequent generations of Epicureans learned by heart: “God presents no 
fears, death no worries. And while good is readily attainable, evil is readily endurable.”11 This 
simple formula may have been composed by Epicurus. In any case, it reliably transmits the core 
of his system of thought.
12
 
The first part of the tetrapharmakon is, “God presents no fears.” The Epicureans believe 
that the first and greatest source of human suffering is fear of the gods, but philosophy can show 
that the vengeful, jealous gods of Greek and Roman mythology have no basis in fact. The most 
important proof begins from Epicurus’ conception of the divine nature:  
                                                             
11  LS 25J. For Epicurus’ views on memory-aids, and concerning the importance of a 
“comprehensive overview,” see the Letter to Herodotus, DL X.35 and 83. 
12  
Compare KD 1-4, DL X.139-140 (LS 23E4 and 21C). The progression of ideas mirrors 
what is found in the tetrapharmakon. 
11 
 
A blessed and eternal being has no trouble himself and brings no trouble upon any other 
being; hence he is exempt from movements of anger and partiality, for every such 
movement implies weakness.
13
 
 
The true gods of philosophy are characterized by an immovable self-sufficiency. They have no 
reason to meddle in human affairs. Thus they truly “present no fears”—but we must also add that 
they present no grounds for hope.
14
 
The second part of the tetrapharmakon is, “death presents no worries.” This article 
complements and extends the point made in the first part. “Death presents no worries,” because 
there is no prospect of reward or punishment in the afterlife. This possibility is altogether 
excluded; the soul perishes along with the body. The Epicureans offered numerous arguments in 
support of this point. They were well aware that most human beings would resist the idea that the 
soul’s eternal death could be a consoling truth. Still, Epicurus taught, our annihilation at death 
should not frighten us: our nonexistence after death is no more intrinsically troubling than our 
nonexistence before birth—and who is disturbed by that?15 
                                                             
13  
KD 1, DL X.139 (LS 23E4). 
14  
Two things should be noted here. First, gratitude and vengeance are excluded, but what 
about caprice? Could the gods aid (or hinder) man simply on a whim? Would the Epicurean 
understanding of the divine nature exclude caprice as a motive? Consider Leo Strauss, “Notes on 
Lucretius,” in Liberalism Ancient and Modern, pp. 77-78, 99-100. Additionally, Epicurus would 
seem to commit himself to the view that happiness is can be achieved without divine 
benevolence—i.e. to tacitly assume the self-sufficiency of the “happy man” or Epicurean wise 
man (ho sophos). 
15  This is the famous “mirror argument” of Epicurus. For a critical response, see Thomas 
Nagel, “Death,” in Mortal Questions, pp. 7-10. Can the belief in an afterlife be consoling, rather 
than troubling? Epicurus might seem to presume, as a matter of human psychology, the 
preponderance of fear of punishment over any hope of reward. Alternatively, he might contend 
that fear and hope are both disturbances of the soul—i.e. both lead us to do things which we 
would not have chosen to do on a straightforward pleasure vs. pain analysis. 
12 
 
The third and fourth parts of the tetrapharmakon are best taken together: “while good is 
readily attainable, evil is readily endurable.” Again, the purpose of the formula is to eliminate the 
sources of human anxieties. Men think that they need to acquire great honors or wealth or 
political office—difficult things!—in order to be secure. Their lives are filled with constant 
worry while they try to obtain these empty “goods” and avoid the corresponding “evils.” But true 
good and true evil are much closer at hand. In fact Epicurus says that the infant will know what 
they are: the good is pleasure, and the evil is pain.
16
 
The strategy of Epicurean philosophical propaideutic is to eliminate the false beliefs 
about good and evil which cause us unnecessary anxiety and suffering. The infant may intuit the 
basic character of the good, but philosophy is needed before that intuition can flourish into 
“happiness” or eudaimonia. The infant does not realize that some pleasures are accompanied by 
greater pains—just as some pains open the way to experiencing greater pleasures. What we need 
is a calculating approach that selects pleasures and pains as necessary with a view to maximizing 
the long-term preponderance of pleasure over pain. Philosophy facilitates this calculating 
approach by making distinctions among our desires. It reveals—perhaps surprisingly—that many 
of the things people most eagerly struggle to obtain are in fact neither natural nor necessary. 
At the same time, we attribute to temporary and minor pains a significance that they do 
not deserve. Epicurus argues that physical suffering, on its own, is unlikely to disrupt the happy 
life. If the pains are not too intense, it may even be possible to bear them happily. On the other 
                                                             
16  This is known as the “newborn argument,” or “cradle argument.” See DL X.137, and 
Cicero, De finibus, I.29-32 (LS 21A). See the discussion in Jacques Brunschwig, “The Cradle 
Argument in Epicureanism and Stoicism,” in The Norms of Nature, M. Schofield and G. Striker, 
eds., pp. 113-144, as well as my discussion of how this argument relates to specifically political 
philosophy in chapter two. 
13 
 
hand, if they are intense, they are certain to be over soon. In this context, he cited his own 
experience. While suffering from the kidney-stones which would eventually end his life, he 
wrote this note to his friend Idomeneus: 
I wrote this to you on that blessed day of my life which was also the last. Strangury and 
dysentery had set in, with all the extreme intensity of which they are capable. But the joy 
in my soul at the memory of our past discussions was enough to counterbalance all this. I 
ask you, as befits your lifelong companionship with me and with philosophy: take care of 
the children of Metrodorus.
17
 
 
Was Epicurus really able to enjoy “joy” on his deathbed? The question is almost irrelevant. The 
purpose of the note is to reiterate his claim that physical suffering, on its own, is nothing to fear 
or worry about. The danger, he thinks, is that we will attach to our suffering a mental 
significance which magnifies it out of proportion. Rather than doing this, Epicurus chooses to 
turn his mind to the memory of past discussions, while exhorting his friend to look after the 
children of his deceased student Metrodorus. Making proper arrangements for what will happen 
after his death provides a tangible pleasure to the philosopher during his remaining hours of life. 
It was characteristic of Epicurus to have been writing, even on his deathbed. He was a 
notoriously prolific author, and he left behind a philosophical corpus almost unparalleled in the 
ancient world.
18
 An ancient catalogue of his works has been preserved. It amounts to roughly 
three hundred scrolls. None of these works survive in anything approaching a state of completion. 
Still, it is possible to learn something by reviewing the list of titles. Of all the works of Epicurus, 
                                                             
17  
DL X.22 (LS24D). 
18  
DL X.26-28. Only the Stoic Chrysippus is said to have written more—allegedly out of a 
desire to surpass Epicurus. 
14 
 
the longest and most important was, as I have mentioned, Peri phuseōs, which ran to a 
remarkable thirty-seven scrolls in length.
19
 
The Garden prospered after Epicurus’ death, becoming a model for similar Epicurean 
communities scattered throughout the Mediterranean. At some point—perhaps during the late 
second or early first century B.C.—the Epicurean school began to acquire adherents in the 
Roman world. Cicero reports that Epicurean philosophy had become very popular during the 
waning years of the Republic. Archaeological discoveries confirm his account of the school’s 
widespread popularity, and suggest that it made a lasting contribution to Roman and Greek 
intellectual life. More than a century after Cicero’s death, an Epicurean library in the town of 
Herculaneum was buried in volcanic ash during the eruption of Mount Vesuvius. The charred 
scrolls of the so-called “Villa of the Papyri” were rediscovered in the eighteenth century, and 
have since become an important resource for scholars working to understand the Epicurean 
school. Halfway across the Mediterranean, at Oenoanda, in modern-day Turkey, the text of a 
monumental Epicurean inscription dating from the mid- to late-second century A.D. is gradually 
being reconstructed. This inscription was commissioned by a wealthy man named Diogenes who 
wished to leave his fellow-citizens a lasting testament to the philosophy which had enabled him 
to enjoy true happiness. All in all, the available literary and archaeological evidence suggests that 
Epicurean philosophy flourished for approximately five hundred years. 
Little survives of Peri phuseōs, or of the rest of Epicurus’ once-voluminous body of 
writings.
20
 We have three long letters, reportedly by Epicurus, which summarize the different 
                                                             
19  
Sedley, Lucretius and the Transformation of Greek Wisdom, pp. 94-133, provides a 
summary of what is currently known about the structure and content of Peri phuseōs. 
15 
 
parts of his philosophy. These are preserved in a biography by Diogenes Laertius—which also 
contains the list of maxims that has been collected under the title Kuriai doxai. Everything else 
that survives is fragmentary. Recent work has greatly expanded our collection of Epicurean 
fragments. In the ashes of Herculaneum, several scrolls containing individual books of Peri 
phuseōs have been found. The chapter beginnings, which were placed on the outside of the rolls, 
are without exception illegible; they were carbonized during the eruption of Mount Vesuvius. 
Portions of the insides of the rolls have been recovered, however, and, bit by bit, they continue to 
be edited and published. 
For the most part, the works of Epicurus’ followers fared little better. There is only one 
work of significance that survives in anything like a state of completion. Fortunately, it is not 
only almost complete, but also, indubitably, a masterpiece. This is the Latin poem of Lucretius. 
Because of its completeness and intrinsic merit, DRN will be for us, as it was for thinkers from 
the renaissance onward, the single most important resource for understanding Epicurean 
thought.
21
 This is true despite the difficulties in taking Lucretius as a source for Epicureanism; 
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Sedley estimates that we possess less than one percent of what Epicurus wrote. See 
Lucretius and the Transformation of Greek Wisdom, p. 86, n. 108. 
21  Leo Strauss calls DRN, “[t]he greatest document of ancient conventionalism and, in fact, 
its only document available to us that is both authentic and comprehensive.” See Natural Right 
and History, pp. 111-112. Others have raised the question of Lucretius’ possible source—or 
sources. Did Lucretius work from a single text? For opposing views, contrast Diskin Clay, 
Lucretius and Epicurus, pp. 13-53, with David Sedley, Lucretius and the Transformation of 
Greek Wisdom. For a recent attempt to arbitrate the dispute, see Joseph Farrell, “Lucretian 
Architecture: The Structure and Argument of the De Rerum Natura,” in The Cambridge 
Companion to Lucretius, S. Gillespie and P. Hardie, eds., pp. 73-91. To summarize, the 
defenders of Clay’s position can point to some clear rearrangements of the order of Peri 
phuseōs—if this is indeed the source text that Lucretius is working from. Sedley’s side-by-side 
comparison, on the other hand, does seem to suggest fruitful hypotheses regarding the rationale 
of these rearrangements. Neither side has a conclusive argument; barring further discoveries, the 
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although Lucretius wrote a poem (which Epicurus never did, and advised against), wrote it in 
another language than Epicurus, and wrote almost two and a half-centuries after Epicurus’ death, 
there is still good reason to think that Lucretius was, in spirit, very faithful to Epicurus’ vision.22 
There are other reasons to value DRN as a textual resource. It is my belief that much of 
the existing literature is insufficiently concerned with the threat of persecution faced by the 
Epicureans—or, indeed, by any ancient thinkers who might plausibly be associated with atheism 
or religious heterodoxy. Lucretius directly confronts this threat. At the beginning of book I, he 
explicitly responds to the charges of impiety he expects to face. Furthermore, Lucretius 
addresses his poem to a non-Epicurean, Memmius, with the stated intention of converting him to 
Epicureanism. Because of the poem’s attention to the threat of persecution, and the project of 
conversion, it appears more attuned to the political dimension of speculative and theological 
matters than any other Epicurean text. Hence it directly addresses many of the concerns of the 
present study. The somewhat paradoxical corollary is that DRN, read judiciously, may contain 
more that is unsettling and heterodox than the works of Epicurus themselves.
23
 
                                                                                                                                                                                                    
debate will remain unresolved. Regardless of the debate's conclusion, however, scholars seem 
increasingly inclined to view Lucretius as a faithful and comprehensive expositor of Epicurean 
doctrine. 
22  
At one point, Lucretius speaks of himself as planting his feet in the footsteps Epicurus 
had left for him, and he contrasts himself as a “swallow” or “kid” to Epicurus’ “swan” or “horse.” 
See DRN III.1-ff. In keeping with these images, Sedley, in Lucretius and the Transformation of 
Greek Wisdom, argues that Lucretius can be seen as a defender of Epicurean orthodoxy, and 
finds that the text of Lucretius’ poem tracks very closely to what we now know about the 
structure and content of Epicurus’ magnum opus. For further discussion of the question of the 
relation of Epicurus and Lucretius, see chapters two and three, below. 
23  Strauss’s “Notes on Lucretius” and Nichols’s Epicurean Political Philosophy are good 
guides to the political implications of Lucretius’ esoteric text. The present study is deeply 
indebted to both. If more of Epicurus’ writings had survived, we might find that he was no less 
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The fragments of Epicurus serve as vital supplements for my reading of Lucretius, but 
they must be taken with some degree of caution, for they lack the context that is often required to 
distinguish shades of meaning. Likewise, the letters are explicitly said to be synoptic and are 
often incomplete in important respects. 
It is fortunately possible to supplement the paucity of ancient Epicurean sources with a 
fairly substantial ancient literature on Epicureanism. The works of Cicero, for example, contain a 
great deal of information on various aspects of Epicurean thought. As a young man, Cicero 
studied in Athens with the Epicurean scholarch Zeno of Sidon.
24
 His friend, Atticus, was a 
follower of Epicurean philosophy. And, for what it is worth, Cicero is reported to have edited 
DRN for publication after Lucretius’ untimely death.25 Cicero had ample acquaintance with 
Epicureanism, and it shows in the philosophical discussions that appear in his dialogues. The 
most prominent for our purposes are the discussion of hedonism in De finibus (On Moral Ends), 
the discussion of utility in book II and III of De officiis (On Duties), and the discussion of 
Epicurean religion and the Epicurean account of the gods in De natura deorum (On the Nature of 
the Gods). Cicero’s position in these dialogues is generally critical or anti-Epicurean (just how 
                                                                                                                                                                                                    
concerned with esotericism. The surviving portions of Peri phuseōs appear to be substantially 
devoted to the private concerns of the Epicurean school and seem to recount Epicurus’ own 
wanderings and changes of position—characteristics which are certainly compatible with some 
degree of circumspection. See Clay, Lucretius and Epicurus, p. 57. 
24  
See the reference to Zeno of Sidon in De natura deorum, I.21; also compare Tusculan 
Disputations, III.17. 
25  
Ad Quintum, II.10 is one of our very few ancient sources which mention “the poem of 
Lucretius.” 
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critical—and whether unfairly critical—is a matter for scholarly debate) but it is not plausible to 
argue that Cicero was ill-informed.
26
 
Plutarch discusses Epicurean philosophy in a number of his moral essays. Again, his 
position is critical—at times harshly polemical—but he remains an important source for many 
aspects of Epicurean thought. For example, his essays are the only source to preserves Epicurus’ 
maxim “live unnoticed” (lathē biosas)—a phrase with important political implications. 
Various other fragments of Epicurus and Epicureans survive. Perhaps the most significant 
for our study is a long excerpt from Hermarchus’ lost work Against Timocrates, which has been 
quoted in Porphyry’s On Abstinence from Animal Flesh. In this passage, Hermarchus discusses 
the Epicurean theory of human social origins, a topic which, as we shall see, plays a considerable 
role in our understanding of Epicurean political philosophy.
27
 
A final category of Epicurean texts is comprised of those unavailable until recent times. 
These include the inscription of Diogenes of Oenoanda, which is still being transcribed and 
translated, as well as the large number of texts being recovered at the Villa of the Papyri in 
Herculaneum—among them, several damaged scrolls containing portions of Epicurus’ Peri 
                                                             
26  For defenses of Cicero’s overall reliability and accuracy, see Philip Mitsis, Epicurus’ 
Ethical Theory: The Pleasures of Invulnerability, pp. 7-8, 73; and Walter Nicgorski, “Cicero, 
Citizenship, and the Epicurean Tradition,” in Cultivating Citizens, D. D. Allman and M. D. 
Beatty, eds., pp. 3-28. The opposing view is taken by Brad Inwood “Rhetorica Disputatio: The 
Strategy of De Finibus II,” in The Poetics of Therapy, M. Nussbaum, ed., pp. 123-164. For a 
critical discussion of Cicero’s treatment of Epicurean justice, in particular, see Paul A. Vander 
Waerdt, “The Justice of the Epicurean Wise Man,” The Classical Quarterly 37.2 (1987), pp. 
402-422. I respond directly to Vander Waerdt’s specific claims in chapter four. 
27  
The best discussion of this fragment of Hermarchus is found in Paul A. Vander Waerdt, 
“Hermarchus and the Epicurean Genealogy of Morals,” Transactions of the American 
Philological Association 118 (1988), pp. 87-106. 
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phuseōs, as well as fragments of works by later Epicureans such as Zeno of Sidon and 
Philodemus. These will not figure very prominently in the present study, since they were 
unavailable to the early modern thinkers responsible for the recovery and revival of Epicurean 
philosophy during the renaissance. Still, I will point out some cases in which they seem to 
support my interpretation of Epicurean philosophy. 
We do not know when the Epicurean community in Athens was finally dissolved. After 
the second century A.D., there is little evidence of a continuing Epicurean tradition. As 
Christianity spread across the Mediterranean, Epicureanism seems to have gradually disappeared. 
But it was not forgotten. For thinkers such as Tertullian, Lactantius, and Augustine, 
Epicureanism served as a philosophical foil, and as a reminder of the dead-end character of 
classical philosophy. To the extent that Christian thinkers gradually came to an accommodation 
with the ancient philosophical tradition, it was a tradition purged of almost any remnant of 
Epicureanism. 
In some respects, this particular animus against Epicureanism appears unjustified. 
Augustine, especially, seems to have recognized that all ancient schools of philosophy were 
deeply problematic from the Christian point of view—but that, within this context, there were 
large swaths of Epicurean philosophy were no more unacceptable than the Stoic or Platonist 
alternatives. 
Augustine’s insight would not be fully fleshed out for roughly one thousand years. In 
1417 Poggio Bracciolini, Florentine and papal secretary, discovered a manuscript of DRN in the 
library of a German monastery, and had a copy made for himself. At around the same time, a 
complete Greek text of DL was brought to Florence. These materials would facilitate a centuries-
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long reassessment of Epicurean philosophy, in which (or so I shall claim) Epicurean political 
philosophy gained new regard—in part because its teachings regarding “love of honor” were 
recognized as being harmonious with Christian skepticism regarding worldly glory. 
 
Outline of the argument 
For many outside observers, one of the distinguishing features of Epicurean school was 
its success at preventing breakaway movements and defections. Arcesilaus, head of the Platonic 
Academy, was once asked why other schools lost members to the Epicureans, but it was very 
unusual—virtually unheard of—for an Epicurean to become a Stoic or a Platonist. His reply was: 
“You can turn a man into a eunuch, but you can’t turn a eunuch into a man again.” 
An amusing witticism—but is it, in any sense, more than just a witticism? One of the 
goals of the present study is to explore the possibility that Arcesilaus’ reply represents a 
superficial manifestation of a serious and sincere critique of Epicurean political philosophy. This 
critique will be explored more thoroughly in later chapters, beginning with chapter two; setting it 
aside for the time being, I return to the observation that Epicureanism seems to have been 
uniquely resistant to internal change. It never produced a “second founder,” as the Stoics did 
with Chrysippus, or the Platonists did on several occasions. Lucretius, the philosopher and poet 
who is, in my view, the greatest thinker ever produced by the Epicurean school, notwithstanding 
his great art and great abilities, does seems to possess something of the character of a 
“fundamentalist”—to use David Sedley’s terminology. It would be misleading, however, to think 
that because Epicurean thought is so dogmatically consistent, or because the historical 
representatives of the school show such enduring doctrinal discipline, Epicureanism is therefore 
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a philosophy which lacks significant internal tensions, or significant potential for differences of 
opinion—which, after all, might be developed either within or outside of the “official” Garden-
tradition. As I hope to show in this study, there are significant fault lines in the Epicurean 
account of man and the world—although many of them were not clearly articulated until long 
after the Garden’s end, when humanist thinkers of the renaissance began to grapple with 
Epicurean ideas in a changed theologico-political context. 
The major claims of this study can be summarized as follows: I argue that Epicureanism 
has a political philosophy, but not a political theory. By this I mean the following: Epicureanism 
puts forward a comprehensive view of human nature, of the nature of politics, of the good life, 
justice, the common good, and of the relationship of politics to philosophy—in other words, a 
political philosophy. On the other hand, Epicureanism puts forward no theory of the best regime, 
no account of the regime as such, no prescriptive theory of citizenship, no positive account of 
paideia or political education—in short, no political theory, narrowly construed. 
Epicurus divides philosophy into three major parts: ethics, physics, and canonic—with 
canonic, or theory of knowledge, generally being regarded as a subcategory of physics. The 
interesting thing about Epicurean political philosophy is that it appears to derive from both sides 
of the ethics-physics boundary. To put it somewhat differently: the core teaching of Epicurean 
ethics is hedonism—a eudaimonistic form of hedonism, which distinguishes between pleasures, 
and regards as life’s ultimate objective the sustained preponderance of pleasure over pain over 
the duration of one’s life as a whole. The question for Epicurean political philosophy is whether 
justice and concern for the common good can be defended on these hedonistic grounds. Epicurus 
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asserts that they can, but later thinkers, including Cicero, would challenge his claim. These 
attacks, while not indisputably successful, would prove to be highly influential. 
On the other side, the core teaching of Epicurean physics is that we have nothing to 
fear—or, to be more precise, that we have nothing to fear from the gods. Religious fear is the 
most distressing of all human fears, and Epicurus, who discovered the only effective remedy for 
religious fear, is thus the greatest of all the benefactors of mankind. Epicurus has sometimes 
been accused of being an atheist. This is misleading, in my view; he seems to have been willing 
to grant the existence of a multitude of gods—but he insisted that they would never take an 
interest in human life for any reason. The universe as a whole is infinite and purposeless, and 
within this framework Epicurean political philosophy must again consider the question of 
whether justice and concern for the common good can be defended. Political philosophy must 
also consider the question of how human communities came to be in the absence of—what had 
traditionally been assumed—a divine creator and legislator. Epicurus and his followers attempted 
to answer these questions, and, again, later thinkers such as Cicero put forward influential 
criticisms of their efforts. 
This brief overview leads me to the second major claim of my study: that Epicureanism 
cannot be reduced to ethics or to physics simply. It is a comprehensive system of philosophy 
with at least two irreducible and coequal premises—the premises which I have already identified, 
namely, eudaimonistic hedonism, and the critique of religious fear. Interpreters have sometimes 
suggested that Epicurean ethical hedonism can be derived from Epicurean atomistic physics. But 
I believe that any attempt to actually do so will fail. Pleasure and pain are not themselves 
inherent in the atoms or their motions—no more than color is. They exist on the level of human 
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consciousness, and this, Epicurus insists, is the level we are most immediately concerned with. 
The goodness of pleasure and the badness of pain are immediately apparent facts, on the 
Epicurean view—and as such, they stand prior to any inquiry into the natural world, and into 
their own physical bases. 
On the other side, an interpreter might argue that the Epicurean account of physics—
which reaches its final culmination in the critique of religious fear—could be derived from the 
demands of Epicurean eudaimonistic hedonism. On this view, the full account of the natural 
world, from blind atoms to indifferent gods, is designed so as to console our fears, and not 
because it represents the truth of things. This argument—or so I would claim—also fails to 
persuade. The poem of Lucretius teaches that the Epicurean account of the nature of things is not 
sweet simply, or even primarily. It is bitter medicine, to use Lucretius’ most famous image. 
Furthermore, as Lucretius would have been quick to note, consoling fictions lose their power to 
console, after they have been recognized and admitted to be fictions. 
These are the brief arguments for the claim that the Epicurean system cannot be reduced 
to ethics or to physics simply; I will present longer arguments over the course of this work as a 
whole. To prepare the way for this longer discussion, I will here observe that ethics and physics 
both interact, in differentiable ways, with the Epicurean account of politics. In other words, it is 
possible to distinguish an ethically-derived political philosophy and a physically-derived political 
philosophy, and the two can be usefully drawn out and contrasted. One sign of this can be seen in 
the fact that Epicurus discusses politics once in his letter concerning ethics, and again—rather 
differently—in his letter concerning physics. The twofold character of Epicurus’ teaching 
concerning politics provides me with a justification for taking a twofold approach in the body of 
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this essay: in chapter two, I will consider politics from the perspective of eudaimonistic 
hedonism. Then, in chapter three, I will begin again from the perspective of atomistic 
materialism, and the Epicurean critique of religious fear. This line of inquiry continues on into 
chapter four, which will consider the second aspect of physically-derived political philosophy: 
the Epicurean and Lucretian account of the origin of political communities. 
This two-sided framework sets up the next major claim of my study: that political 
philosophy makes its own distinct and irreducible contributions to the Epicurean system. 
Epicurus is said to have declared, “I spit upon the noble and all those who vainly admire it, when 
it produces no pleasure.” The odd thing about this statement is that many of us would be inclined 
to say that performing, or even witnessing, a noble action produces a pleasure all its own. The 
“noble which produces no pleasure,” in other words, seems to be an empty category. According 
to those of us who hold this view there is—or can be, for a properly educated human being—a 
certain pleasure in knowing that one has done something fine and noble, even if this deed 
produces no other advantage. The point is a subtle one. Epicurus is intent on separating the 
noble from the pleasant—apparently in order to show that the noble as such is without intrinsic 
value. In his view, the desire to perform noble or praiseworthy deeds is an “unnatural, 
unnecessary desire,” and, as such, should be minimized or even extinguished. 
There is, I think, no obvious hedonistic reason to do this. Epicurus regards the most 
abstruse intellectual pleasures and the most earthly sensual pleasures as genuine, but he 
dismisses the pleasures associated with performing or witnessing noble and praiseworthy deeds 
as “empty.” As I will suggest in chapter two, this is because Epicurean hedonism borrows 
25 
 
important premises from an implicit anti-Platonic political psychology. Epicurus’ deprecation of 
the noble is tied to his deprecation of thumos—the spirited part of the human soul. 
This line of inquiry is taken up again in chapter four, where I consider the Epicurean 
account of human political origins, and the virtue of justice. Readers who are not yet acquainted 
with the Epicurean system of philosophy may be surprised to learn that Epicurus reasons his way 
from eudaimonistic-hedonistic premises to a full-blown defense of the traditional virtues—
wisdom, justice, moderation and courage. On the face of things, there seems to be a tension 
between the hedonistic roots of the system, and Epicurus’ practical advocacy of a classical roster 
of virtues. Critics of Epicureanism found the account of justice, in particular, to be problematic. 
Can a calculating self-interested hedonist really reason his way to a consistent adherence to the 
virtue of justice—even in cases where the virtue of justice appears to require self-sacrifice? 
Thus my argument, which begins by drawing theoretical and conceptual distinctions, 
ends by looking at the practical problems associated with the virtue of justice. As many 
commentators have noted, Epicurean philosophy is more than just a systematic account of the 
world and of man’s place within it. It is also a way of life—and Epicurus was admired by his 
followers as much for the example he left, as for the system of thought he propounded. For this 
reason, I think we need to take the dismissive remark of Arcesilaus very seriously. He recognizes 
that Epicurus’ living example compels many of his students to a powerful obedience, but warns 
us that if we take up his philosophy we may in the end be robbed of our thumos—and left 
truncated in spirit. 
Plato, in his Republic, connects the problem of justice to the problem of death and the 
fleeting character of worldly goods. Glaucon’s formulation of the problem in book II is 
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remembered for good reason: he wants Socrates to show that justice is something worth dying 
for. The conventionalist, as represented by Plato in the person of Thrasymachus, fails to take 
Glaucon’s desire into account. Epicurus is vulnerable to a similar criticism. The desire for 
transcendence through the practice of great deeds of self-sacrificial justice has no place in his 
philosophy—he soothes the potential “Glaucons” among us by denying it. 
At this point in the argument, we have come to the end of my chapter four, and the 
account of Epicurean political philosophy is now fully conceptualized. In the last two chapters I 
will consider the partial revival of Epicurean ideas in renaissance and early modern political 
philosophy. My reasons for doing this are, first, to test the idea, recently reasserted in a book by 
Stephen Greenblatt, that the recovery and dissemination of Epicurean texts—and particularly the 
text of Lucretius—helped to bring about the modern world. Second, I find that the history of the 
appropriation of Epicurean ideas may help us to identify some of the fault lines which I assert are 
present in the Epicurean system. 
I consider several historical attempts to “pick and choose” among Epicurean doctrines. 
Somewhat surprisingly, I show that the first Epicurean doctrine to be seriously reconsidered 
within a Christian moral and political context is eudaimonistic hedonism. Beginning with 
Lorenzo Valla, Epicurean hedonism is given a thoughtful and generally sympathetic reappraisal. 
This is not, I think, part of an effort to subvert Christian morality. Rather, it is an attempt to 
shore up Christian morality against new threats posed by the growing admiration for classical 
political models. Epicurean eudaimonistic hedonism offers a ready-made critique of these 
models—that is to say, of politics based around concern for the praiseworthy and noble. 
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For Christian thinkers such as Thomas More, Epicureanism is not Arcesilaus’ target, that 
is, “philosophy for eunuchs.” It is, instead, a plausible remedy for a moral problem of real 
contemporary urgency. The vanity and glory-seeking which More saw all around him, and which 
he feared might be exacerbated by the turn to classical—and especially Roman—political models, 
could be countered by a measured revival of Greek eudaimonism, in which Epicurean arguments 
play a prominent role. 
In the second half of chapter five, I turn to Machiavelli’s rather different response to 
Epicureanism. He can hardly be said to have internalized Epicurean ethical attitudes, with their 
heavy emphasis on withdrawal from politics. But he does appear to have been aware of them as 
an alternative—and, I argue (in agreement with recent work by Paul Rahe) he puts forward a sort 
of “internal critique” of them. In essence, Machiavelli finds that the Epicurean critique of 
religious fear does not inevitably lead to moderate ethical hedonism. In fact, the infinite and 
purposeless universe, as depicted in the poem of Lucretius, could just as easily motivate a policy 
of conquest and self-aggrandizement. 
Chapter six begins by considering a favorite charge of Hobbes’s contemporary critics: 
that he was an atheist and an “Epicurean.” These charges, though sometimes spurious, are shown 
to have a core of truth. The guiding intention of Hobbes’s scientific writings and scriptural 
interpretations—namely, the relief of man’s fear of “powers invisible”—is thoroughly Epicurean 
in character, and Hobbes’s quotations from Epicurean sources show that he was well aware of 
this connection. Hobbes was not a slavish follower of Epicurus, however. The second part of the 
chapter shows how, in his hands, Epicurean hēdonē became political. The transformation of 
ancient apolitical hedonism into modern “political hedonism” is most clearly seen in Hobbes’s 
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philosophy. On the one hand, he critiques moderate Epicurean hedonism; on the other hand, he 
replaces the self-regulation of the Epicurean wise man with the political regulation of 
unregulated appetites. Austere Epicurean hēdonē is replaced by a demotic “felicity,” and politics 
is given a necessary role in the realization of this felicity. 
 
Why does this matter? 
Why study Epicurean philosophy? The question is an especially pointed one for a 
political scientist. It cannot be on account of political influence, if we understand that to mean 
influence on political practice, ancient or modern; there is no evidence that Epicurus ever failed 
to observe his stringently apolitical policy of “living unnoticed” and “staying out of politics.” 
Nor is there any clear record of a member of his school, Greek or Roman, applying Epicurean 
teachings to the practical problems of political action.
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 To this one might contrast the Platonists, 
the Peripatetics, and even the Roman Stoics under the principate. In sum, Epicurean philosophy 
does not appear to contain any material of interest for the working politician—unless we 
consider his advice to “take early retirement” to be an example of such material. 
So why, then? One response is because of the strength of its philosophical claims. 
Epicurus’ account of human life, which subsumes his account of human politics, is so 
intrinsically compelling that it remains worthy of consideration even today—more than two 
millennia after he lived and wrote. Epicurus tells us that he has found the secret of human 
happiness. It is worth studying his philosophy, on the chance that he may have been right. 
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The case of Cassius, co-assassin of Caesar, is a difficult one, as is shown by David 
Sedley, “The Ethics of Brutus and Cassius,” Journal of Roman Studies 87 (1997), pp. 46-47. 
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Epicurus teaches us that there would not be any need to study philosophy, if we (that is to 
say, “we humans” or mankind generally) were not troubled by fears regarding cosmic and 
meteorological phenomena and by our failure to recognize the natural limits of our human needs. 
For Epicurus, philosophy is good because of what it produces—namely, peace of mind. It is not 
possible to attain peace of mind without investigating and answering the central questions of 
philosophy; but a further point must be noted: and that is, that, on this view, philosophy is not 
intrinsically desirable. For the true Epicurean, there is nothing good about the activity of 
philosophy in itself; it is, rather, the peace of mind that philosophy provides that is good and 
indeed, the good. 
A second response points to the striking similarities between Epicureanism and some 
modern theories and ways of thinking—for example, atomism, skepticism, the notion of 
philosophy as therapy, and so on. Such similarities doubtless exist—but one pitfall of this 
approach is that it encourages us to assimilate Epicurus to more familiar ways of thinking, and in 
doing this, we run the risk of leading ourselves astray. Worse, we lose touch with what is perhaps 
most valuable about reading Epicurus’ works (or, indeed, “old books” more generally) the 
opportunity that they provide to step outside—however briefly and imperfectly—our parochial 
opinions and the prejudices of our own time. 
A final response comes to light as we examine modern appropriations of Epicurean ideas. 
This project is worthwhile for the perspective it offers on the “theologico-political problem.” The 
term itself has come to prominence in recent years as a major theme—arguably the major 
theme—in the works of Leo Strauss. The “clash between reason and revelation,” with its all its 
political concomitants, constitutes a subject of great intrinsic importance. Epicurean philosophy 
30 
 
conceives of itself as a participant in this clash, engaged on the side of reason, against what 
Lucretius terms “religio.” Epicurean ways of framing this clash are always pointed, and always 
interesting. The Epicureans can be thought of as “reason’s” most radical ancient partisans. As a 
consequence, the close study of Epicurean philosophy has a small but significant role to play in 
furthering our understanding of the thought of Leo Strauss. Furthermore, the close study of the 
Epicurean reception, in Christian (or ostensibly Christian) thinkers of the early modern period 
contributes to the filling of a gap in the “theologico-political problem,” as Strauss himself 
presented it. Scholars have noted that Strauss rarely, if ever, devotes sustained close attention to 
the specific claims of the Christian revelation. The study of Christian appropriations of 
Epicurean philosophical thought thus makes a major contribution toward broadening the scope of 
our understanding of the “theologico-political problem.” 
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Chapter II: Politics and Pleasure 
In this chapter, I will show that Epicurus’ endorsement of a policy of nonparticipation 
and withdrawal from public life should not be taken as an indication that he and his school failed 
to reflect on political matters. To the contrary, the Epicurus’ system can be seen as an attempt to 
address important questions of political philosophy. The Epicurean account of pleasure is, at 
bottom, a political doctrine, and deserves to to be read alongside the accounts of pleasure found 
in more overtly “political” thinkers such as Plato and Aristotle. If this is done, the distinctiveness 
and originality of Epicurus’ contributions become readily apparent. The Epicurean school’s 
members—and many of its harshest ancient critics—were aware of the political underpinnings of 
the school’s philosophy of pleasure. 
My argument in this chapter has three main parts. First, I summarize the generally 
accepted view of Epicurus’ ethics, and show why his philosophy of eudaimonistic hedonism 
leads him to endorse nonparticipation and withdrawal from public life. This is politics viewed as 
a sort of “applied ethical hedonism.” Second, I introduce a complication: I argue that the widely 
accepted distinction between Epicurean hedonism and “vulgar” hedonism is misleading. On 
strictly Epicurean grounds there is no reason to distinguish between “higher” and “lower” 
desires—with one important exception. Epicurus claims that the desires relating to politics are 
“empty,” which leads him to advise that they not be satisfied. This stands in contrast to his 
general advice to satisfy the basic desires of sense, as well as the more refined desires of 
philosophy. In the chapter’s final part, I argue that the political psychology of Plato’s Republic 
suggests a satisfying explanation for the otherwise puzzling character of Epicurean hedonism. 
Epicurus rejects political desires because he is apprehensive of thumos, or “spiritedness,” 
32 
 
regarding it as a threat to political and philosophical ataraxia. Parts two and three of this chapter 
suggest that Epicurean politics must be seen as more than just “applied ethical hedonism.” 
Considerations of political psychology play an important role in the overall structure of 
Epicurean ethical philosophy, and contribute to Epicurus’ rejection of politics as a realm of 
“empty desires.” 
 
Live unnoticed 
Epicurus repeatedly and unambiguously asserts that pleasure is the good. In the Letter to 
Menoeceus he states that it is “the beginning and end of the blessed life,” and our “primary and 
congenital good.” It is the beginning of “every choice and avoidance,” and after we engage in 
any activity “we come back to [pleasure], using the feeling as the yardstick (kanōn) for judging 
every good thing.”29 This means that, for him, pleasure has not only a practical priority in our 
everyday decision making, but a cognitive priority in all of our reflections on good and bad. The 
cognitive priority, in particular, makes pleasure the proper starting point for any inquiry into 
Epicurean views on politics.
30
 The priority of pleasure is similarly evident in the first words of 
Lucretius’ poem. The poet invokes the goddess Venus, naming her the “mother of Aeneas' race,” 
and the “pleasure of men and gods.” It would seem that, just as the mythic Venus, mother of 
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Aeneas, is “the link between Romanism and Epicureanism,” so too Venus, personification of 
pleasure, is the link between the concerns of human life and the truths of Epicurean philosophy.
31
 
What is pleasure, exactly? Epicurus sometimes describes it in remarkably austere terms: 
“When we say that pleasure is the end, we do not mean the pleasures of the dissipated and those 
that consist in having a good time . . . [but rather] freedom from pain in the body and from 
disturbance in the soul.”32 In Epicurus’ view, freedom from pain (aponia) and freedom from 
disturbance (ataraxia) are not a middle state between pleasure and pain, but rather the very peak 
of pleasure.
33
 With respect to aponia and ataraxia, the Epicurean philosopher is said to approach 
the “self-sufficiency,” or autarkeia, of the gods themselves.34 
Pleasure is the good—but there are good reasons not to pursue every passing pleasure. 
Epicurus observes that some pleasures, if indulged, lead to greater long-term pain, and some 
pains, if endured, leads to greater long-term pleasure. As a consequence not every pleasure ought 
to be chosen, nor every pain avoided. The optimal strategy, he thinks, is one which weighs 
pleasures and pains—an activity which he calls “prudence” or phronēsis—with a careful eye to 
ensuring maximum pleasure over the course of one’s life as a whole.35 The resulting position can 
be thought of as eudaimonistic hedonism, or, even, virtue hedonism, since Epicurus asserts that 
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one must practice the traditional virtues of courage, moderation, wisdom, and justice in order to 
enjoy the greatest long-term pleasure: 
 [Prudence] teaches the impossibility of living pleasurably without living prudently, 
honorably, and justly, <and the impossibility of living prudently, honorably, and justly> 
without living pleasurably. For the virtues are naturally linked with living pleasurably, 
and living pleasurably is inseparable from them. 
36
 
 
Living pleasantly requires living virtuously, and living virtuously ensures living pleasantly. Thus, 
although on Epicurus’ view pleasure alone is intrinsically desirable, the prudent hedonist has 
good reason to practice justice and refrain from injustice in any conceivable circumstances. 
The critique of political participation follows directly from these first principles. Epicurus 
acknowledges one plausible hedonistic justification for engaging in politics, namely, the desire 
for asphaleia or “security.”37 He believes, however, that political participation is a demonstrably 
ineffective means of achieving security. In KD 7 he declares: 
Certain people wanted to become famous (endoxoi) and admired, thinking that they 
would thus acquire security (asphaleia) out of other men.
38
 Consequently, if such 
people’s life was secure, they did obtain nature’s good; but if it was not secure, they are 
not in possession of the objective which they originally sought after on the basis of 
nature’s affinity.39 
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Epicurus intends the conditional to be understood as a counterfactual: “If such people’s life was 
secure [which it was not], [then] they did obtain nature’s good [which they did not].”40Still, it is 
significant that he frames the question as one of determining the lifestyle best suited for 
obtaining security.  
The surviving discussions of the Epicurean account of political origins in DRN book V 
and the lengthy fragment of Hermarchus preserved by Porphyry confirm that the desire for 
security is the driving force in the origin and development of human political communities.
41
 
Furthermore, these political communities do succeed, at least in some measure, in answering the 
human desire for security—albeit not for those who “wanted to become famous and admired.”42 
Epicurus’ student Colotes makes our debt to these individuals explicit: 
Those who drew up laws and customs and established monarchal and other forms of 
government brought life into a state of much security (asphaleia) and tranquility 
(hēsuchia) and banished turmoil; and if anyone should remove these things, we would 
live a life of beasts, and one man on meeting another would all but devour him.
43
 
 
Thus it would seem that even the Epicurean philosopher, whose pleasure could in no way be 
increased by becoming famous and admired, might still obtain substantial benefits from living 
within a well-functioning political community. 
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The best-known piece of political advice with which Epicurus is associated is the maxim 
lathe biōsas, or “live unnoticed.” Plutarch was inspired to write an anti-Epicurean polemic 
literally entitled, “On Whether ‘Lathe Biōsas’ is a Wise Precept.”44 This essay gives valuable 
context for understanding Epicurus’ practical approach to politics. Plutarch’s most interesting 
criticism of Epicurus is that he “dishonestly”—literally, “unjustly”—courts fame and notoriety 
(doxa) with his advice to “live unnoticed.” In other words, Epicurus seeks fame by disparaging 
fame.
45
 This may seem frivolous, but one does not have to accept Plutarch’s argument in its 
entirety to agree that there is something conspicuously odd about Epicurus’ way of dealing 
fame—a point to which I will return later in this chapter. 
One of the Vatican Sayings gives an indication of Epicurus’ broader ethical outlook: “We 
must liberate ourselves,” he says, “from the prison of routine business and politics.”46 Here, not 
only politics is condemned, but also “routine business”—which includes activities in the public 
sphere which are not strictly speaking “political.” One thinks of the business of the Athenian 
Agora—and of Epicurus’ decision to locate his philosophical Garden outside of the city walls; a 
tacit rejection of Acropolis and Agora alike. Furthermore, Epicurus’ description of “routine 
business and politics” as a “prison” has surprising resonances: The word he uses for “prison,” 
desmōtērion, recalls Plato’s “prisoners” (demōteis), who are said to be “bound from an early age” 
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to the walls of the cave in Republic book VII.
47
 It would appear that, like Plato, Epicurus 
envisions the world of the polis as a prison, and all those inside it as prisoners. Philosophy—just 
as in Plato—can be thought of as “liberation” from involuntary captivity. 
To be sure, fundamental differences remain between Plato and Epicurus. While Epicurus 
announces in a passage from the KD that politics supplies crucial preconditions for the 
philosophic life, he does not suggest that the philosopher can (or should) return the favor by 
using his knowledge for the benefit of the community: 
When tolerable security out of other men
48
 is obtained, then on a basis of power sufficient 
to afford support and of material prosperity arises in most genuine form the security of a 
quiet private life withdrawn from the multitude.
49
 
 
The “security of a quiet private life withdrawn from the multitude” is meant to be associated with 
the life of philosophy, and it is portrayed as something good for its own sake, apart from any 
benefit it may provide to the political community. Indeed, any attempt to harness philosophy and 
use it for political ends will annihilate the security which serves as the philosophic life’s 
principal justification. One suspects that Epicurus would not acknowledge the incentive which, 
for Plato, serves to convince the best men to rule: the penalty of “being ruled by a worse man, if 
one is not willing to rule oneself.”50 The Epicurean philosopher accepts the rule of a worse man, 
in order to enjoy the fruits of his ability and willingness to rule himself.   
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The Epicurean teaching’s emphasis on the philosopher’s benefiting from a less-than-full 
participation in public life has a precedent in Socratic thought. In Xenophon’s Memorabilia, 
Aristippus, the student of Socrates, takes the position that it is better to live detached from the 
political community as a foreigner. Aristippus begins his argument by stressing the connection 
between private life and necessary needs on the one hand, and civic life and unnecessary needs 
on the other: “[I]t is quite senseless,” he says to Socrates, “that it not be enough for a human 
being to furnish himself with what he needs, although it is a lot of work, but instead to take on 
the additional task of procuring also for the rest of the citizens what they need.” Socrates 
responds that in choosing private life Aristippus is in fact choosing slavery. Aristippus, however, 
believes that there is a third option. “In my opinion,” he says, “there is a certain middle road 
between [master and slave], which I try to travel, neither through rule nor through slavery, but 
through freedom; and this road especially leads to happiness.” He goes on to explicitly associate 
this “middle path” with the life of a stranger or foreigner.51 Here, once again, the topic of 
freedom as “liberation from politics” is emphasized.52 
The life of a foreigner, who lives under the laws and benefits from them, but does not 
participate in the regime, matches quite well the narrowly circumscribed political participation 
endorsed by Epicurus. To quote from a collection of Epicurean opinions compiled by Diogenes 
Laertius: 
[The Epicurean wise man will not] make fine public speeches . . . He will marry and have 
children . . . but he will not engage in politics . . . or rule as a tyrant, or live as a Cynic . . . 
                                                             
51  
Xenophon, Memorabilia II.1.8-13. 
52  
Compare Socrates' statement in Plato, Apology, 32e; as well as the choice of the shade of 
Odysseus in Republic X, 620c-d. 
39 
 
[He will] bring lawsuits . . . He will be concerned about his property and the future . . . 
He will be concerned about his reputation, up to the point of ensuring that he will not be 
disparaged. He will set up statues but be indifferent about having one . . . He will make 
money, but only by his wisdom, if he is hard up. He will on occasion pay court to a 
king.
53
 
 
It is too simplistic to claim that Epicurus’ practical political advice reduces to non-
participation.
54
 As we see here, Epicurus in fact endorses a life that is a careful mixture of public 
and private. The best parallel is the “way of freedom” or “middle path” of the itinerant foreigner. 
The wise man willingly accepts the benefits provided by the city—namely, security, provision of 
resources, and legal process (including protection of private property)—but he eschews the 
harmful (albeit, for many, attractive) temptations of rule, tyranny, or (in sum) any sort of 
engagement in the regime. 
Lucretius gives a poetic presentation of the Epicurean teaching in DRN, book II. In what 
may be the poem’s most memorable image, he praises the state of the observer who gazes down 
upon the tribulations of others—an observer who sees, but is not touched by the tumults taking 
place below. 
Sweet it is, when on the great sea the winds are buffeting the waters, to gaze from the 
land on another’s great struggles; not because it is pleasure or joy that anyone should be 
distressed, but because it is sweet to perceive from what misfortune you yourself are 
free.
55
 
 
The concluding qualification is crucial. The philosopher’s distinctive “pleasure” or “joy”—the 
pleasure which he uniquely enjoys—is the pleasure of gazing on others caught up in great 
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struggles, while being himself at rest. It is an intellectual pleasure insofar as it depends upon the 
philosopher’s certain knowledge that he, in contrast to others, stands secure upon dry land. It is a 
reflective pleasure insofar as it requires not just the visibility of others, but an act of comparison 
with others in order to be savored. Ataraxia cannot shine forth as a true liberation if the 
“struggles”—the tarakhai—of other human beings are not conspicuously available for purposes 
of comparison. 
Lucretius’ image of a storm suggests that there is a natural source for the tumults that 
cause human struggles. This is, at least in part, true, as the poem’s account of physics in its 
relation to human life demonstrates. The necessary culmination of Lucretius’ materialist atomism 
is the bitter realization that, as Leo Strauss put it, “nothing lovable is eternal, and nothing eternal 
is lovable.”56 Epicurean physics shows that the things we care for are evanescent, and the natural 
order is vastly indifferent to, and ultimately destructive of, all human intentions and efforts. 
Lucretius, however, soon turns his gaze to the human causes of the tumults: the great 
conflicts of war and of politics. “Sweet it is too,” he writes, “to behold great contests of war in 
full array over the plains, when you have no part in the danger.” Given his frequent analogizing 
of the atomic microcosm to a clash of armies, it is fitting that this, the central image of the proem 
of DRN II, depicts the “great contests of war.” War, for Lucretius, is the middle term connecting 
natural reality and human reality. It is in terms of war that his intended audience first comes to 
see something of the ultimate character of nature.
57
 As Lucretius here implies, and later makes 
much more explicit, we have little ground to claim that we “take no part in the danger.” The 
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image here is different from the one Lucretius presents later in DRN II. “Mock conflict” may 
accurately characterize the clashes from the perspective of the atoms. They truly “have no part in 
the danger,” since they are indivisible. We, on the other hand—along with the world of human 
meaning in its entirety—constitute the stakes of the “great contests of war.” Even the Epicurean 
philosopher must expect to be consumed and destroyed in the atomic tumults—but Lucretius 
delays exploring this sad and sobering thought.
58
 
Lucretius concludes his discussion of Epicurean pleasure with an image which may be 
his clearest illustration of philosophic bliss. The greatest and most surpassing sweetness is not 
gazing down upon struggling ships or clashing armies, it is gazing upon men wandering, 
embroiled in the conflicts of politics. 
[N]othing is more gladdening than to dwell in the calm regions, firmly embattled on the 
heights by the teachings of the wise, whence you can look down on others, and see them 
wandering hither and thither, going astray as they seek the way of life, in strife matching 
their wits or rival claims of birth, struggling night and day by surpassing effort to rise up 
to the height of power and gain possession of the world.
59
 
 
These are the men who wanted to become “famous and admired” in Epicurus’ KD 7. But this 
passage from Lucretius has the virtue of raising a question which might not have appeared 
obvious to the reader of KD 7. What desires could possibly persuade men to pass their days and 
nights in fruitless struggle? Is it really security that political men are striving to obtain? If not, 
where did they get the false opinions that led them to participate in politics? 
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Extremes against the mean 
It is customary to distinguish Epicurean hedonism from so-called “vulgar” hedonism, and 
to deplore the centuries of hostile misrepresentation which have successfully muddled the two in 
the minds of most non-specialists.
60
 But scholarly readers and interpreters sometimes have 
trouble articulating this important distinction. The problem they face is that Epicurus’ own 
statements on the subject of pleasure do not always clearly distinguish him from a vulgar 
hedonist. We have already looked at Epicurus’ definition of pleasure as aponia and ataraxia. He 
expands upon the point in the immediately following passage. 
[Pleasure] is not continuous drinking and parties, or the sexual enjoyment of boys and of 
women, or the enjoyment of fish and the other dishes of an expensive table, but sober 
reasoning which tracks down the causes of every choice and avoidance, and which 
banishes the opinions that beset souls with the greatest confusion.
61
 
 
This seems to show that the Epicurean hedonist is not the vulgar caricature associated with the 
phrase, “Eat, drink and be merry, for tomorrow we die.” One wonders how this passage could be 
compatible with Epicurus’ notorious statement in a treatise entitled On the End: 
I cannot conceive of anything as the good if I remove the pleasures perceived by means 
of taste and sex and listening to music, and the pleasant motions felt by the eyes through 
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beautiful sights, or any other pleasures which some sensation generates in a man as a 
whole.
62
 
 
The tension between the “sober reasoning” of the Letter to Menoeceus passage, and the “crude 
sensualism” of the On the End passage has not been overlooked; Long and Sedley, for example, 
note the “defensive” and “attractively shocking” style of the latter, and of many of Epicurus’ 
other statements on the subject of pleasure. But while they suggest that Epicurus “anticipated 
opposition and misunderstanding from rival philosophers,” and imply that he deliberately placed 
“bait” which was eagerly accepted by his critics (especially the Stoics), I contend that it is 
possible to take Epicurus’ sensualist claims quite seriously—but only if we are willing to 
abandon the distinction between Epicurean hedonism and vulgar hedonism as it is traditionally 
understood.
63
 
The distinction dates back to Epicurus’ own lifetime. The biographer Diogenes Laertius 
reports that Timocrates, a onetime student of Epicurus, had a falling out with his teacher and 
subsequently accused him of vulgar hedonism in the extreme—for example, vomiting twice 
daily through overindulgence, consorting with prostitutes, and so on. Diogenes Laertius finds 
these accusations ridiculous. As he points out, the surviving accounts of Epicurus and his 
followers strongly suggest that the Epicurean notion of the pleasant life was not unrestrained 
consumption.
64
 Still, the possibility remains that, as Cicero argued, Epicurus lived better—more 
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moderately and more virtuously—than his philosophy entitled him to.65 Is there an intellectually 
rigorous way to distinguish the vulgar hedonist from the Epicurean? Does Epicurus put forward 
an idea of pleasure that is consistent with itself? 
Let us return to first principles. Epicurus repeatedly and unambiguously asserts that 
pleasure is the good.
66
 This means that pleasure alone is intrinsically desirable and all other 
things are desirable only through pleasure. It is an important consequence of this position that 
Epicurus must oppose any suggestion that the goodness of pleasure can be established by 
argument. Cicero’s Epicurean spokesman Torquatus explains the point: 
[T]here is no need to prove or discuss why pleasure should be pursued and pain 
avoided . . . these matters are sensed just like the heat of fire, the whiteness of snow and 
the sweetness of honey, none of which needs confirmation by elaborate arguments; it is 
enough to point them out.
67
 
 
The concern seems to be that, if Epicurus were to grant that the goodness of pleasure could be 
established by argument, he might also find himself conceding that “argument,” or reason, stands 
prior to pleasure. He might even find himself conceding that the good stands prior to pleasure.
68
 
Epicurus wishes to deny these claims. Thus, he consistently asserts that sensation provides the 
only standard of judgment, stating: “If you fight against all sensations, you will not have a 
standard against which to judge even those of them you say are mistaken.”69 
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The consequence, ethically speaking, is that Epicurus is opposed any attempt to judge the 
goodness of pleasure from a perspective extrinsic to pleasure. He grants that it is possible to 
weigh pleasures and pains against one another, but not that one could ever weigh pleasures and 
pains against other “goods” or “ills”—because on his view there are no other “goods” or “ills.” 
The goodness of pleasure cannot be demonstrated, but it can be illustrated through the 
use of examples—and it is in this context that Epicurus cites what has sometimes been known as 
the “newborn argument.” The name is somewhat misleading. Epicurus insists it must not be 
understood as an argument, but rather as a sort of illustration.
70
 All living creatures, before 
having any experience of life or of “the good,” seek pleasure as their first and innate good. 
Nature, so long as it has not been set astray by its upbringing, gives testimony to the truth of the 
Epicurus’ statement that the pleasant is the good. This is a truth which stands prior to any 
demonstration. 
The scholars who attempt to distinguish Epicurean hedonism from vulgar hedonism are 
right to suspect that Epicurus does, at bottom, admit of distinctions between different kinds of 
pleasures. However they are looking for distinctions in the wrong place. Epicurean pleasure is 
both austere and sensual. To speak of “higher” and “lower” pleasures is misleading, because the 
essence of Epicurean hedonism is the union of higher and lower pleasures against what may be 
termed the “middle” pleasures—that is to say, the pleasures relating to political recognition and 
honors. Only with regard to the pleasures of recognition does Epicurus unambiguously and 
categorically speak out against the satisfaction of desire. 
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In KD 29, Epicurus divides the desires (epithumia) into three classes. Some are “natural 
and necessary. Others are “natural, but not necessary.” Still others are “neither natural nor 
necessary but are due to empty opinion (kenēn doxan).”71 It is not clear which desires make up 
each class; perhaps this is why the following scholion is added to our manuscripts:    
Natural and necessary [desires] according to Epicurus, are ones which bring relief from 
pain, such as drinking when thirsty; natural but non-necessary are ones which merely 
vary pleasure but do not remove pain, such as expensive foods; neither natural nor 
necessary are ones for things like crowns and the erection of statues.
72
 
 
The point of the tripartite categorization of desires is the demotion of “unnatural unnecessary 
desires.” Epicurus claims that the longing for such things is “easily got rid of,” and there will be 
“no pain when they fail to be gratified.”73 The phrase “empty opinion” appears to suggest the 
absence of any natural basis for these desires; it may echo the image of “full vessels” and “leaky 
vessels” in Plato’s Gorgias: since members of the third class of desires have no natural basis, 
they prove in practice to be insatiable.
74
 In the same vein, Epicurus states that what is natural is 
easily obtained, but what is empty is hard to procure.
75
 
Should the “desires due to empty opinion” be identified with the desires for political 
recognition and honors? This is what the example given by the scholiast, namely, “crowns and 
the erection of statues,” implies. This interpretation would be in harmony with Epicurus’ advice 
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to “live unnoticed,” which takes on additional resonances when it is understood that “living 
unnoticed” means eschewing fame or “opinion” (doxa). Plutarch’s attack on Epicurus for 
courting doxa may seem a bit less frivolous in this light. If he were to show that Epicurus had 
written because of a desire to achieve fame, this would be truly damaging. It might suggest that 
Epicurus was a hypocrite whose actions were not consistent with his openly stated principles. 
One does not have to agree with Plutarch’s polemic, to agree that it works better, as polemic, if 
one assumes the account of Epicurean hedonism that is given here. 
 
Starving the lion, feeding the beast 
Epicurus regards the desire for political recognition as an “unnatural, unnecessary desire.” 
Some men are persuaded to seek recognition because they think it will provide them with 
security; these men are mistaken about the true sources of security. Other men seek recognition 
for its own sake, because they imagine that things like “crowns and the erection of statues” are 
choiceworthy in themselves; these men are in the grip of a dangerous and insatiable “empty 
opinion.” The desire for recognition is not natural, and no one suffers any pain if it fails to be 
gratified. When Epicurus tells his students to “live unnoticed,” he is not just giving them good 
practical advice—he is showing them how to properly order their souls. If they want to be happy, 
they must shun the realm of reputation or opinion (doxa). His ethical psychology teaches them to 
take pleasure in the moderate enjoyment of sensual things, and to apply their intellect to the job 
of debunking the false pleasures of recognition.
76
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Book IX of Plato’s Republic offers a very different view of the proper ordering of the 
soul. Socrates presents an “image of the human soul in speech,” divided into its gain-loving, 
spirited, and calculating parts. These parts are likened, respectively, to a many headed beast, a 
lion, and a human being. Each of the parts is said to experience a pleasure which is intrinsic to 
it.
77
 For the “lion”—i.e. the spirited or “thumotic” part of the soul—this pleasure comes from 
being awarded honors, winning victories, or expressing anger.
78
 On this model, the pleasures of 
recognition are not “unnatural” or “empty,” but the intrinsic pleasures of a distinct part of the 
human soul. To be sure, if the thumotic soul is given free rein, Socrates thinks it will run awry 
and fail to achieve what it desires.
79
 Still, he takes a more positive view of the lion than he does 
of the many-headed beast. This is part of a larger psychic strategy. Socrates contends that the just 
man ought to do and say those things from which the human being within “will most be in 
control,” and that this requires him to “take charge of the many-headed beast—like a farmer, 
nourishing and cultivating the tame heads, while hindering the growth of the savage ones.” 
Reason’s rule over the desiring soul is not quite as simple as this: the many-headed beast is 
larger and stronger than the human being, and in order to succeed in this project an alliance must 
be struck between reason and thumos. The human being must “make the lion’s nature an ally.”80 
Only when the man and lion are united do they possess the strength to take charge of the many-
headed beast. 
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Epicurus’ political psychology can be contrasted with this model. In Platonic terms, we 
could say that he is chiefly concerned with asserting the human being’s rule over the lion, rather 
than over the many-headed beast. The thumotic desire for receiving honors, winning victories 
and expressing anger must be starved. This desire is unnatural, and it will cause no pain if we fail 
to feed it. In agreement with Socrates, Epicurus argues that reason must exercise some degree of 
control over the many-headed beast; but he appears to think that the strategy of enlisting the lion 
as an ally is dangerous or unnecessary. The human being and the many-headed beast should 
instead unite against the lion. Epicurean psychology promotes a distinctive form of hedonism; 
we might call it “hedonism minus thumos”—or hedonism minus the distinctive pleasures of the 
thumotic part of the soul. 
This interpretation comports with Lucretius’ invocation of Venus in the opening lines of 
DRN. Lucretius appeals to the goddess (who must be understood in her higher and lower senses) 
for the specific purpose of calming Mars and causing his “wild works of warfare” to be lulled to 
sleep. Lucretius prays for “gentle peace for the Romans,” because it is the precondition for 
engaging in his own poetic task “with mind undistressed,” and also the precondition for his 
addressee Memmius to listen without the distraction of political exigencies.
81
 Again, this is 
human being and many-headed beast united against the lion. 
In sum, a distinguishing feature of Epicurean philosophy is the way in which it regards 
thumos with suspicion. The desire for political recognition is seen as a greater threat to 
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philosophy than the uncurbed sensual desires. If reason can determine a limit (peras), it would 
seem quite capable on its own of controlling the many-headed beast.
82
 
I have argued previously in this chapter that Epicurus is opposed to any attempt to judge 
the goodness of pleasure from a perspective extrinsic to pleasure. If so, then Epicurus’ 
categorical rejection of thumotic pleasures is surprising. It is only by stepping outside the 
experience of pleasure that he can stigmatize the pleasures of thumos as “unnatural and 
unnecessary.” Why would he think it necessary to starve the spirited part of the soul, instead of 
arguing, as Socrates does, that the spirited part of the soul can be put under reason’s control? I do 
not have a good answer to this question. Instead, I suspect that Epicurus’ rejection of thumotic 
pleasure functions as a sort of ethical axiom—an instance in which political philosophy supplies 
a foundational premise for Epicurean ethics. 
 
Conclusion: The splendor of moral virtue 
The reputed density and intricacy of Peri phuseōs notwithstanding, Epicurus had an easy 
way with words, and a controversialist’s sense for finding a provocative way to summarize his 
view. He once declared, “I spit upon (pros-ptuō) the noble (to kalon), whenever it produces no 
pleasure.” As this saying’s raw imagery would seem to imply, whatever is “noble,” “fine,” or 
“beautiful” is rejected or “spit outside” of his moral philosophy, unless it can justify being 
retained on strictly hedonistic grounds. Epicurus was critical of “the noble,” in part, because he 
recognized that noble actions and nobility of character, might seem to be choiceworthy for their 
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own sake, regardless of any increase of pleasure or diminution of pain they may procure for us. 
He understood that there seems to be a certain “splendor” to moral virtue—or to the willingness 
to make great sacrifices and endure great hardships for the sake of some higher end. If Aristotle 
is to be believed, this splendor of virtue can be depicted so compellingly as to inspire young and 
well-born characters to dedicate their lives to the pursuit of it.
83
 
Epicurus’ response is deflationary. To those who are inclined to be moved by depictions 
of great sacrifices and great acts of endurance, his imagery recalls the fickleness and 
conventionality of all human expressions of esteem. What is today reputed “noble,” may 
tomorrow be spit upon. The pursuit of virtue’s “splendor” is just another empty activity, like the 
pursuit “of crowns and the erection of statues.” Nor, as Epicurus would remind us, is there any 
pain, if these desires fail to be satisfied. 
To be sure, a little space remains for virtue, in the Epicurean account. The philosopher 
will practice all of the virtues, because he knows that being wise, just, moderate, and courageous 
is the prescription for maximum pleasure, considered over the span of his life as a whole. Indeed, 
awareness of his own virtuousness, and of the many enjoyments secured by that virtuousness, 
forms a not inconsiderable part of his happiness, considered generally. This, however, is virtue 
pursued on the basis of calculation, and there is no reason to think that anyone would be inspired 
by its splendor. 
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A final wrinkle remains: Epicurus and his followers devoted considerable attention to the 
speculative account of human social and political origins.
84
 If what I am saying is correct, this 
should come as no surprise. The accounts of human political origins found in classical political 
philosophy place great emphasis on the role of thumos.
85
 A primary object of the Epicurean 
account is to show how political society can come to be through pure calculation of interest, 
without undue reliance on thumos as an explanatory factor. Furthermore, the speculative account 
of human social and political origins might help to show how the desire for honors—“unnatural, 
unnecessary desire,” in the Epicurean schema—could come to implant itself in so many human 
souls. 
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Chapter III: The Indifferent Universe 
Many of the tenets of Epicurean physics have an identifiable prehistory in prior Greek 
thought.
86
 The most important—the notion that our universe is composed of atoms and void—
was originally proposed by Democritus (460-370 B.C.) and Leucippus (c. 5
th
 century B.C.). 
Cicero would make this the subject of one of his most influential criticisms: the valuable parts of 
Epicurus’ philosophy, he claimed, are not original, but stolen—with some modifications for the 
worse—from Democritus.87 Many later thinkers agreed with Cicero’s assessment. In fact, one 
factor motivating early modern interest in DRN and other Epicurean texts seems to have been the 
desire to get back to the allegedly superior, but fragmentary, atomism of Democritus. The 
persistence of this view is shown by the fact that it was still current in 1841, when Marx wrote 
his doctoral thesis, entitled The Difference between the Democritean and Epicurean Philosophy 
of Nature. Marx challenges the prevailing view—with the ultimate goal of vindicating Epicurus 
by showing his modifications to Democritean physics are, in fact, for the better.
88
 
The dismissive attitude toward Epicurean physics is sometimes tied to the notion that 
Epicurus’ system can be reduced to phusiologia—in other words, that Epicurus’ system is, in its 
entirety, derived from premises supplied by natural science. I believe that this view is mistaken, 
and that it provides an incomplete account of the sources of the Epicurean system. I have 
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presented some of my reasons in the preceding chapters; additional reasons will be presented in 
the current chapter. Still, I want to acknowledge at the outset that Epicurean natural science does 
have significant implications for human life and for political philosophy. One purpose of this 
chapter will to draw out some of these implications. 
Because the tenets of Epicurean natural science have an easily identifiable prehistory, it is 
possible to regard them as a revival of pre-Socratic views against certain “cosmological 
innovations” introduced by Plato and Aristotle. As Friedrich Sollmsen puts it: 
With regard to . . . issues [such as the nature of the Soul and the eternity of the Universe], 
Epicurus would think of the Platonists as committing something like intellectual treason 
by taking their stand on the side of popular misconceptions and superstitions and giving 
them vigorous support in the form of elaborate theories and arguments.
89
 
 
This seems to me correct—but potentially misleading. Epicurean natural science must be 
supplemented by an Epicurean account of the purpose of natural science. It is true that Epicurus 
thinks of the Platonists as committing “something like intellectual treason,” but this is not on 
account of his own belief in the integrity of the scientific enterprise—quite the contrary. 
Epicurus instructed his followers to take a mercenary attitude toward scientific “truth.” I have 
already pointed out his principle of “multiplicity of possible explanations”—his belief that 
providing several explanations for a single physical event was preferable to providing just one, 
since it was more likely to compel persuasion. In the Letter to Menoeceus, he suggests that it 
would be better to “believe the false myths about the gods” than to be “enslaved to the 
determinism of the physicists.” The problem he perceives is that a rigorous necessity (anankē) or 
“determinism”—of the sort associated with Democritus—undermines human freedom, and with 
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it the grounds for praise and blame of actions. The myths of the gods at least “hold out some 
faint hope that we may escape if we honor [them], while the necessity of the physicists is deaf to 
all entreaties.”90 
The principle, generalized, is that the conclusions of natural science ought to be rejected 
if they undermine human happiness conceived as ataraxia—we would be better off believing the 
“myths of the gods.” But, as he does elsewhere, Epicurus states his point as a counterfactual. As 
it so happens (or so Epicurus believes) the conclusions of natural science support ataraxia—by 
showing, for example, that our apparent freedom is real, and that the alarm we feel at strange and 
unexpected celestial phenomena is unjustified. In Epicurus’ view, it is not the truth as such that 
sets us free, but the particular truth that there is no reason for fear.
91
 
Stated differently, the philosopher engages in natural science not out of a “desire to 
know,” but out of a particular, felt need to relieve “fears of the mind.” Epicurus describes these 
as, “the fears inspired by celestial phenomena, [the] fear of death, [and the] fear of pain.”92 Only 
by means of natural science can these fears can be conclusively refuted.
93
 Epicurean physics is 
consequently dogmatic—in contrast to the skepticism of Democritus or Protagoras. It is 
necessary to have secure knowledge in order to achieve ataraxia. It is not sufficient to say, “I 
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reserve judgment,” or, “I cannot make up my mind.” Uncertainty about life, death, and the 
fundamental character of the universe provides an inadequate basis for peace of mind.
94
 
Thus it is wrong to read Epicurean physics as a straightforward revival of pre-Socratic 
phusiologia against the “cosmological heresies” introduced by Plato and Aristotle. To the extent 
that Epicurus revives the tenets of pre-Socratic physics, he transforms them by putting them to 
use in the service of an ethical outlook which is motivated by happiness conceived as ataraxia. 
For this reason, Ludwig Edelstein is right to describe the Epicurean system as the “entelechy” 
(we might say, the “being-at-work-staying-itself”) of pre-Socratic ideas.95 Epicurus extends and 
completes the physics of Democritus and the pre-Socratics by “putting it to work” within a 
project of human liberation via philosophy. It is with an eye to these matters that Benjamin 
Farrington defines Epicureanism as “a refurbishing of the atomism of Democritus by a follower 
of Socrates.”96 
One may detect in this the influence of the Socratic question: “how ought one to live?” 
This question is at the very heart of Epicurean philosophy, just as it was at the heart of Socratic 
philosophy. From this it follows that Epicurus’ criticism of Plato and Aristotle—his judgment 
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that they commit something like “intellectual treason”—must be referred back to his 
disagreement with the mainstream of Socratic thought as regards the right way of life. Epicurus 
does not take issue with classical political philosophy because it defends “popular 
misconceptions and superstitions.” He takes issue with classical political philosophy because the 
particular misconceptions and superstitions which it defends prevent men from achieving 
ataraxia. Socrates is “zetetic” or constantly inquiring; Epicurus is dogmatic—because he judges 
that only certainty can eliminate fear and unease. And while Socrates is animated by a desire for 
wisdom that is in some sense “erotic,” Epicurus is animated by a desire for ataraxia—a state of 
being which exists only when the desire for wisdom, along with all other desires, has fallen silent. 
 
The Socratic turn 
In Plato’s Phaedo, Socrates gives us an intellectual autobiography of sorts. He says that 
as a young man he was “wondrously desirous of that wisdom which they call ‘inquiry into nature’ 
(historia peri phuseōs).” He wished “to know the causes (aitiai) of each thing and why each 
thing comes to be and why it perishes and why it is.”97 As Socrates indicates, the search for the 
causes and origins (archai) of things was a well-established field of inquiry. The first Greek 
“inquirer into nature” or phusikos, was the semi-legendary figure, Thales—who was best known 
for having predicted a solar eclipse.
98
 Thales showed that an unusual and spectacular event was 
predictable, and in fact followed a regular, foreseeable schedule. On the same model, the young 
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Socrates sought to understand the phenomena of heaven and earth, but he found instead that his 
inquiry into nature produced “blindness,” and caused him to unlearn things he once thought he 
knew. His curiosity seems particularly to have pertained to living beings, in their organization, 
perception, and capacity for knowledge. The difficulties he faced seem to have pertained to these 
same questions. Socrates says that he used to think, in his simple-minded way, that a human 
being grows by eating and drinking. But now, he says, “I do not even persuade myself that I 
know why . . . [anything] comes to be or perishes or is by this way of proceeding.”99 Pre-Socratic 
inquiry into nature appears to have reached a skeptical dead end. 
It was at this point, Socrates recounts, that he overheard somebody reading a book by 
Anaxagoras, in which it was written that “Mind” (nous) puts the world in order and is 
responsible for all things. At first, Socrates was pleased with this sort of argument. He imagined 
that the causality of Mind would “order all things and position each thing in just that way which 
was best.”100 But when he read the book for himself, Socrates found that Anaxagorean Mind—
contrary to his initial assumption—had no place for an account of the best: “I saw a man who 
didn’t employ Mind at all and didn’t hold any causes responsible for putting things in order, but 
instead put the blame on air and ether and water and other things many and absurd.”101 To 
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borrow the terminology of Aristotle, Anaxagoras describes Mind as an efficient cause, but 
neglects to describe a formal or a final cause.
102
 
Once again, Socrates judges the failure of pre-Socratic “inquiry into nature” to 
specifically pertain to its failure to account for living, purposeful beings: it is, he claims, as if 
someone were to say that Socrates sits in his jail cell on account of muscles, bones and sinews—
material causes—instead of on account of his “Mind” or intelligence.103 Socrates’ allusion to his 
imprisonment adds an element of moral seriousness to what might have seemed a lighthearted 
mockery of the obtuseness of pre-Socratic inquiry into nature: the failure of Anaxagorean Mind 
to account for Socrates’ decision to remain and face his sentence is not only laughable—it is also, 
in this particular context, deadly serious. 
It is the failure of Anaxagorean Mind that leads Socrates to embark on what he calls his 
“second sailing in search of the cause.”104 No longer will he risk “soul-blindness” by looking 
directly at beings with his eyes and “attempting to grasp them by each of the senses.” To do so 
would be to risk suffering “the very thing those people do who behold and look at the sun during 
an eclipse.” Just as it is safer for them to look at the sun’s “likeness in water or some other such 
thing,” so Socrates will “take refuge in accounts (logoi) and look in them for the truth of 
beings.”105 It is the turn to “accounts” or logoi that Socrates identifies as the specific difference 
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between his own, mature mode of inquiry, and the mode of those before him who had inquired 
into nature. 
From this perspective, Epicurean physics may seem to be the final and definitive 
statement of pre-Socratic inquiry into nature: a return to the “first sailing” of Anaxagoras and the 
young Socrates. It too is concerned to know “the causes of each thing and why each thing comes 
to be and why it perishes and why it is,” and it begins by asserting things which are not evident 
(to adēlon), but which have a respectable history in pre-Socratic physiology: that nothing comes 
to be out of nothing, that nothing perishes into nothing, and that the totality of things (to pan) 
was always and will be such as it is now.
106
 From these first principles, Epicurus derives his 
account of the causes of each thing and of its generation and destruction and why it is. This 
account can be briefly summarized. The whole (to pan) is infinite, and unchanging with respect 
to generation and destruction. The “simple bodies” or atoms are infinitely hard, unchanging, and 
imperceptible. Void exists between the atoms—for how else could motion be possible? 
Everything that is, is either atoms, or void, or some property or accident of atoms and void. All 
motion is the consequence of the atoms’ three intrinsic tendencies to motion: to descend at a 
constant rate, to rebound from collision, and—only occasionally—to “swerve” with respect to a 
straight-line path. 
Every case of generation and destruction can be referred to motion and to a material 
principle: the “seeds” (spermata) or “indivisibles” (atomoi) which together comprise the basic 
“elements” (stoikheia) of all things. Knowledge of atoms and atomic compounds is –or is 
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asserted to be—the consummation of the “wisdom” that young Socrates sought under the title 
“inquiry into nature.” 
According to a lost biography by Apollodorus the Epicurean, Epicurus was first led to 
philosophy by the inability of his schoolteacher to explain the meaning of “Chaos” in Hesiod.107 
The reference is to line 116 of the Theogony, where Hesiod states “verily first of all did Chaos 
come into being.” It is not clear what the word “Chaos” means in this context; etymologically, it 
may derive from a root meaning “gape,” “gap,” or “yawn,” and thus might be understood as a 
sort of gulf or void. In Hesiod’s account the opening of this gulf is accompanied by the 
appearance of earth and sky, day and night, and the gods and the titans. It is possible to read this 
passage as a pre-philosophic cosmogony. Kirk, Raven, and Schofield discuss the cosmological 
significance of this creation-story and of Hesiod’s other references to “Chaos” and conclude that 
Hesiod is likely describing “the first stage in the formation of a differentiated world, [that is to 
say,] the production of a vast gap between sky and earth” (though why, in this case, would Chaos 
be said to come-to-be prior to earth and sky?); they reject (among other things) later 
philosophical interpretations of “Chaos” as “place” (Aristotle’s account in Physics, book IV) and 
“disorder” (a later view, they contend, perhaps “Stoic in origin”).108 The fact that Epicurus’ 
question led him to philosophize suggests that he was not merely concerned with determining 
Hesiod’s authorial intentions—or that he was interested in determining Hesiod’s authorial 
intentions to the extent that they cast light on the problems of cosmogony and theogony. 
                                                             
107  
DL X.2. 
108  
Kirk, et. al., The Presocratic Philosophers, pp. 34-41. See also Aristotle, Physics IV.1 
208b29. 
62 
 
Apollodorus’ story may not be authentic. We possess it through Diogenes Laertius, who 
probably wrote his biography some five centuries after Epicurus’ death. It is possible that this 
charming tale is a bit of later biographical invention. But even if this were the case, it would be 
an interesting and potentially astute bit of biographical invention. Whether or not one takes 
Apollodorus’ story as truth—indeed whatever one takes “Chaos” in Hesiod to mean—it is clear 
that Epicurean physics is concurrently a meditation on the beginning (archē) and causes (aitiai) 
of things, and a meditation on the character of the All (to pan) out of which individual things are 
formed. Furthermore, it may be, like Hesiod’s Theogony, a meditation on the origin and the 
nature of the gods. 
In this last vein, Epicurus denies that Mind (or anything else for that matter) “orders 
things” and “positions each thing in just that way which is best.” There is no cosmic order, and 
no divine providence. The infinite universe (to pan) reflects no overarching plan. Within it, a 
multiplicity of worlds or cosmoi—some just like our own—are constantly being generated and 
destroyed. All of this purposeless activity is due to atomic collisions. Even if a god took concern 
for the order of things, there would be good reason to doubt his power to impose a plan on the 
infinite (of which he is necessarily a part, in the Epicurean conception).
109
 Moreover, Epicurus 
would instruct us to deny the premise: as the first part of the tetrapharmakon seemed to imply, it 
runs contrary to the very nature of divinity to take concern for the order of things. 
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First principles 
The starting point of Epicurean physics is faith in the veracity of the senses. This faith is 
justified by Epicurean “canonic,” or the account of the criteria and conditions of knowledge. 
Canonic will only figure briefly in our discussion of Epicurean philosophy, so it would be good 
to say something about it here. It seems to have considered the question, “How do we come to 
know things?” Here an important distinction must be made between the Epicurean theory of 
knowledge and any modern “scientific” theory of knowledge. Epicureanism is naïve: it takes the 
testimony of our senses as true, and it argues that there is no way one sense impression can serve 
as a check on another—for that would require one impression to be “more true” than another.110 
The world really is more or less as it appears to us. Modern natural science, in contrast, is 
“reflective.” It allows one sense impression to serve as a check on another sense impression 
because it does not take any sense impression as the primary object of knowledge. Instead, the 
knowledge of modern natural science is knowledge of mathematical models, which can be used 
as a check on our sense impressions. 
According to Epicurus, our senses are basically reliable sources—the world is, more or 
less, as we see it. The interesting thing is that, while Epicurean phenomenology is self-
professedly naïve, the arguments Epicurus adduces to defend naïve sensualism are reflective and 
sophisticated. Further, the naïveté of Epicurean sensualism is used to reach surprising and subtle 
conclusions. Epicurean physics applies the truth of our sense impressions to prove the existence 
of things unmanifest and thoroughly obscure. The best example is the void (to kenon). It should 
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go without saying that none of us have experience of the void, given Epicurus’ mechanist model 
of sense-perception, in which atomic collisions—atomic touches, to put it more bluntly—are 
responsible for all sensation. Whatever else one may say about the void, it is clear that it is not 
“touchable” in any sense. Indeed, that is what defines it, for Epicurus. The existence of the void, 
however, is required if we are to avoid being caught denying the testimony of our senses—and 
for this reason we might say that the void is proven through a reflective application of naïve 
sensualist first principles.
111
  
Epicurean phenomenology can be thought of as post-skeptical and post-Socratic in the 
most important respects. Greek thought appears to have undergone a skeptical period in the late 
4
th
 century and early 3
rd
 century BC. The manifestations of this skepticism include Democritus’ 
claims that “truth is in a well,” and that we cannot know the things in themselves, but only our 
perceptions of the things
112; Protagoras’ moral and epistemological relativism; Prodicus’ 
“linguistic turn;” the Socratic turn away from inquiry into nature and toward inquiry into man 
and the good life; finally, Pyrrho and the school of radical skepticism to which he gave his name. 
The first principles of Epicurean physics are “nothing comes into being out of nothing” 
and “nothing passes into nothing.” The denial of these principles is tantamount to the denial of 
nature, and indeed Epicurus often criticizes rival physicists for their failure to adhere to rigorous 
philosophical naturalism. The “swerve” is Epicurus’ most significant departure from 
Democritean atomism, and in his view, it is necessary for two reasons. First, it jump-starts the 
process of atomic aggregation; the paths of atoms would never intersect if all were falling in 
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parallel straight-line paths. Second, it explains the existence of a capacity for free choice; choice 
would be impossible or illusory if our lives took place entirely within a deterministic chain of 
causation. 
The swerve does not apply equally to all atoms at all times. Rather, it occurs “at times 
quite undetermined and at undetermined spots.”113 It was perhaps inevitable that subsequent 
writers of virtually every philosophical bent would turn the tables on Epicurus and criticize the 
swerve as an ad hoc device inconsistent with rigorous philosophical naturalism. Even if the 
existence of the swerve is granted, it is unclear how random breaks in the chain of causation 
could provide a physical explanation for human freedom. But, be that as it may—it is clear that 
the dogma of the swerve is obligatory for the true follower of Epicurus: “it would be better to 
subscribe to the legends of the gods than to be a slave to the determinism of the phusikoi.”114 In 
the Epicurean perspective, a poor account of nature—if it is ethically salutary—may be 
preferable to a superior account of nature that is ethically harmful. If this is the case, we have 
some reason to suspect the strictly physical grounds for introducing the theory of the swerve.
115
 
All perceptible things and many that extend beyond our perception—for example, the 
cosmos itself—are “mixed bodies” produced by atomic collisions and interactions. Being 
conglomerates, they are weak and subject to disruption by any wandering atom that collides with 
them. It is in the nature of every mixed body to eventually perish from these disruptions. As 
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human beings, you and I are no different. Our death is inevitable, and the human soul, being a 
particular structure of atoms within the body, is just as fragile—or even more fragile—than the 
shell of the body which encloses it. Our cosmos, too, will one day die. In fact, the whole contains 
innumerable such cosmoi, scattered in an infinite sea of atomic flux. The ceaseless hail of atomic 
projectiles will annihilate them all, while others randomly emerge from chaos to take their places. 
In all the entirety of existence, no object of human attachment will survive forever. As Leo 
Strauss memorably put it, “nothing sempiternal is lovable, [and] nothing lovable is 
sempiternal.”116 
Epicurus claims that happiness is the ultimate end of human life. Knowledge—even 
knowledge of nature—is subordinate to an ethical teaching which paves the way to happiness, 
for, as Epicurus writes in the Letter to Menoeceus, “when happiness is present we have 
everything, while when it is absent the one aim of our actions is to have it.”117 It is important to 
recall that Epicurean eudaimonia is described not in terms of presence but in terms of absence, 
particularly aponia or “absence of pain,” and ataraxia or “absence of disturbance.” As a result 
even philosophy, and particularly natural philosophy, must be rejected if it fails to alleviate pain 
and disturbances. 
Empty are the words of that philosopher who offers no therapy for human suffering. For 
just as there is no use in medical expertise if it does not give therapy for bodily diseases, 
so too there is no use in philosophy if it does not expel the suffering of the soul.
118
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Philosophy, then, is not to be pursued for its own sake. Nor is knowledge of nature. In fact, we 
might well imagine certain “truths” about nature which are a greater threat to eudaimonia than 
outright myth or delusion—such as the determinism proposed by certain natural philosophers. 
Epicurus’ view is that we fortunately do not have to choose between happiness and truth. As it 
happens, the correct understanding of the natural world is not deterministic, but rather leaves 
space for human freedom and responsibility. Yet the general principle still holds: in this regard 
philosophy and, in particular, natural philosophy or “physics” are at bottom bound to ethical 
considerations. 
Physics is an adjunct to the pursuit of human happiness. And thus we find Epicurus 
stating that there would be no need to study physics if we were not “upset by worries that 
celestial phenomena (ta meteōroi) and death might matter to us, and also by failure to appreciate 
the limits of pains and desires.”119 This is an important statement, and we would do well to dwell 
on it briefly. Epicurus identifies three specific contributions that the study of physics can make to 
human happiness, and he goes so far as to claim that without these contributions true happiness 
is impossible. 
The first thing that physics (and only physics) can do for us is “dispel worries regarding 
celestial phenomena.” The Greek word translated as “celestial phenomena” is ta meteōroi—
literally the things “raised off the ground” or “unsupported,” from which we get the words 
“meteor” and “meteorology.” It just so happens that there is one letter, among the small number 
of writings of Epicurus still extant, which has as its subject ta meteōroi: the Letter to Pythocles. 
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It follows that this letter is likely of special importance for understanding the relationship 
between Epicurean physics and Epicurean ethics. The Letter to Pythocles discusses what we 
might call “astronomical” phenomena like the movements of the sun and moon, as well as 
“meteorological” phenomena like clouds and rainbows—and even “terrestrial” phenomena like 
earthquakes. If it is permissible to make generalizations about this heterogeneous collection of 
things, it seems that there are two general classes into which these phenomena fall. On the one 
hand, some of them can be grouped together as phenomena which by their size, permanence, and 
regularity could be thought to imply the presence of a rational and divine creator. On the other 
hand, some of them can be grouped together as phenomena which by their infrequency, 
conspicuousness, and terribleness could be thought to imply the presence of fearful supernatural 
powers. Epicurus’ strategy is the same as regards both classes. He insists that there are several 
plausible naturalistic explanations. In the final analysis, it does not matter which of these 
explanations one chooses to believe, or indeed whether one chooses to believe any of them.
120
 
What is important is what the Epicurean account excludes. One must not believe that any 
concept of the “divine nature” is needed to explain these things: “exclusion of myth,” Epicurus 
writes, “is the sole condition necessary.”121 The reader who keeps these explanations in mind 
will “escape a long way from myth” and learn to properly interpret many other phenomena 
similar to these.
122
 We conclude that “worries regarding celestial phenomena” are associated 
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with the notion of “divine governance.” Serious reflection on the conspicuous regularities and 
irregularities of heaven and earth will lead to the hypothesis of divine involvement—unless it is 
countered by Epicurean argument. 
 
Not by design 
An important extension of this argument can be found in Lucretius. Just as there is no order 
imposed “from on high” by a god or gods, so there is no order inherent in the atoms themselves: 
 For certainly neither did the first beginnings place themselves by design (neque consilio) 
 each in its own order with keen intelligence, nor assuredly did they make agreement what 
 motions each should produce.
123
 
 
The target here is the pantheistic vitalism that would identify the principles of cosmic order with 
some “design” or “compact” of the atoms themselves. We should pause here. The specific 
formulation that Lucretius uses is significant. I have translated the phrase neque consilio as “not 
by design.” It derives from the term consilium, which is notoriously difficult to translate. Besides 
“design,” it can mean "counsel,” “judgment,” “plan,” or “deliberation.” It is a term rife with 
political implications, and it takes on great significance in the works of Cicero. For example, in 
On the Commonwealth (De re publica) Cicero has Scipio declare: 
Every commonwealth . . . needs to be ruled by some sort of deliberation (consilium) in 
order to be long lived. That deliberative function (consilium), moreover, must always be 
connected to the original cause which engendered the state; and it must also either be 
assigned to one person or to selected individuals or be taken up by the entire 
population.
124
 
 
                                                             
123  
DRN I.1021-1023. The lines are repeated in a different context, and with strikingly 
different implications in DRN V.419-421. 
124  
Cicero De re publica I.41-2, pp. 18-19. 
70 
 
One reason “apolitical” readings of Epicurus and Lucretius have been comparatively prevalent is 
the widespread failure to perceive the political aspect of Epicurean physics. Lucretius’ use of the 
term consilium is instructive in this regard. Twice, in books I and V, it occurs as part of the 
phrase ne consilio. In both cases it indicates Lucretius’ denial of consilium as a principle of 
cosmic order. By his conspicuous silence, Lucretius suggests that consilium has no role to play in 
the origin of political community. And in the five cases in which consilium is positively asserted, 
context shows that it is meant only in the sense of the “logical faculty” (to logikon) of the human 
mind.
125
 Four of these cases occur in book III, in the context of arguments for the death of the 
soul. Consilium, then, is nothing but a mortal aspect of the mortal human brain. 
Lucretius seems to twist the definition of consilium away from “deliberation in common” 
and towards “the logical faculty of the human mind.” The implications for political philosophy 
should be clear. What happens when men deliberate? Not, as Cicero would have it, the “shared 
exercise of reason.” Instead, deliberation is merely the working of “the logical faculty,” which 
one man (in principle) could do as well as any assembly. If the new definition of consilium is 
accepted, it becomes very hard, if not impossible, to make a Ciceronian defense of public 
deliberation and of oratory. How could anything be gained by calculating in common?
126
 
Further evidence of the redefinition of human rationality and demotion of deliberation is 
seen in the account of the origin of language found in Epicurus’ Letter to Herodotus and in book 
V of DRN. Language is there presented as a human creation. The existence of language—or 
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languages—is natural, but there is no natural connection between words and things. The natural 
connection is between human impulses and words. In essence, the Epicurean position amounts to 
a denial that we can come to a better understanding of things “through speeches” or dialectically. 
Instead, we are advised to attend to the customary meanings of words. There is no ascent from 
opinion. Rather, in the best case, there is a sort of “falling away” of opinion. 
We return to the “ne consilio.” The problem, for the Epicurean, is to explain the existence 
of consilium understood as the human logical faculty, in a world which is characterized by the 
absence of consilium understood as cosmic order. In Epicurean philosophy, the philosopher’s 
own understanding begins to become a problem: the “vantage point, made secure by the 
teachings of the wise” of DRN book II threatens to topple over into a sea of atomic conflict. 
There are three considerations that serve to exacerbate this problem: First, the philosopher is 
characterized by his understanding (consilium) of that which is said to defy order or design 
(consilium). Second, the philosopher is limited; mortal. The universe is, in contrast, unbounded 
(apeiron). How could the limited comprehend the limitless?
127
 Third, the philosopher’s 
knowledge is associated with knowledge of limit: “the limit of pleasures and pains,” or even, in 
Lucretius’ poetic presentation, “the flaming walls of the universe.” But the idea of “limit” itself 
becomes questionable in the Epicurean cosmos, in which “the All” is literally unbounded—and 
in which the philosopher knows the permeability and fragility of the “flaming walls of the 
universe.” 
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Epicurean philosophy has something of the character of a walled garden: a garden created 
by human reasoning and operating on principles which are opposed to—or, at any rate, in tension 
with—the surrounding infinite chaos. It is possible to draw an analogy with the intermundia 
which Lucretius describes as the true habitations of the gods. As with the gods, so too with the 
wise men of Epicurean philosophy—serious doubts remain about the security of these 
habitations. 
 
The gods of the many 
Nowhere in Socrates’ intellectual autobiography does he suggest that he felt doubts about the 
possible impiety of his youthful decision to pursue inquiry into nature. Socrates does not seem to 
have been put off by the idea that the study of nature may be impious. But Epicureanism finds it 
necessary to respond to this idea. Lucretius makes it the subject of one of his first preliminaries 
to philosophy. 
Herein I have one fear, lest perchance you think that you are starting on the principles of 
some impious reasoning, and setting foot upon the path of wickedness. Nay, but on the 
other hand, again and again our foe, religion, has brought forth criminal and impious 
deeds.
128
 
 
This is in spirit identical to Epicurus’ response: “[t]he impious man is not he who denies the gods 
of the many, but he who attaches to gods the beliefs of the many about them.”129 But why is this? 
The answer may be seen by revisiting KD 1, Epicurus’ fundamental statement on the nature of 
the gods: 
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A blessed and eternal being has no trouble himself and brings no trouble upon any other 
being; hence he is exempt from movements of anger and partiality, for every such 
movement implies weakness.
130
 
 
Epicurean psuchagogia requires that physics be discussed first, because only physics is able to 
respond to the objection that study of Epicurean philosophy is tantamount to impiety. The first 
and most weighty objection to philosophy is the objection that is made on behalf of religious 
belief. 
The physics of the gods' divine existence is, to be sure, somewhat perplexing. Epicurus 
states that the gods are living animals (zoon), and they result from a continual influx of images 
having a human form.
131
It would seem that, even if such gods avoid the particular cataclysm that 
will one day destroy our world, they are still in principle vulnerable to the same sort of 
disruptions as any other mixed body. The intermundia, too, may be disordered by a massive 
influx of atoms. And what happens if the constant stream of images one day ceases? In any case, 
the gods have a nature, and Lucretius suggests that we ought always to conceive of “nature” in 
association with a fixed span of existence.
132
 
But perhaps we are taking the physics of Epicurus’ gods too seriously. It must be 
remembered that Epicurus and his followers were widely believed in ancient times to have been 
atheists. In any case, Epicurus was a tireless critic of traditional religious belief. He argues that 
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the traditional view misrepresents the nature of the gods by presenting them as needy beings 
concerned with petty terrestrial existences like our own. As Lucretius wrote, 
It must needs be that the divine nature enjoys life everlasting in perfect peace, sundered 
and separated far away from our world. For free from all grief, free from danger, mighty 
in its own resources, never lacking aught of us, it is not won by services nor touched by 
wrath.
133
 
 
In short, the gods—whatever they may be—are not such as to take interest in the affairs of men. 
They have no love for mankind. “Divine providence” is a contradiction in terms. There is 
nothing “divine” about constantly having to tend to a fragile and imperfect natural order.134 True 
piety mimics divine indifference.
135
 Piety is not faith or obedience, but rather “to be able to 
contemplate all things with a mind at rest.”136 Particularly at stake in this Epicurean critique are 
all the specifically political and communal aspects of divine worship which follow from the 
traditional conception of the gods as interested participants in worldly affairs.
137
 
At this point, an objection could be made: to be able to look on everything with a tranquil 
mind would seem to be impiety—or at least, inhuman. What should one do when one sees an 
outrage? A temple profaned, for example? Consider Plato’s tale of Leontios and the criminals’ 
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corpses outside the walls of the city.
138
 Epicurus would not criticize the desire to look on the ugly 
bodies. He would say that one should aspire to be able to look on them with a tranquil mind. 
Leontios, however, may seem to us more decent for not wishing to do this. Here we see evidence 
of just how much in the way of natural sentiment one must overcome in order to become an 
Epicurean. Epicurean philosophy demands that we wage a war against our own thumotic 
capacities for outrage and disgust. 
As I have previously noted, the primary obstacles to ataraxia are, in the Epicurean view, 
twofold: first, fear of what may happen to us in this world or the next; second, eros or longing 
for unnecessary pleasures. Physics helps to relieve us of the former by dispelling the myths that 
hold men in terrified subjection. This in particular accounts for the anti-mythological character of 
much of Epicurean physics. 
On account of this anti mythological character we ought to consider a possible hedonistic 
objection to Epicurean physics. Is not the traditional belief in providential gods and personal 
immortality more pleasant than Epicurean indifference and annihilation? Our response derives 
from the Epicurean notion of “unmixed pleasures.” Personal immortality may mean reward in 
heaven or the next life; but it may also mean eternal damnation—and one would be hard pressed 
to claim that the religious imagination focuses more on the former.
139
 One cannot contemplate 
heavenly reward without some anxiety at the prospect of just or unjust punishment. Thus the 
traditional view is the very definition of a “mixed pleasure.” Reasoned acceptance of our 
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mortality (for example, the Epicurean saying, “death is nothing to us”) is the only possible basis 
for true peace of mind and unmixed pleasure.
 140
 
Most traditional and philosophical views of the nature of the universe serve to exacerbate 
fear and longing. The conviction that gods, country, and family will abide forever encourages 
one to take interest in the state of the world after one’s death.141 The falsifying sense of gratitude 
binds one to desires that extend beyond the fleeting individual. One must be brought painfully to 
the realization that one lives in “an unwalled city.”142 Once this has been done, one can proclaim 
with perfect detachment that death and the end of the world are nothing. Now one possesses the 
wisdom of the first of men to “[pass] far beyond the fiery walls of the world.”143 Like the Spartan, 
the Epicurean makes living without walls, in total vulnerability, the foundation of his ultimate 
security. “Life has no terrors for him who has thoroughly apprehended that there are no terrors 
for him in ceasing to live.”144 
What does the Epicurean project of liberating man from his fears imply? First, the 
realization of such a project necessarily occurs on a person-by-person basis. The Epicureans, to 
the extent that they did proselytize, devoted all their efforts to persuading individuals. Ataraxia 
can be enjoyed individually, or within a circle of friends (see below) but not on the level of the 
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political community as a whole. Nor is it the sort of goal that, while being realized on an 
individual level, still implicitly ties the individual to his fellows, as, for example, glory. Ataraxia 
tends toward the view that the ultimate purpose of government is to “get out of the way.” Second, 
the Epicurean critique of the gods is implicitly a critique of all traditional politics as it was in the 
classical world. The gods of tradition were political gods, benefactors of a particular city or 
extended community. For further evidence that the Epicureans viewed politics and religion as 
intimately related, note the juxtaposition of Lucretius’ account of the introduction of laws and his 
account of the introduction of divine worship.
145
 
 
Conclusion: physics versus ethics? 
It is helpful to contrast the critical—and, indeed, radical—view of politics implied by 
Epicurus’ physics-based teaching, with the more conventionally respectable view implied by his 
ethics-based teaching, discussed in the preceding chapter. If the Epicurean emphasis on moderate 
indulgence, practice of the traditional virtues, and political withdrawal is allowed to be 
compatible with his physics-based account of the indifferent universe, it nevertheless, does not 
seem to be directly implied by his physics-based account of the indifferent universe. In fact, as I 
shall argue in chapter five, there seems to be at least one other political teaching which is equally 
compatible with Epicurean physics. The mere fact of an indifferent universe is not sufficient on 
its own to determine one’s philosophy of life. Sufficient distance exists between Epicurean 
advocacy of moderation, and Epicurean cosmology, for later thinkers to attempt to appropriate 
the one but not the other. In extreme cases, they may even argue that moderate hedonism is more 
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at home in an alternative cosmology—say, the Christian—or that Epicurus’ indifferent universe 
in fact demands an alternative account of human life, in which the good may be defined, not as 
moderate indulgence, but as conquest. 
 
79 
 
Chapter IV: The Nature of Justice 
The topic of justice is discussed in two general ways in the surviving works of Epicurus. 
First, it appears in the context of a general discussion of prudence (phronēsis)—a discussion 
which emphasizes the instrumentality of ethical virtue in general and justice in particular. Second, 
it appears in the context of a general discussion of the origins of justice in compact (sunthēkē), 
and the relation of justice to “things having been set down by law” (nomisthentai). The first 
approach is found in the Letter to Menoeceus. A hybrid of the first and second approaches is 
found in the KD. Further elaboration of the Epicurean account of human origins is found in the 
Letter to Herodotus and Lucretius’ DRN, book V. Together, these help to supply a more 
complete picture of Epicurean “justice as compact.” 
The two general approaches are closely linked by the notion of the advantageous (to 
sumpheron). To begin with the former, Epicurus describes prudence as the calculation or “sober 
reasoning” (logismos) that a hedonist will uses in order to determine what is choiceworthy—that 
is to say, the most pleasant or least painful option out of the range of choices available to him. 
Prudence, then, is nothing other than the careful consideration of the advantageous. Even justice, 
considered as an ethical virtue, is nothing more than a particular perspective on the 
advantageous—i.e. on the way of life most conducive to the individual’s pleasure. Summing up 
this view, Epicurus states, “It is not possible to live pleasantly without living prudently, nobly 
and justly; nor to live prudently, nobly and justly without living pleasantly.”146 
On the other side—that of “justice as compact”—Epicurus states that the advantageous 
can be used as an analytic tool for deciding whether an agreement or compact deserves to be 
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called “just.” Whatever is deemed just by law, is in fact just—so long as it is advantageous for 
mutual intercourse. But this of course means that, if circumstances change in such a way as to 
change what is advantageous, the “just” itself changes. The difficulty of setting down any 
universally applicable rule for the needs of human community suggests that justice, at least as it 
relates to the “things having set down by law,” is essentially changeable. Furthermore, we might 
wonder how the agreement-criterion and the advantage-criterion interact. Does justice have a 
nature—and if so, what is it? 
 
Prudence and justice 
Setting aside these puzzles for the moment, we return to Epicurus’ discussion of 
individual justice as a product of prudence. The best resource is Epicurus’ Letter to Menoeceus. 
Diogenes Laertius describes the content of the Letter to Menoeceus as “concerning life” (peri 
biōn).147 Although Epicurus speaks to Menoeceus in the imperative, there is never a hint of his 
character. The Letter is curiously silent as regards its addressee. It gives no evidence of his age, 
but begins by exhorting old and young alike to study philosophy.
148
 It mentions no specific 
question, or questions, which might have inspired its writing. Here one might contrast the Letter 
to Herodotus and Letter to Pythocles, which give evidence both of the questions which 
motivated their writing, and of the individual character of their addressees. It seems likely that 
the Letter to Menoeceus was not been written in response to any particular need—or if it was 
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written in response to a need, then it was written in response to the general human need for 
philosophy as a means to the pleasant life. Menoeceus’ personal need for philosophy comes to 
represent the intrinsic human need for philosophy. 
The part of the Letter that chiefly concerns us is its account of the virtues. This part 
begins by relating the virtues to the ethical end of pleasure, which is described as “absence of 
pain in the body and trouble in the soul” (mēte algein kata sōma mēte tarattesthai kata 
psuchēn)149—a state which is achievable only through prudence. Prudence selects the way of 
action most conducive to secure pleasure by measuring one pleasure against another 
(summetrēzein) and reasoning out the grounds of every choice and avoidance. From this activity 
of measuring and reasoning “spring all the other virtues.”150 The question one must ask is, are 
these “other virtues” the received virtues of tradition and philosophy—i.e. the “cardinal virtues” 
of justice, wisdom, moderation, and courage—or are they “new” virtues, or modifications having 
little more than a name in common with the traditional virtues? Nowhere in the surviving works 
of Epicurus does one find listed the traditional four virtues; nor does one find listed the 
traditional four virtues plus piety.
151
 This is our first indication that the Epicurean account of 
virtue may be to some degree revisionist.
152
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The details of Epicurus’ treatment of virtue support a revisionist reading. Prudence is a 
sort of “ruling” virtue; from it spring all the other virtues. In a passage which mirrors KD 5, 
quoted above, Epicurus writes, “we cannot live pleasantly without also living prudently 
(phronimōs), nobly (kalōs), and justly (dikaiōs), nor live prudently, nobly, and justly without also 
living pleasantly.”153 This, we should note, is the only time that Epicurus gives a list of what he 
considers to be virtues; when he elsewhere mentions wisdom, moderation, and courage, he does 
not clearly state whether he regards any of these qualities as being “inseparable with the pleasant 
life.” Of this triad, the primary virtue is prudence, since it teaches all the other virtues; the 
secondary virtues of nobility and justice are derived from prudence but in practice equally 
necessary if one is to be happy. In Epicurus’ pithy formulation, the three have “grown into one 
(sumpephukasi) with the pleasant life, and the pleasant life is inseparable from them.”154 We note 
that nobility and justice, which prior conventionalist theory tended to regard as “by convention” 
and not “by nature,” are here given the gloss of nature or of “second nature.” 
In summary, the account of justice given in the Letter to Menoeceus—and which is 
repeated in the KD—is instrumental, in holding justice to be not in itself good, but good for the 
end to which it contributes, namely, “absence of pain in the body and trouble in the soul.” We 
might suspect that justice has rather more to contribute to the latter. The suspicion is confirmed 
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in the KD: Absence of trouble in the soul, or ataraxia, is said to be enjoyed in the greatest degree 
by the just man, while the unjust man suffers the greatest disturbances.
155
 Justice is an 
inseparable part of, but instrumental to, ataraxia—since prudence shows that the only certain 
defense against fear of punishment is the confidence that one has never done injustice. 
 
Cicero’s critique of Epicurean justice 
Perhaps the best and most concise summary of Cicero’s critique of Epicurean justice is 
one found in De legibus, book I.
156
 Speaking to his friend Atticus, Cicero’s spokesman “Marcus” 
insists that Epicurus’ ostensible “defense” of justice in fact uproots it completely: 
[I]f justice is obedience to the written laws and institutions of a people, and if (as these 
same people say) everything is measured by utility, then whoever thinks that it will be 
advantageous to him will neglect the laws and will break them if he can. The result is that 
there is no justice at all if it is not by nature, and the justice set up on the basis of utility is 
uprooted by that same utility: if nature will not confirm justice, all the virtues will be 
eliminated.
157
 
 
This critique is compressed and needs to be unpacked. In the passage quoted, Marcus touches 
upon all the major themes of the Epicurean account of justice as expressed in the KD.
158
 His 
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summary begins with a reference to the conventionalist character of Epicurean justice: justice is 
nothing other than “obedience to the written laws and institutions of a people.” It is, in other 
words, a sort of pact or “covenant” (sunthēkas).159 Epicurus seems particularly to wish to rule out 
the idea that justice is anything “in itself” (kath’heauto).160 It is instead a “symbol of the 
advantageous” (sumbolon tou sumpherontos).161 
At this point, a discordant note creeps into Marcus’ summary. He opposes the Epicurean 
theory to his own view that justice is “by nature.” Epicurus, however, seems to announce that 
there is a “natural justice” (to tēs phuseōs dikaion), which he equates with the aforementioned 
“symbol of the advantageous” What are we to make of this? Is Cicero mistaken? Is Epicurus in 
fact a kind of natural right theorist? There is no clear scholarly consensus on how to interpret the 
relevant KD.
162
 In my view, the only way to make sense of Epicurus’ oracular statement is to tie 
it to the subsequent KD and in particular, to his claim that “justice is nothing in itself.”163 
Epicurus then goes on to state that justice will vary according to particular circumstances.
164
 To 
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be more specific, legislative enactments (nomisthenta) can be considered “just” for as long as 
they serve the common advantage, and become “unjust” when they no longer do so.165 
In other words, Epicurus’ position on justice seems to be roughly as follows. He affirms 
the existence of “natural justice” against those—including Cleitophon—who claim that “justice” 
is whatever it is said to be. This subjectivist account of justice is false. The truth about justice is 
that it has a fixed character or “nature,” and this “nature” consists in its being always and 
everywhere relative to some common advantage. Wherever there is no common advantage, or no 
prior covenant, there is no justice. Thus, on the Epicurean view, justice truly can be said to have 
a nature—its nature is to be a particular kind of convention. 
On this reading, Marcus is not wrong to oppose Epicurean conventionalism to his own 
view that justice is something “by nature”—particularly if one recalls his earlier statement: 
[T]he beginning of justice is to be sought in law . . . in establishing the nature of justice, 
let us begin from that highest law, which was born aeons before any law was written or 
indeed any state was established.
166
 
 
For Epicurus, there is clearly no “natural justice” in this sense of the term. 
To return, then, to Cicero’s summary: the Epicurean account measures everything—
including justice—by its “utility” or “advantage.” And this “advantage” is to be understood with 
reference to the hedonistic theory of the good. Epicurus’ account of justice therefore can be 
understood as a straightforward application of his particular variety of ethical hedonism. 
This is the point where Cicero moves in for the kill: the true hedonist “will neglect the 
laws and break them if he can”—as long as the result is advantageous to him personally. 
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Epicurean ethics demands that he choose what is personally most advantageous to him—i.e. the 
greater over the lesser pleasure, or the lesser over the greater pain. But this is not the worst part. 
According to Cicero, not only does the Epicurean theory, rightly understood, demand 
lawbreaking—it also subverts any attempt to chastise lawbreaking as “unjust.” 
Cicero’s point is that, if advantage supplies the only standard by which a law can be said 
to be “just,” then whenever a law works to someone’s personal disadvantage, it is vulnerable to 
being attacked as “no longer just [for me] . . . in consequence of a change in circumstances.”167 If 
Epicurus evades this problem by restricting the meaning of “justice” to agreements in cases of 
mutual advantage, he loses the ability to speak of “justice” as a personal virtue. To act against 
personal advantage for the sake of some mutual advantage, would be to act against the “prudence” 
(phronēsis) which Epicurus calls the foundation of all the virtues.168 Marcus concludes: “if 
nature will not confirm justice, all the virtues will be eliminated.” 
The problems that Cicero identifies here become especially acute when no one is 
watching: 
[Those] who are not moved by the idea of honor itself to be good men, but rather by 
some sort of utility or profit, are not good men, but crafty. What will a person do in the 
dark if he is afraid only of witnesses and judges? What will he do in some deserted place 
if he encounters someone from whom he can steal a lot of gold, someone weak and 
alone?
169
 
 
In essence, Cicero poses a version of the Ring of Gyges problem introduced by Glaucon in 
Plato’s Republic. The parallel is made even more explicit in a passage from De officiis in which 
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he directly references the Ring of Gyges.
170
 There he argues that if an Epicurean hedonist were 
to obtain a ring of invisibility, his theory of the good would commit him to using the ring for 
selfish enjoyment, without regard for the strictures of justice. It follows from this, Cicero argues, 
that Epicurus’ praise of the virtue of justice is either misguided or fraudulent. If the true hedonist 
were secure from threat of punishment, he must commit injustice when it is to his advantage. Let 
it be granted the biography of Epicurus shows he always observed the rules of justice; let it even 
be granted that he always taught that pleasure and justice were inseparable. Still—the inevitable 
tendency of his philosophy is to uproot justice, and Cicero argues it would be a strike against 
Epicurus intellectually, if he were shown to be unable to correctly draw the necessary 
consequences of his starting premises. 
 
The Epicurean rebuttal 
Contemporary scholars have tended to be suspicious of Cicero’s argument. In a paper 
entitled “The Justice of the Epicurean Wise Man,” Paul Vander Waerdt observes that “it is no 
longer easy to reconstruct the controversy over the nature of justice in which the Stoics [as 
represented by Cicero, in his critique] and the Epicureans engaged.” In fact, a single line of 
Horace seems to be our sole surviving example of a direct Epicurean response.
171
 
Vander Waerdt argues that Epicurus’ hedonistic theory of the good can be used to shore 
up any apparent weakness in his account of justice. The Epicurean will not exploit a ring of 
invisibility because he is categorically uninterested in the sort of pleasures a ring of invisibility 
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might help him to obtain. He is just, in other words, because he does not desire any of the 
proceeds of injustice. On this reading, Cicero has misconstrued Epicurus’ position; he and his 
fellow critics fail to appreciate the way in which Epicurus’ teaching on justice is “parasitic on his 
doctrine of the human good.”172 Cicero has failed to show that the Epicurean will perceive any 
utility in committing injustice. In fact, as Vander Waerdt summarizes, “there is abundant 
evidence that an Epicurean would have no interest in the kind of life praised by Glaucon.”173 
 Vander Waerdt makes a positive argument which is, I think, equally important. The 
Epicurean’s justice—his “just disposition” or dikaiosunē—is in fact constitutive of the pleasant 
life: “Just conduct provides the psychic harmony necessary to lead a life of the highest 
pleasure.”174 This is accurate, but may be in need of clarification. It is necessary to distinguish in 
what sense the Epicurean’s justice is constitutive of his happiness. Does he take pleasure in 
regarding himself as just? Does he take pleasure in the fruits of a just reputation? As I have 
argued in chapter two, the answers to these questions must be “no.”175 Rather, as Vander Waerdt 
rightly points out, the Epicurean wise man takes pleasure in justice as harmonious ordering of 
the soul, and his consciousness of freedom from the misfortunes that injustice would necessarily 
expose him to. The justice of the Epicurean wise man is a justice without splendor. 
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Does justice demand self-sacrifice? 
  What is at stake in the Epicurean reinterpretation of justice becomes clear when we 
compare the Letter to Menoeceus to the account of justice that appears in books I and II of 
Plato’s Republic. The question, we might say, is whether justice requires self-sacrifice. Both 
Socrates, as a defender of justice, and Thrasymachus and Glaucon in their roles as attackers of 
justice, maintain that it does. For Epicurus, in contrast, it could never be against one’s own 
interest—rightly understood, of course—to be just. This is because Epicurean justice derives 
from prudence. In order to get a sense of now radical Epicurus’ position is, and how it represents 
a departure from prior conventionalism and from prior natural right theories, we turn to the 
beginning of the Republic, in which Socrates elicits various attempts at a definition of justice 
from his interlocutors. In Plato’s presentation, the basic problem of justice appears to result from 
the conflict between our intuition that justice is something good, and our intuition that justice 
involves sacrifice. The conventionalist response to this conflict, as represented by Thrasymachus 
and Glaucon, is to “deconstruct” the notion of justice, by arguing that justice represents a sort of 
confusion about the good. In Thrasymachus’ formulation, we must ask for whom justice is good. 
The answer, he thinks, is for another—i.e. for the stronger who has made the laws. The response 
of natural right, as represented by Socrates, is properly the subject of the Republic as a whole, 
but may be summarized as a “raising up” of the idea of justice into a thing of transcendental 
beauty, good through its participation in the idea of the good, and worthy of motivating the 
greatest acts of self-sacrifice. 
First, I set down this point for my interpretation: in conversation, the most revealing 
admissions are often those least intended to be. An unpremeditated remark may tell us more 
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about a character than any carefully crafted peroration. As in life, so in the dialogues of Plato: we 
would do well to pay close attention, not only to what an interlocutor intends to say, but to what 
he finds himself compelled to say. This principle is on full display in the first book of the 
Republic. Thrasymachus, for example, sets out his position multiple times and at great length; 
but if we attend to the argument we find that he shifts the basis of his position almost at will. His 
long speeches mostly serve to obfuscate the issue. What is chiefly interesting is what 
Thrasymachus finds himself compelled to say. 
The same is true in other, less adversarial, situations. Socrates asks Cephalus, his wealthy 
host, to name the greatest good that he has enjoyed as a result of his great wealth. Cephalus 
replies that, due to his old age, he has begun to feel “fear and care” about things to which he had 
formerly given little thought. In particular, he has started to think about “tales told about 
Hades”—tales claiming that the one who does unjust deeds will have to pay a penalty there.176 
Cephalus says he now “reckons up his accounts and considers whether he has done anything 
unjust to anyone.” It is with great relief that he concludes that he has never been forced to cheat 
or lie to anyone on account of money—his ample fortune contributes in that way to his peace of 
mind 
Cephalus thinks he knows what justice is. He gives his definition of justice in two parts: 
justice is “not cheating or lying to any man against one’s will,” and not “[owing] sacrifices to a 
god or money to a human being.”177 We may call the concatenation of these two parts a 
“banker’s definition” of justice. Cephalus is scrupulous and concerned to pay back his 
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obligations, but he is also obviously self-interested. He focuses on the duty to maintain faith—as 
Socrates’ generalizes it: “to tell the truth and to give back what is owed.” We note that the 
question of what is owed to the gods is silently dropped. There is no hint of a general duty to 
benevolence in Socrates’ restatement of Cephalus’ definition. 
But when Socrates then challenges Cephalus with the scenario of a friend who has gone 
crazy and comes back asking for his sword, Cephalus is forced to concede something about 
justice that he may have always known, but which he has not yet troubled to articulate even for 
himself. It is not right to return a weapon to a friend who has gone crazy. This reveals something 
about Cephalus’ idea of justice—something he may not have noticed or even been able to 
articulate before. He first conceived of justice as a means to a reward for himself, but now he 
adds something else in addition. Cephalus believes that justice cannot be something harmful. To 
put it another way, he believes that justice must be something good. Only under Socrates’ 
prodding does Cephalus realize this. 
At this point, Cephalus announces that he is leaving in order to perform some sacrifices. 
We note that he still feels some degree of “fear and care” over what he owes to the gods. He 
leaves his share of the argument to his son Polemarchus, who dutifully takes up the task of 
defending his father’s definition of justice. With Polemarchus is introduced the question of how 
far justice is meant to extend. It was never clear whether Cephalus meant to assert that justice not 
be harmful as a general principle, or whether he was thinking only of the particular case of not 
causing harm to a friend. Polemarchus argues that it must be the latter. As Polemarchus later puts 
it: justice consists in giving back “what is owed”—that is to say, “good to friends and harm to 
enemies.” 
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At Socrates’ instigation Polemarchus is led to analyze this “what is owed.” Just what sort 
of a thing is it? Polemarchus offers his own gloss on what is owed: “friends owe it to friends to 
do some good and nothing bad.”178 At Socrates prodding, Polemarchus extends this principle to 
enemies: we must give enemies too whatever is owed. This would at first appear to be “some 
harm.” But Polemarchus is gradually forced to concede this point. He concludes with Socrates 
that justice, if it is to be truly good, must consist in doing good, irrespective of the friend-enemy 
distinction. 
It is this counterintuitive conclusion which provokes Thrasymachus to burst onto the 
scene. And, just as the position of Socrates and Polemarchus represents the logical extension of a 
familiar opinion about justice—namely, that justice is something advantageous or “good”—so 
too Thrasymachus begins from a familiar opinion about justice—namely, the opinion that the 
practice of justice involves sacrificing one’s own interest to the interest of others. In 
Thrasymachus’ own words, justice is the advantage of the “stronger”—that is to say, the ruling 
group who are responsible for setting down the laws.
179
 And it is easy to see, not only why 
Thrasymachus would think this, but why he would feel such indignation. Experience gives many 
examples of injustice profiting at the expense of justice, or of justice working to benefit someone 
other than its practitioner. 
The tension between the beneficial and self-sacrificial sides of justice is seen most 
vividly in Glaucon’s speech in book II. Glaucon states that he wants Socrates to show him what 
justice is “in itself”—as opposed to what justice is said to be. He wants Socrates to prove that 
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justice is beneficial to the just man, and he sets up an example designed to remove all of the 
benefits that come merely from seeming, as opposed to being, just. Consider the wages of such a 
man: “Doing no injustice, let him have the greatest reputation for injustice, so that his justice 
may be put to the test to see if it is softened by bad reputation and its consequences.”180 Could 
such a man live happily? Glaucon wants Socrates to show that he could, despite the great 
sufferings that he will surely undergo: “[he] will be whipped; he’ll be racked; he’ll be bound; 
he’ll have both his eyes burned out; and, at the end, when he has undergone every sort of evil, 
he’ll be crucified.” It seems to Glaucon that the just man, when put to the rack in this way, will 
confess that “one shouldn’t wish to be, but to seem to be just.”181 But he awaits Socrates’ 
vindication of justice. It is important to recognize that Glaucon is asking Socrates to defend 
justice in this example. He wants to be shown that it is better to be a just man, even one who is 
tortured and put to death, than to be an unjust man who enjoys every profit of his injustice 
accompanied by the sweet reputation of justice. Put in the terms stated earlier, Glaucon wishes to 
see justice defended as each person’s greatest good, while at the same time justifying even the 
greatest and most painful sufferings. He wants it to be shown that justice is “something worth 
dying for.” 
A further point about Glaucon’s speech: Justice is a sort of mean, in the conventionalist 
account Glaucon proposes. In Glaucon’s “restoration” of Thrasymachus’ argument, he even uses 
the expression “the nature of justice” to describe a mean between the best (doing injustice and 
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getting away with it) and the worst (suffering injustice).
182
 What does this mean? Glaucon is 
suggesting that, if justice is natural, it is natural only insofar as it is the self-interested desire of 
an arbitrarily defined group of individuals to protect the private good of each.
183
 
 
The splendor of moral virtue, revisited 
What, then, could Epicurus say to Glaucon? We note that Epicurus allegedly claimed that 
the wise man could be happy even under torture.
184
 But he gave no indication that the wise man 
would take consolation from having suffered for a just cause. In fact, the opposite is true: 
Epicurus would seem to suggest that any such consolation is the very model of an “empty” 
pleasure. The plausibility of the Epicurean account of justice depends upon his audience’s 
willingness to concede that justice does not and could not justify suffering or self-sacrifice. 
Furthermore, it depends upon his audience’s willingness to scale back their wish to see justice 
defended as each person’s greatest good. Justice in the Epicurean scheme is instrumental and 
self-interested. This does not mean that the Epicurean philosopher would abuse his ring of 
invisibility—but it does mean that Epicurus tacitly avoids the question of justice, as Glaucon has 
posed it. 
The noble and the just are said to be inseparable from the pleasant life, but choiceworthy 
only on account of their contributions to the pleasant life. They are “useful,” strictly speaking—
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and not to be sought for their own sake. This means that Epicurus would criticize any traditional 
or philosophical conceptions of the noble and the just which go against calculation of advantage. 
He has closed off the way to any attempt to show the transcendence of justice. He concentrates 
on the status of the noble and the just precisely because he sees in them the most likely route for 
the importation of “transcendence” into ethical philosophy. This, I suggest, is what leads him to 
declare “I spit upon the noble (to kalon) and all those who vainly (i.e. “emptily”—kenōs) admire 
it, when it produces no pleasure.”185 
 
The conventionalist account of political origins 
Scholarly research today connects the Epicurean account of the origin and development of 
language to a range of epistemic and anthropological concerns.
186
 The context of DRN V.1028-
1090 suggests, however, that Lucretius’ efforts to describe the origin and development of 
language are a component of his account of the origins of justice, and of political community 
more generally. Recent work on the Epicurean account of language fails to give this point 
adequate emphasis. In this section, I propose a new reading of DRN V.1028-1090, with an eye to 
what it teaches regarding the Epicurean account of human political origins. 
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Lucretius begins by mocking those who suppose an original name-giver: “to think that 
anyone then parcelled out names to things, and that from him men learnt their first words, is 
mere folly.”187 The problem with this view is that there is no reason to suppose—as name-giver 
theorists invariably do—that one human alone should be able to make names and use them to 
indicate things.
188
 The first students of the name-giver must be assumed, from the very beginning, 
to have a similar capacity to make and to use names; otherwise, they would not have been able to 
learn names—but this ability (or so Lucretius claims) would make them all name-givers as well. 
It might be objected, here, that individuals exhibit different degrees of proficiency with language, 
and that the original name-giver could be thought of as someone proficient in the extreme. In 
other words, the name-giver does not differ from others in kind, but only in degree. The 
Epicurean theory of language in fact has a place for such extraordinary individuals. They are the 
leaders of a second stage of the emergence of language, in which rudimentary language is 
expanded and refined through the addition of new terms and the elimination of ambiguities. The 
more acute are able to obtain preconceptions (prolēpseis) of concepts that remain unclear to the 
majority of men, until a term is introduced. In any case, Lucretius could still point to the baseline 
of ability that all members of a linguistic community—from the most able to the least able—
must be presumed to share. This fact alone (he would assert) is enough to refute the sole name-
giver hypothesis. 
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Lucretius’ second objection is that no pre-linguistic human, even the most able, could 
foresee and plan for the emergence of language.
189
 The problem with such a story—if it were 
true—is that the preconception (prolēpsis) of the advantage of language is acquired only through 
experience, and in keeping with Epicurean theory of knowledge, this experience must be the 
experience of beneficially using language. Where could the original name-giver have gotten such 
experience? By definition, he can be assumed to have no one capable of to collaborate with him. 
As Lucretius observes, it is language which grants the ability to “know and see with [one’s] mind 
what [one] wants to do.”190 The claim that the original name-giver could have “planned it all out” 
is thus doubly absurd. He would have no notion of language prior to the experience of it—nor 
would he have the ability to make and execute detailed projects such as the institution of 
language. 
Lucretius’ final objection is that a single person could neither compel the multitude, nor 
even, by compulsion, teach so much as a single individual.
191
 If the audience is truly “deaf” to 
his entreaties, as the sole name-giver theory requires, then they will not respond to any of his 
attempts at persuasion. It seems reasonable to ask, at this point, why Lucretius would spend his 
time focusing on such an extreme—not to say implausible—version of the conventionalist 
account. Nichols concludes that Lucretius’ goal is to emphasize the naturalness of language—
which only can be done by pointing to evidence of an intrinsic, universal linguistic capacity, and 
demonstrating the incoherence of theories that assume there is no such capacity, or a capacity 
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which is not universal. This explanation seems correct, and it has the benefit of casting additional 
light on Lucretius’ intentions in subsequent verses, in which he describes the vocal abilities of 
animals. In Nichols’s reading, Lucretius’ account of language has the function of making human 
speech appear no more remarkable than the barking of dogs.
192
 
To this, I would add that Lucretius is likely responding to the specific version of the 
name-giver theory which had been advanced in Cicero’s De inventione. In Cicero’s version, the 
original name-giver is an orator. “There was a time,” he writes, “when men wandered at random 
over the fields, after the fashion of beasts, and supported life on the food of beasts; nor did they 
do anything by means of the reasoning powers of the mind.”193 There is little difference, at this 
point, between this and the Epicurean account of man’s initial state. Lucretius could have 
accepted this word-for-word as a description of the original condition of mankind. Cicero notes 
in particular the absence of law: “nor had any one [at this time] any idea what great advantage 
there might be in a system of equal law.”194 
 The turning point, on Cicero’s account, comes when some exceptional individual 
identifies the latent powers of the human mind and sets himself the goal of developing them to 
their full fruition—in himself and in others. 
At this time then a man, a great and a wise man truly was he, perceived what materials 
there were, and what great fitness there was in the minds of men for the most important 
affairs, if any one could only draw it out, and improve it by education.
195
 
                                                             
192  
Nichols, Epicurean Political Philosophy, pp. 131-137. 
193  
Cicero, De inventione I.2. 
194  
Cicero, De inventione I.2. 
195  
Cicero, De inventione I.2. 
99 
 
 
In order to do this, however, he must communicate his insight and persuade those around him of 
its value. 
No wisdom which was silent and destitute of skill in speaking could have had such power 
as to turn men on a sudden from their previous customs, and to lead them to the adoption 
of a different system of life.”196 
 
The Epicurean account of the origins of language and of justice consciously opposes this view. 
Not name-giving and persuasion, but expediency and fortuitous coincidence, led men to first 
organize themselves in societies. The rhetorical tradition represents original language as a 
product of one exceptional (human) intellect, thus showing some degree of sympathy with 
religious beliefs that represent language as the product of divine intellect; Epicureans, on the 
other hand, deny that any individual could have assembled and taught a “deaf” multitude. For 
them, the origin and development of language are transacted “in common.” In keeping with this, 
                                                             
196  Cicero’s point had been previously made by Isocrates. See Isocrates, Nicocles III.5-ff., 
on the power of persuasive speech to raise man from the level of beasts to a civilized state: 
[B]ecause there has been implanted in us the power to persuade each other and to make 
clear to each other whatever we desire, not only have we escaped the life of wild beasts, 
but we have come together and founded cities and made laws and invented arts; and, 
generally speaking, there is no institution devised by man which the power of speech has 
not helped us to establish. For this it is which has laid down laws concerning things just 
and unjust, and things base and honorable; and if it were not for these ordinances we 
should not be able to live with one another. 
On the Epicurean view, the Ciceronian-Isocratean account is close to being the reverse of what 
we must suppose to have actually occurred. Primitive humanity escapes “the life of wild beasts” 
spurred by natural necessity. Then the weakest members of the community—children—are 
constrained to utter sounds which reason retrospectively associates with particular needs. 
Through a gradual process of bootstrapping, those with clearer conceptions of a thing utter words 
which can be used by others to refine their own conceptions. Speech, in every instance, follows 
upon natural necessity, rather than looking ahead (as in the Ciceronian-Isocratean account) to a 
new and better system of life.    
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the rhetorical tradition represents the origin of language as something wonderful, while Lucretius 
dismisses it as a straightforwardly natural consequence of man’s inherent capacities. He attempts 
to dispel the wonder that may result when one contemplates the origins of a phenomenon as 
complex, articulate and finely-tuned as language. His account of the origins of language 
resembles his other polemics against design. 
Lucretius argues that it would be folly to suppose the existence of an original “name-
giver”—that is to say, a god or “culture-hero” responsible for giving names and teaching men the 
proper use of these names. The first objection that he makes against this hypothesis is that it does 
not explain why one individual alone would have the ability to give names to things, while the 
rest of humanity finds itself reduced to a position of passive receptivity. If the name-giver has the 
power to attribute names to things, then so does everyone else, and we have a multitude of 
“personal” languages with no ability to communicate with one another. The name-giver 
hypothesis thus fails to explain what was intended—that is, how it could have come to be that 
multiple individuals speak the same language. 
One of the things we notice in Lucretius’ description of the origins of language is the way 
in which the human power of language is analogized to animal capacities and, in particular, the 
natural weapons with which many animals are supplied. Thus the human “sounds of the tongue” 
are analogized to the horns of a calf, or the sharp claws and teeth of a panther kitten, or lion cub. 
In keeping with this point, Lucretius’ account of human language is immediately followed by an 
account of the noises made by various animals; the first being the “growling” of “Molossian 
hounds.” What is the purpose of these analogies? The first point Lucretius makes is that it is a 
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mistake to believe an animal’s attributes or natural capacities are given with purposeful intent.197 
The lion does not have claws in order that it might hunt other beasts, rather the lion happens by 
chance to have claws, and happens by chance to find itself in circumstances where it might 
discover the claws’ optimal use. The role of fortune is emphasized, teleology denied. 
Unfortunate combinations of traits (a hermaphrodite, a sheep with lion’s claws, a lion with 
sheep’s anima) are winnowed out.198 Some varieties ill-suited to protect themselves are 
preserved because they are useful to human beings; these become domesticated animals. 
I suggest that Lucretius’ presentation of the Epicurean account of human linguistic 
capacity is meant to be understood within a similar framework. We human beings do not have a 
tongue and vocal cords in order that we may speak with one another and thereby live politically; 
rather, we have a tongue and vocal cords by fortuitous coincidence, and it is fortuitous 
coincidence that led some men to happen upon a social use for the human capacity for 
vocalization. If primitive humans did not make use of their communicative capacity (and did not 
make use of it to a specific end—i.e. the protection of women and children) then the human race 
would have long ago gone extinct.
199
 One might imagine that those early humans who did not 
have the capacity (or the inclination) to join together in bonds of friendship and equity were 
winnowed out just as surely as the lion with a sheep’s anima. 
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A fundamental principle of the Epicurean account of human social origins is that nature is 
indifferent, or even hostile to human flourishing. This can be taken as a corollary of the assertion 
that the gods did not create the world for man: “the world (natura rerum) was certainly not made 
for us by divine power,” Lucretius writes.200 The defectiveness of this world is immediately 
apparent.
201
 Lucretius’ favored principle of spontaneous generation is contrasted to purposeful 
divine creation: the former is capable of accounting for imperfection, while the latter is not. 
What are the political implications of this account the origin of language and the origin of 
political society? Two in particular stand out. First, the parallelism between the origin of 
language and the origin of justice serves to emphasize justice’s essential character as agreement 
for mutual advantage, thereby helping to ensure that it will never “point outside itself” or toward 
something higher. No one could mistake Epicurean justice—or the Epicurean virtue more 
generally—as the perfection of man. Whether one regards this as a strength, or as a weakness of 
the theory is, of course, open to debate—and the debate is resumed in new and fascinating ways 
with the emergence of Christianity, as I will show in the next chapter. 
Second, it fills in a gap in the Epicurean account of human social origins—a gap which is 
most obvious if we set it alongside the account of social origins found in Aristotle. If “man is by 
nature a political animal,” then, even if the first humans lived scattered like beasts, the 
foundation of the first political communities can be thought of as deeply purposeful in the sense 
of answering an innate human need. Epicurus, of course, would reject this teleological view. The 
alternative he proposes is more nuanced. Man is not by nature a political animal. The transition 
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from bestial origins to speech and to political life is indifferent or “accidental.” The Epicurean 
view, particularly in the form in which it is presented by Lucretius, has sometimes been mistaken 
for “primitivism.”202 It is nothing of the sort. The transition, indifferent in itself, from savagery to 
community, acquires significance in light of the emergence of the philosophy which liberates 
man from his bondage to fear and unnecessary desires. Of course, this philosophy then teaches 
those men who comprehend it to turn their backs on political life as the multiplier par excellence 
of fear and unnecessary desires. Still, it is only with the aid of philosophy that men can order 
their lives properly according to the simple standard—pleasure—which had been available to 
them prior to philosophy and prior even to language. To be sure, the emergence of the city, and 
of the false philosophies which proliferate within it, throws additional obstacles in the way of our 
simple, unreflective adherence to pleasure’s commands. The paradoxical character of Epicurean 
political philosophy is manifest in the leap from the faceless city which concludes DRN book V, 
to the portrait of Epicurus which begins DRN book VI. The polis, on this account, is a detour 
nature takes in order to get to one or two great men.
                                                             
202  A misconception which has become increasingly rare. See Philip Merlan, “Lucretius—
Primitivist or Progressivist?” Journal of the History of Ideas 11.3 (1950), p. 358, who concludes, 
“[i]t would seem somewhat unfair to Lucretius to pin him down either as a progressivist or a 
primitivist; it seems too much even to say that his attitude towards the primitive past was 
ambiguous—because it does not seem that he wanted to treat the problem at all.” (Emphasis 
added.) Merlan’s final claim is mistaken, I think. Lucretius treated the problem quite deftly, and 
with an appreciation for the inherent paradoxes of the Epicurean position. His attitude only 
appears “ambiguous” or “evasive” if one assumes—as Merlan indeed does—that DRN book V is 
unfinished or “in the character of a draft or disconnected jottings.” Since there is ex hypothesi no 
“unity of composition,” the historical critic is free to impose whatever “unity of thought” makes 
the most sense to him. 
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THE ORIGINS OF MODERNITY 
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Chapter V: The Epicurean Revival 
Most scholarship on the recovery and reception of Epicurean ideas emphasizes the 
incompatibility of Epicurean and Christian worldviews. In this chapter, I will argue that, while 
comprehensive disagreement may form part of the background for the renaissance recovery and 
reception of Epicurean ideas, potential for common cause on narrow points of mutual agreement 
has been underappreciated. Building on the account of Epicurean political philosophy advanced 
in preceding chapters, I identify one area of potential agreement in political philosophy. The 
Epicurean and the Christian share a cautious, critical orientation toward thumos, and toward the 
all-encompassing claims of ancient politics. Nor is this area of potential agreement merely 
hypothetical. Humanist thinkers such as Valla, Erasmus, and More recognize the opportunity to 
appropriate Epicurean arguments for the sake of defending a distinctively Christian notion of the 
human good against dangerous excesses associated with the return to ancient models of virtue. 
The first part of this chapter will give a brief overview of early Christian responses to 
Epicurean philosophy. The purpose of this is not to tell the “story” of the often fraught relations 
between Christians and Epicureans in late antiquity; indeed, it is one contention of this chapter 
that there is no such “story.” Christian responses to Epicurean philosophy are remarkably varied. 
To single out the political aspect of these responses, we see on the one hand Church Fathers 
excoriating the Epicurean project to abolish men’s fears of the afterlife on the grounds that this 
will undermine the fear of punishment which is a necessary support of the law. On the other hand, 
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we see parallels in Epicurean and early Christian suspicion of political virtue—and, occasionally, 
these parallels lead to common ground, and to open expressions of approval.
203
 
The prevailing view is that Christianity is at odds with Epicureanism—arguably more at 
odds with Epicureanism than with any other school of ancient philosophy. An opposing view 
exists, however, in which Christianity and Epicureanism are viewed as sharing considerable 
common ground. The general question of Christianity’s relation to Epicureanism is a larger one 
than can reasonably fit within the scope of this thesis. Nevertheless, it seems possible to shed 
light on the problem, by looking at the issue from a political perspective. My purpose in the 
present chapter is to describe the interactions between Epicurean and Christian political thought. 
Augustine provides a model for the appropriation of ancient ideas when he comments on 
the Biblical “spoliation of the Egyptians.” Ancient philosophy contains within it valuable “gold” 
as well as useless “dross.” Given Augustine’s own critical attitude toward libido dominandi—the 
political “lust for domination”—it would seem that Augustine himself should have been the first 
to discover the potential for Christian appropriation of the Epicurean critique of thumos. In the 
City of God, Augustine compares the differences between the Stoic and Epicurean schools. 
Surprisingly, the Stoics are subjected to criticism every bit as harsh as that faced by the 
Epicureans. Stoic pride is every bit as flawed—every bit as “according to the flesh”—as 
Epicurean indulgence of the senses. 
                                                             
203  In view of early Christian approbation of Epicurus’ own modest and communal way of 
life, Norman W. DeWitt argues “it would have been singularly easy for an Epicurean to become 
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Cambridge Companion to Epicureanism, J. Warren, ed., pp. 60-64. I will argue (as many of the 
early Christians themselves did) that the speculative differences between Christians and 
Epicureans were, on many points, irreconcilable. 
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The question that developed during the renaissance was: could Christian humanists find 
the resources within ancient thought to counter the hazardous tendencies inherent in the ancient 
theory of virtue? To the Christian, thumotic ancient political thought inflamed sinful desires. The 
clash between ancient and Christian ideas during the renaissance meant that the problem was 
newly aggravated. 
It is in this context that we see humanists such as Valla, Erasmus and More giving 
Epicurean moral philosophy its first serious reappraisal since antiquity. Earlier writers, hampered 
by the lack of source materials, retained some idea of “Epicureanism” but associated it with base 
sensualism. In the humanists, we see an appreciation for the nuances of the Epicurean conception 
of pleasure. For these thinkers, a significant part of the appeal of Epicurean thought was that it 
could inculcate the heart against a political conception of virtue. It might even serve as a 
corrective to the excesses of Christian prelates. 
Epicureanism remained dangerous—particularly as regards its theology and cosmology. 
Still, the humanists could find some justification and even prior precedent for a sympathetic 
reappraisal of selected Epicurean ideas. The Church Fathers in general seem to have found 
specific features of Epicurean thought worthy of approbation. For this reason it has been claimed 
that there is virtually no Epicurean doctrine which was not appropriated or endorsed by some 
Church Father. As I will show, this risks overstating the case. In fact, there are some Epicurean 
doctrines which cannot be endorsed or appropriated from within the context of orthodox 
Christianity. There was real potential, however, for a selective appropriation of parts of 
Epicurean moral thought—provided they could be detached from scandalous theological and 
cosmological doctrines. 
108 
 
What does this mean for our understanding of the history of political thought? One 
potential benefit of this project is that it further complicates one influential account of the origin 
of modern republicanism. The civic humanist thesis, as proposed in the work of Hans Baron, and 
elaborated (with important modifications) by many others, including J.G.A. Pocock and Quentin 
Skinner, identifies the revival of classical political models, beginning in Renaissance Florence, 
as an event of unparalleled significance in the history of the emergence of a distinctively modern 
set of political ideas.
204
 Major differences of opinion and interpretation between these thinkers 
make it difficult to speak of “civic humanism” or a “republican tradition” without immediately 
qualifying one’s claims. Still, there does seem to be a general trend within the civic humanist 
literature toward a greater appreciation of the complexities and internal tensions within our 
republican inheritance. Thus, against Pocock’s view, which had emphasized continuities between 
the “Atlantic” republican tradition and its classical antecedents, Skinner, in particular, has 
highlighted the neo-Roman character of much early republican thought. Eric Nelson, more 
recently, has identified a Greek tradition in republican thought, which is, in many respects, 
diametrically opposed to Roman or neo-Roman versions of republicanism.
205
 The differences 
between the neo-Roman and Greek traditions are well worth pausing to consider. The neo-
Roman view endorses the aggressive pursuit of wealth and glory for the sake of the res publica, 
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and defines liberty, fundamentally, as non-domination. The Greek view, on the other hand, is 
associated with concern for a balanced distribution of property, endorses (or looks favorably 
upon) the philosopher’s reluctance to rule, and defines liberty as the rule of reason. 
Seen from within this framework, the present chapter’s review of humanist 
appropriations of Epicurean moral philosophy helps to flesh out a more complete picture of the 
Greek tradition. Lucretius, on this reading, becomes a sort of “honorary Greek,” on account of 
his many pointed criticisms of politics and of Roman wealth- and glory-seeking. For humanist 
thinkers of the renaissance, particularly in its northern European manifestations, the 
comprehensive struggle against Romanitas may have helped to forge strange new alliances. Thus 
in Thomas More’s Utopia, we see a novel syncretism of Platonic and Epicurean elements for the 
apparent purpose of illustrating a best-possible regime in the absence of Christian revelation. 
Utopia takes many of its most important cues from the Greek tradition—indeed, it seems 
intentionally designed to look like “nonsense” from the Roman point of view.206 Epicureanism 
makes a significant, if understated, contribution to More’s statement of Greek republicanism, 
insofar as it provides many of the strongest and most scathing critiques of the Roman model. 
This is not to say that Utopia is an Epicurean document. In fact, the regime of the Utopians 
represents a synthesis of Epicurean and other Greek elements, within a context deeply influenced 
by the classical political philosophy of Plato’s Republic. Still, Epicureanism has an important, if 
inherently limited, part to play in More’s Utopia. 
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Epicurean ideas play a rather different role in the political thought of Niccolò Machiavelli. 
Recent scholarship has complicated the view of Machiavelli as a neo-Roman theorist, 
highlighting cases in which the Greek tradition influenced Machiavelli and other thinkers of in 
his circle. Nelson, in particular, suggests that Machiavelli has internalized some Polybian ideas 
regarding corruption and inequality of wealth—without definitively associating himself with the 
neo-Roman or the Greek tradition.
207
 I will argue that, far from fitting Epicurean ideas into a 
syncretic republican framework as More had done, Machiavelli, latches on to the anti-republican 
implications of Epicurean philosophy, particularly evident in its physics and cosmology. In this 
way, Epicureanism serves for him, not as a resource to be mined for arguments critical of 
Romanitas, but as a means to evade the opposition of Greeks and Romans altogether. In 
agreement with recent work by Paul Rahe, I see Machiavelli as providing an internal critique of 
Epicureanism—one which takes very seriously the Epicurean account of “worldly things,” but 
finds that philosophic self-effacement is not the only possible response to an indifferent 
universe.
208
 
 
Quid ergo Athenis et Hierosolymis? 
“What has Athens to do with Jerusalem?” The question posed by Tertullian (c. 160—c. 
225 A.D.) speaks to the clash of ideas which he and his co-religionists were party to.
209
 The 
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Church Fathers were steeped in the philosophical culture of “Athens,” and they debated amongst 
themselves the question of how to respond to it. Should they welcome the arguments of Greek 
philosophy? Or should they reject them? Tertullian’s rhetorical question is a contribution to this 
conversation. Philosophy, on the view he propounds here, is a source of heresies. He warns his 
fellow Christians to avoid philosophical argument, lest they introduce a spirit of “curious 
disputation” into their faith. The alternative to “Athens,” or philosophy, is represented by him as 
“Jerusalem,” and the question he asks is whether “curious disputation” which divides itself into 
all sorts of contentious heresies, or rather faith’s “simplicity of heart,” is the better guide to 
truth.
210
 Philosophy itself concedes defeat—or so he claims—because it is unable to achieve the 
sort of consensus that befits truth. Tertullian exhorts his fellow believers to avoid the dead end of 
idle speculation: “Away with all attempts to produce a mottled Christianity of Stoic, Platonic, 
and dialectic composition!”211 
The problem can be seen as one of a clash of authorities; an instance, perhaps, of the 
irreducible conflict between reason and revelation.
212
 Christianity takes issue with philosophy as 
such. But if it is possible to draw distinctions between philosophies which are relatively less and 
more unacceptable, the distinctions might seem to go as follows. Leo Strauss observes, “It is 
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212  See Leo Strauss, “Jerusalem and Athens,” in Jewish Philosophy and the Crisis of 
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often said that the philosopher who comes closest to the Bible is Plato.”213 By a similar token, 
the philosopher who is often said to stray farthest from the Bible is none other than Epicurus.
214
 
The roots of disagreement could not lie any deeper. Whereas the Bible teaches that “fear of the 
Lord is the beginning of wisdom,” the Epicurean regards fear, particularly religious fear, as 
childish ignorance.
215
 The task of philosophy is to show that “even as children tremble and fear 
everything in blinding darkness, so we sometimes dread in the light things that are no whit more 
to be feared than what children shudder at in the dark.” In so showing, philosophy dispels our 
fears, “not by the rays of the sun and the gleaming shafts of day, but by the aspect and law of 
nature.”216 The particular fear for which Epicurus and his followers have the greatest concern is 
fear of death. It is the job of philosophy to show that death is nothing to worry about, both 
because it does not lead to anything terrible, and because is not in itself anything terrible.
217
 
The account of Paul’s missionary journey to Athens (c. 50 A.D.) described in Acts, 
chapter 17, is the first reported encounter between Christians and Epicureans. Paul encounters 
“some Stoic and Epicurean philosophers” in the Agora, and they bring him before the Areopagus. 
There, he addresses a crowd of men and women who “spent their time in nothing else, but either 
to tell or to hear some new thing.” Paul’s response is to rebuke the Athenians for their 
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superstition, and to suggest that the city’s patronage of so many schools of philosophy is linked 
to its idolatry. He tells them that God the creator is no longer hidden. He will come to “judge the 
world in righteousness,” and the “proof” (pistin) of this is the resurrection of the dead. Some in 
the crowd mock, while others say, “We will hear again of this matter.”218 
It is striking that Paul appears to associate Athenian philosophy with idolatry. This may 
be because he likens the proliferation of sects to the proliferation of gods, or because he senses 
that philosophy and idolatry share a common source in the desire to “tell or hear some new thing.” 
Perhaps we should regard this phrase as an early articulation of what Tertullian was to call 
“curious disputation”—the mindset which he earnestly implores Christians to expel from their 
faith. In any case, we must imagine that the Epicureans are at the forefront of those mocking 
when they hear Paul speak of the resurrection.
219
 The central tenet of Paul’s Christian faith is 
precisely what the Epicurean must mock. Thus Tertullian, in his synoptic account of the ancient 
schools of philosophy, specifically associates Epicureanism with “the opinion that the soul 
dies.”220 
A dispute of equal importance concerns the nature of the Deity, or, in the Epicurean case, 
of deities. The problem is not so much that the Epicureans were accused of being atheists—an 
accusation they could rebut with specific references, chapter and verse, in their master’s 
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writings.
221
 Nor was it the fact that they asserted a plurality of gods— which Plato and Aristotle 
could be read as doing. The particularly intractable problem is that the Epicureans deny any 
providential role to the gods as being incompatible with the nature of divine happiness. For 
Epicurus, the gods are perfectly self-sufficient. As a result, they cannot be benefited or harmed, 
and they are therefore immune to any feelings of anger or gratitude.
222
 As the Christian 
rhetorician Lactantius (c.240—c.320 A.D.) points out, this view seems destined to destroy all 
religion. If God feels no gratitude, what could be more senseless than “to build temples, to offer 
sacrifices, to present gifts, to diminish our property, [all] that we may obtain nothing?” Or, on the 
other side of the equation, “How can religion itself be maintained or guarded without fear? For 
that which is not feared is despised.”223 He judges that the Epicurean scheme of abolishing fear 
will undermine religious observance, in such a way as would ultimately terminate in the 
destruction of all political life. The laws themselves will lack force if there is no religious terror 
to support fear of punishment. “Laws cannot punish conscience unless some terror from above 
hangs over to restrain offenses.” 
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For Christian authors, the Epicurean denial of life after death, which implies the denial of 
divine judgment after death, is not only theologically but also politically hazardous—the belief 
that one will be judged in the life to come is a necessary support for justice, and for the laws of 
this world. Tertullian argues that the Epicurean account of death, with its emphasis on the 
finitude of earthly suffering, undermines the fear of punishment that is an essential component of 
the authority of all human laws. Only a Christian who believes in eternal punishment can be 
trusted to uphold the law in all circumstances. 
Epicurus makes light of all torture and pain; “if it is slight,” he says, “you may despise it, 
if it is great it will not be long.” Yes! We who are examined in the sight of God who sees 
all, we who foresee an eternal punishment from His hand, we well may be the only ones 
to attain innocence.
224
 
 
It should be noted that this specific criticism need not presume a Christian theological basis. 
When Cicero posed his version of the Ring of Gyges dilemma for the Epicurean hedonist, one of 
his arguments was that Epicurean philosophy (by its own claim) enabled its practitioners to hold 
in contempt all earthly punishment, through its teaching that all pains are endurable or that, “pain, 
if extreme, is present a very short time, and even that degree of pain which barely outweighs 
pleasure in the flesh does not last for many days together.”225 The Christian version of the 
argument, as put forward by Tertullian and Lactantius, is more pointed, however: the fear of the 
Lord on this account is the beginning not only of human piety, but of human wisdom, and of 
human justice. The Epicurean project of dispelling fears thus targets the roots of human moral 
virtue. 
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Insofar as Epicurus uses materialist arguments to establish the mortality of the soul, 
materialism too would seem to be a likely target. This was not generally the case. 
226
 A curious 
example, suggesting how the ideas of materialism and mortalism might be distinguished, appears 
centuries later in Dante’s Inferno. It seems that atomistic physics is not, in itself, grounds for 
giving a negative assessment of an ancient philosopher. In Limbo, Dante encounters Democritus, 
the philosopher “who ascribes the world to chance,” amongst a “family” of philosophers which 
includes not only Socrates, Plato and Aristotle—but even Averroes.227 Epicurus and his 
adherents, however, are consigned to the sixth circle and the company of heretics, where they 
rest forever, entombed in sealed sepulchers. “In this part,” Dante writes, “Epicurus with all his 
followers, who make their soul die with the body, have their burial place.”228 Epicurus, who has 
killed the soul with his doctrines, experiences the soul’s true death as an eternal form of 
punishment. 
Surveying the writings of the Church Fathers, one finds expressions of approval for 
Epicurean views in canonic, physics, and even ethics, but there is little middle ground between 
orthodox Christian belief in the resurrection, and Epicurean belief in the eternal death of the 
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mortal human soul. Augustine, for example, writes that before his conversion he thought very 
highly of the Epicurean system: 
[A]s I saw it, Epicurus would have won the debate [between schools of philosophy] had I 
not believed that after death life remains for the soul, and so do the consequences of our 
moral actions; this Epicurus refused to believe.
229
 
 
Augustine’s point here is not just that Epicureanism is incompatible with orthodox Christianity, 
but that, like Tertullian and Lactantius, he regards the doctrine of the soul’s eternal death as 
undermining moral responsibility and threatening justice in this world. 
 
Athenae et Hierosolyma, continued 
Perhaps the most famous Christian criticism specific to Epicureanism is Jerome’s brief 
biographical notice concerning Lucretius. In his entry for the year 94 B.C., Jerome writes: 
The poet Titus Lucretius is born. He was later driven mad by a love philtre and, having 
composed between bouts of insanity several books (which Cicero afterwards corrected), 
committed suicide at the age of 44.
230
 
 
This passage has been criticized as factual error or even sheer invention—at best, it seems to 
provide no more than a hostile and potentially misleading caricature of what Epicurean 
philosophy really is.
231
 Still, it highlights the tendency of Christian critics of Epicureanism to 
focus their attention on the supposed excesses of the Epicurean pursuit of pleasure. 
In some versions, this criticism emphasizes the political cost of uninhibited pursuit of 
desires. Thus Lactantius claims: 
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In order to attract the masses, Epicureanism speaks to the lifestyles of individuals. It 
recommends the lazy not to study, it liberates the mean from public benefactions, it 
advises the coward against politics, the slothful against exercise, and the scared against a 
military career.
232
 
 
This political variation on the conventional anti-hedonist criticism appears to have been 
borrowed from the Stoics. The Stoic Epictetus (55-135 A.D.), for example, had argued that 
Epicurus “cut off all that characterizes a man, and the head of a household, and citizen, and 
friend, but he could not cut off human desires.”233 The suggestion here is that Epicurean 
hedonism is profoundly anti-social, since it strikes at the roots of every sort of interpersonal 
attachment. The irony here is that Lactantius, who is such a comprehensive critic of ancient 
politics, appropriates a criticism of Epicureanism made on behalf of ancient politics. But animus 
against Epicureanism could at times create strange new partnerships. 
Augustine ties criticism of Epicurean hedonism to Biblical teachings concerning “the 
flesh,” and the practice of “living according to the flesh.”234 For him, the espousal of hedonism is 
equivalent to living “by the rule of the flesh since it places “the highest good in physical 
pleasure.”235 This strand of criticism, in particular, enjoys a life of its own—even after the loss of 
the majority of Epicurean source-texts. The association of Epicureanism with hedonism and 
sensualism (even in the form of an exaggerated caricature) can be seen in, for example, 
Chaucer’s only explicit reference to Epicurus, which occurs in his description of the Franklin, 
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who is said to be “Epicurus owene sone, / That heeld opinioun that pleyn delit /Was verray 
felicitee parfit.
236
 
With the return of Epicurean texts into wide circulation, the first question humanist 
thinkers had to confront was: Does Christianity necessarily find itself in conflict with 
Epicureanism? One possible answer to the question is “yes.” The “necessary conflict” thesis was 
not new, having roots that go back to the first reported encounters between Epicurean philosophy 
and revealed religion. As we have seen, there are a number of good reasons to support it. 
In Stephen Greenblatt’s recent book, he argues that conflict is necessary, and that the 
Christian side had won round one: “In one of the great cultural transformations in the history of 
the West, the pursuit of pain triumphed over the pursuit of pleasure.”237 I think this is, first, an 
oversimplification of Christian attitudes (pleasure, even ecstatic pleasure, plays a role in 
Christian beatitudo). Second, I think it misrepresents Epicurean attitudes towards pleasure. The 
pleasures of kinesis are to be indulged, it is true; but there is something peculiarly ascetic about 
Epicurean indulgence. Epicurus once told a disciple that there was probably no one who had ever 
gotten anything good out of sexual intercourse.
238
 Lucretius warned against getting too caught up 
in the particular object of sexual attraction. He would have harshly criticized anyone who risked 
getting caught up in “love.” Epicurean hēdonē is a hēdonē bereft of eros. 
The question a “yes” answer poses is: what to make of the recovery and dissemination of 
Epicurean ideas, and especially of the poem of Lucretius, during the renaissance? Now, broadly 
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speaking, there are two possible responses. One is that attempts to transmit (or revive) Epicurean 
ideas are subversive of Christianity. The other, as Greenblatt perceptively theorizes, is that they 
are attempts at containment by conceding some ground to subversion.
239
 The latter in particular 
is problematic. It may be very hard—even impossible—to decide which is occurring in a given 
case. For these reasons, I believe that the “necessary conflict” thesis leaves us at an impasse. I 
accept the specific points of conflict enumerated above, but argue that this does not preclude 
agreement on a particular, narrowly defined subset of moral questions. In other words, I will 
argue that parts of Epicurean philosophy are, within a Christian context, seen as acceptable and 
even useful correctives to undesirable tendencies in ancient (and Christian) thought. 
Furthermore, I argue that the potential for agreement was recognized and developed in 
the writings of several renaissance humanists; among them, Lorenzo Valla, Desiderius Erasmus, 
and Thomas More. Taken together, these thinkers make the case, not only that certain parts of 
Epicurean moral philosophy were worthy of consideration by a thoughtful Christian, but that 
some of these ideas might help to inoculate the Christian against some dangerous tendencies in 
ancient thought. This move, I shall attempt to show, was of immense significance for subsequent 
political theory. 
 
Pagan and Christian virtue 
Leonardo Bruni’s “Laudatio of the city of Florence” (c. 1403-1404) exemplifies the spirit 
of renaissance civic pride—pride in the specifically ancient parts of a people’s inheritance. In 
Bruni’s formulation, Rome is Florence’s “patrimonial legacy.” And not just any Rome, but the 
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best Rome—the Roman Republic. The Laudatio stands as an expression of continuity between 
ancient and modern virtue.
240
 Bruni bases his Laudatio on ancient models—particularly Aristides’ 
eulogy of Athens.
241
 The Laudatio is professedly Christian. It ends with a prayer—and yet it 
raises a problem that would, increasingly come to preoccupy humanist thought. Could pagan and 
Christian virtue coexist? The city, locus of the pagan conception of virtue, would become the 
nexus of the conflict. 
The tension between ancient and modern conceptions of virtue was recognized in ancient 
times. Augustine, for example, criticizes ancient “worldly” virtue in a chapter of City of God 
entitled “That It is as Shameful for the Virtues to Serve Human Glory as Bodily Pleasure” 
There is nothing, say our philosophers, more disgraceful and monstrous than this picture 
[i.e. of the virtues serving pleasure], and which the eyes of good men can less endure. 
And they say the truth. But I do not think that the picture would be sufficiently becoming, 
even if it were made so that the virtues should be represented as the slaves of human 
glory; for, though that glory be not a luxurious woman, it is nevertheless puffed up, and 
has much vanity in it.
242
 
In City of God, Augustine observes the differences between the Stoic and Epicurean schools. The 
comparison is not one sided in favor of Stoicism, as one might expect. Rather, the ancients are 
taken to task for having made the desire for glory the guiding principle of the whole of virtue.
243
 
The Stoics as well as the Epicureans are taken to task for “living according to the flesh.” All 
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ancient philosophy is infected with dominandi libido, lust for domination, on this 
interpretation.
244
 
In sum, the problem faced by humanist political thought is this: the ancient city had been 
able to accept the love of honor and glory as a constituent part of virtue. Christianity, on the 
other hand, condemned love of honor as incipient “pride.” How could a good Christian make use 
of ancient political examples? Rabelais, for example, writes: 
[The] imitation of the ancient Herculeses, Alexanders, Hannibals, Scipios, Caesars, and 
other such heroes, is quite contrary to the profession of the gospel of Christ, by which we 
are commanded to preserve, keep, rule, and govern every man his own country and lands, 
and not in a hostile manner to invade others; and that which heretofore the Barbars and 
Saracens called prowess and valour, we do now call robbing, thievery, and wickedness.
245
 
 
It is important to note that, in this passage, Rabelais not only identifies the contrast between 
classical and Christian conceptions of virtue, but that he specifies the question of non-
interference vs. “hostile invasion” as the crucial matter at stake. Machiavelli would agree with 
this formulation of the problem. Indeed, his political philosophy can be thought of as a 
systematic critique of the idea that it is possible to “preserve, keep, rule, and govern every man 
his own country and lands, and not in a hostile manner to invade others.” 
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Spoliation of the Epicureans? 
Augustine puts forward his views on philosophy in the context of a scriptural exegesis.
246
 
In Exodus 12:35-36, the children of Israel, having been told to leave Egypt by the Pharaoh, 
“borrow”from the Egyptians their gold and silver and garments. This so-called “spoliation of the 
Egyptians” becomes an example for Augustine and his contemporaries, Christians steeped in a 
Hellenic culture. Like the Israelites, they are instructed by God to take whatever is valuable—not 
in this case gold or silver or garments, but “liberal instruction,” “principles of morality,” and 
“even some truths in regard to the worship of God.” The Christian “separates himself in spirit” 
from pagan culture, just as the Israelite separated himself bodily from the Egyptian kingdom 
during the Exodus. But the treasures of pagan culture are to be kept and put to a Christian use. 
Augustine makes his own preferences clear. He finds the greatest “treasures” in the 
doctrines of the Platonists. But he exhorts his fellow Christians to make use of “whatever is true 
and in harmony with our faith.” Thus the “spoliation of the Egyptians” provides a rationale for 
the eclectic appropriation of whatever may be found valuable in any of the schools of Greek 
philosophy, including the most hostile—in fact, better if it is hostile! At the same time, 
Augustine counsels his co-religionists to separate the gold from the dross: Christians must throw 
out the “false and superstitious fancies” and the “heavy burdens of unnecessary toil” that 
encumber every school of Greek philosophy. 
It is not too hard to guess which doctrines of Epicurean philosophy must be discarded. 
The Epicurean rejection of providence was deemed theologically unacceptable by every 
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Christian authority that we have any knowledge of. Likewise, the Epicurean denial of personal 
immortality. Even Tertullian, who at times flirts with corporealism and mortalism, accepts the 
doctrine of the resurrection. Finally, the Epicurean denial of heaven and hell, which was intended 
to eliminate the sources of fear, is theologically and politically suspect—theologically, because 
Christian revelation asserts judgment in the afterlife; politically, because the belief that one will 
be judged in a life to come is a necessary support for justice and the laws. 
Augustine’s “spoliation-rationale” was immensely influential. However, we find little 
sign of Christian appropriation of Epicurean ideas in the period following Augustine. Christian 
attitudes towards Greek philosophy had begun to crystallize, and Augustine’s oft-stated 
preference for Platonism had set an important precedent. Furthermore, it was becoming harder 
and harder to obtain Epicurean texts. The Emperor Julian had noted this phenomenon a 
generation prior to Augustine (c. 360 A.D.)—with expressions of approval, given his own 
Neoplatonist leanings: “The gods have already in their wisdom destroyed [most of the books of 
Epicurus and Pyrrho],” he notes with satisfaction in a letter to a pagan priest.247 Augustine, for 
his own knowledge of Epicureanism, seems to have chiefly relied not upon the works of the 
Epicurean school, but rather upon the works of Cicero, especially De natura deorum, the 
Tusculan Disputations, and De finibus. But it is clear that Augustine had some familiarity with 
the text of Lucretius as well, as his allusions, expressions of approval, and occasional examples 
taken from DRN show.
248
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Of the true and false good 
In 1417, Poggio Bracciolini, Florentine humanist and onetime Papal Secretary, 
discovered a long-forgotten copy of DRN in the library of a German monastery.
249
 The text of 
Lucretius was at this time otherwise unknown. Poggio had a copy made, and gradually the poem 
began to circulate in manuscript. It was first published in Brescia in 1473.
250
 Our other main 
source for Epicurean philosophy, Diogenes Laertius’ Lives of Eminent Philosophers, had 
circulated in a fragmentary form during the Middle Ages. A full text was brought from 
Constantinople to Florence in 1416, and a Latin translation by Ambrogio Traversari made its 
way into print in the early 1470s.
251
 Surprisingly, Epicureanism seems to have taken a detour 
from oblivion. More to our purposes, the conditions were once again present for the 
compatibility of Christian faith and Epicurean teaching to be put to the test. 
The most significant early attempt to probe the compatibility of Epicureanism and 
Christianity was Lorenzo Valla’s 1431 dialogue On Pleasure (De voluptate), which he later 
reworked and re-titled.
252
 Our reading is based on this final version, entitled Of the True and the 
False Good. Valla knew Poggio; the two were professional rivals. Interestingly, it seems that 
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Valla did not have access to the newly-recovered text of Lucretius—which was kept under lock 
and key by Poggio’s friend Niccoli during the 1430s.253 As a result, Valla was forced to resort to 
other sources (which would have included Diogenes Laertius, as well as the dialogues of Cicero) 
in order to construct his attempt at a vindication of the Epicurean doctrine of pleasure. 
The textual history of Valla’s dialogue is complicated. The work consists of three books, 
the first preceded by a proem in the author’s own voice. The interlocutors are chosen from 
among Valla’s contemporaries and they change between versions of the dialogue. The first 
(Leonardo Bruni/Catone Sacco) takes up the Stoic position defending virtue and honestas, the 
second (“Panormita”/Maffeo Vegio) takes up the Epicurean position defending pleasure, the 
third (Niccolò Niccoli/Antonio da Rho) takes what is ostensibly the “Christian” position and 
mediates between the two. In the end, he opines “although I disapprove of both sides, I make my 
decision in favor of the Epicureans [. . .] and against the Stoics.”254 In truth, he says, both schools 
of philosophy are unsatisfactory when compared to Christian revelation; but if one were forced 
to choose between them, Epicureanism is much to be preferred—it recognizes that true virtue is 
not the highest good, and it does not breed hypocrisy, as did the Stoic school. 
Valla’s readers, both then and now, have struggled to understand the intention of the 
dialogue. A vigorous defense of Epicurean doctrines in books I and II gives way, seemingly, to a 
statement of orthodox Christianity in book III.
255
 Greenblatt suggests that the dialogue can be 
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read either as an attempt at containment—or an attempt at subversion. “Which is it?” he asks, to 
which he responds: “It is exceedingly unlikely that at this distance anyone will discover the 
evidence that might definitively answer the question—if such evidence ever existed.”256 
I will argue (in agreement with Lorch and Hiett) that Valla’s argument is subversive in a 
different sense than Greenblatt may imply—that it proposes a return to what Valla considers the 
spirit of original Christianity, the spirit of the Fathers and of the Bible. The irony of Valla’s 
proposal is that it models itself, in certain respects, on the philosophical dialogues of Cicero, 
especially De finibus. But on the other hand, it uses Cicero to expound an anti-Ciceronian 
position. As Lorch and Hiett write, “it is typical of Valla to use an author against himself.” If 
what I am arguing is correct, Valla’s artfulness goes further. In fact, he uses the classical 
tradition against itself. That is to say, he finds in Epicurean philosophy (or in his creative 
reconstruction of Epicurean philosophy) a suitable tool for pruning back the excessive claims of 
the classical political tradition, as represented, in his work, at least, by the philosophical politics 
of Cicero. 
In the proem to book I, Valla declares that that he has chosen to place Stoic and 
Epicurean theories of the good in opposition to each other because “the Stoics assert more 
bitterly than all others the value of virtue.” The Epicurean advocacy of pleasure, with its 
instrumental account of virtue, seems to offer the best rebuttal to this view. The purpose of the 
dialogue is to refute the Stoics, to show that these proud philosophers champion “not virtue but 
the shadow of virtue, not honor but vanity, not duty but vice, not wisdom but folly.” These 
arrogant pagans and self-declared “followers of wisdom” would have done better “had they 
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worked for the cause of pleasure.”257 We should note that this is distinct from the actual 
advocacy of pleasure. 
The first speech of the dialogue is given by the Stoic spokesman Catone. In predictable 
fashion, he praises virtue and condemns pleasure. He cites Plato’s Phaedrus, for the claim that, if 
virtue could be seen with the human eye, it would incite an incredible love of wisdom.
258
 One 
may detect, in his critical recounting of the Epicurean newborn argument, more than a hint of the 
Christian doctrine of concupiscence: 
We can see children from infancy turning toward the vices of gluttony, games, and luxury, 
more than toward virtue and honor; they hate punishment and love caresses; they flee 
instruction and seek out lasciviousness. I pass over in silence with what pain good habits 
are inculcated.
259
 
 
This anti-hedonist credo sets the stage for the Epicurean Vegio’s rejoinder. He states that he will 
defend not only pleasure, but human nature itself: “what Nature created and shaped cannot be 
anything but holy and praiseworthy.” Thus the Stoic argument can be answered “piously, 
religiously, and without offending the ears of man.” He cites the providential design of nature 
described by Lactantius in his De opificio (On the Handiwork of God). It is true, Vegio admits, 
that Epicurus had denied divine providence—as good Christians, we must disavow this part of 
his philosophy. Vegio, for his part, will speak in defense of pleasure but he will not deny that “all 
things have been created in accordance with the providential care of Nature.” Thus it is not 
Epicureanism in toto but rather Epicurean hedonism which Vegio defends in books I and II. As 
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he does this, he simultaneously subjects the Stoic praise of virtue to a harsh critique. Most 
significantly for our purposes, Vegio singles out the Stoic virtue of courage, arguing that it is not 
in fact a good. The heroic Romans, “men like Codrus, Curtius, Decius, [and] Regulus,” alone 
enjoyed nothing of the goods which they had won through courage and acts of self-sacrifice.
260
 
Book III gives the response of Valla’s Christian spokesman, the monk and theologian 
Antonio da Rho. He finds something to praise and something to criticize the positions of both 
sides: 
I say that both sides of the argument—that of virtue and the right and that of pleasure—
ought to be both approved and disapproved. They ought to be approved because the 
virtuous and pleasure are both excellent things; they ought to be disapproved because 
they should be understood differently from the ways that your arguments intended.
261
 
 
This means, of course, that virtue and pleasure are worthy only to the extent that they are 
understood within a Christian theological framework. Still, from this framework, there is 
something to be said for both sides. Citing the passage from the Acts of the Apostles discussed 
above, da Rho suggests that the Bible’s reference to Stoics and Epicureans be regarded as a 
qualified endorsement. These schools are more worthy than the others; they represent the best 
that Greek philosophy has to offer. 
Interestingly, da Rho suggests that Vegio’s espousal of hedonism is ironic—“more 
Socrates than Epicurus,” as he phrases it.262 Why would Vegio have put forward arguments that 
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Compare Erasmus, In Praise of Folly, pp. 41-2, in which the speaker discusses the Decii 
and Curtius, asking, “what made the Decii devote themselves to the infernal gods, or Q. Curtius 
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that it is none other than “Folly” who has “laid the foundations of cities.” 
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he did not believe sincerely? We are given no clear indication. In the end, da Rho states that he 
disapproves of both sides, but favors that of the Epicureans. Human virtue is false religion or 
idolatry. True virtue is, rather, instrumental: 
[V]irtue is not to be desired for itself, as something severe, harsh, and arduous, nor is it to 
be desired for the sake of earthly profit; it is to be desired as a step toward that perfect 
happiness which the spirit of soul, freed from its mortal portion, will enjoy with the 
Father of all things, from whom it came.
263
 
 
That is to say, Epicurean arguments about the instrumentality of virtue, and even about the 
primacy of perfect happiness, are correct. It is true that the Epicureans erred in their description 
of perfect happiness—it is not ataraxia, but rather the heavenly bliss of the pious soul. 
All of this fits with the spoliation-rationale. In this respect, Valla modeled his actions on 
the Church Fathers, and especially Augustine, who served for him as objects of admiration. 
Valla’s methods are representative of the later trends in the Epicurean revival. The first part of 
Epicurean philosophy to receive widespread sympathetic reassessment was hedonism, and this 
reassessment was dependent upon recognition of the fundamental austerity of Epicurean pleasure. 
Thus Erasmus, in his colloquy “The Epicurean,” has one interlocutor defend the 
proposition that “there are no people more Epicurean than godly Christians.”264 This proposition 
is maintained, with some success, against another interlocutor’s skepticism through a rediscovery 
of the authentic Epicurean distinctions between bodily pleasure and mental pleasure, and 
between kinetic pleasure and katastematic pleasure. Erasmus cites Cicero in support of these 
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points.
265
 In the end, it is not clear whether Erasmus himself means to endorse the Epicurean 
view. The dialogue can certainly be read as falling within the tradition of anti-Epicurean 
literature. On this reading, the Epicurean notion of happiness is best fulfilled, not by an 
Epicurean way of life, but rather by a Christian way of life. Nevertheless, it is clear that the 
Epicurean notion of happiness is being given an honest, and even sympathetic, appraisal. 
 
Pleasure in Utopia 
Although the names “Epicurus” and “Lucretius” never appear in Utopia, Epicurus’ views 
on pleasure and virtue are unambiguously replicated in Raphael Hythloday’s account of Utopian 
moral philosophy.
266
 Erasmus’ colloquy “The Epicurean” suggests an explanation for Utopia’s 
silence: “no school is more universally detested” than the Epicurean. Still, there is a remarkable, 
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266  The absence of Epicurus (and his disciple Lucretius) from More’s Utopia is one sign of 
More’s excellent understanding of Epicurean philosophy. As Edward L. Surtz observes in The 
Praise of Pleasure, the Epicureans would have been excluded from Utopian society on account 
of their denial of divine providence, personal immortality, and judgment after death. It is fitting, 
then, that the names of the leading representatives of the school are figuratively exiled from 
More’s work, although their ideas are given admittance in attenuated form. The characteristic 
Epicurean distinctions among types of pleasures are in fact accepted by the Utopians—i.e. 
pleasures of the body vs. pleasures of the mind (Utopia, p. 71, compare p. 65), pleasures of 
kinesis vs. pleasures of stasis (p. 72), and so forth. The greatest pleasure, in their view, comes 
from practice of the virtues and consciousness of leading a good life (p. 73). The Utopians agree 
with the Socrates of Plato's Gorgias that a life dedicated to “low” pleasures such as eating or 
scratching oneself is a miserable one (p. 73). The Epicureans and Utopians alike eschew “false” 
or “empty” pleasures in favor of a definition of pleasure which concentrates on the satisfaction of 
natural needs—whose demands, it is asserted, are easily satisfied (p. 51). “Honors” are classified 
as a model “false pleasure” (p. 69). The best pleasures are those which can be enjoyed unmixed 
with any pains (p. 74). Common opinion or disease may lead to mistaken ideas concerning what 
is pleasant, but this does not change the true character of the pleasant (pp. 69, 71). In all the 
preceding instances, the Utopians follow an unspoken Epicurean precedent. 
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and surely non-coincidental, degree of philosophical convergence between Utopia and Epicurean 
doctrine. “[The Utopians] carry on the same arguments we do,” Hythloday states: 
They discuss virtue and pleasure, but their chief concern is what to think of human 
happiness, and whether it consists of one thing or more. On this point, they seem rather 
too much inclined to the view which favors pleasure, in which they conclude that all or 
the most important part of human happiness consists.
267
 
 
Hythloday’s mild but uncharacteristic expression of disapproval for Utopian views is 
noteworthy.
268
 He does not say that the Utopians are mistaken, only that they are “rather too 
much inclined” to the view which identifies pleasure with the sum total of human happiness. 
This is the central tenet of Epicurean ethics, and also the school’s distinguishing feature, when 
contrasted with other ancient schools.
269
 
It follows from this view of the human end that the Utopians regard virtue as a means, 
albeit a necessary means, to the life of greatest pleasure. In agreement with Epicurus, they affirm 
that “virtue itself draws our nature to [good and honest pleasure] as to the supreme good,” thus 
relegating virtue to an instrumental role.
270
 Hythloday observes that among the Utopians there is 
an opposing view, held by some, which upholds the Stoic position that “virtue is itself happiness.” 
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But even these “Stoics” reason their way to a position which is, for all intents and purposes, 
indistinguishable from Epicureanism. According to the thinkers of this school, “living according 
to [pleasure’s] rules is defined . . . as virtue.”271 Any disagreement, then, would be purely 
terminological. Thus the overall tendency of Utopian moral philosophy, in all of its varieties, 
traces an outline which was first sketched by Epicurus. 
It is not just that the Utopians are said to live pleasantly, nor that they appear to make 
pleasure the measure and end of a good life. Rather, in their thoughts and actions they 
recapitulate the Epicurean typology of pleasures, with the same intense concern for the 
distinction between “true” and “false” pleasures. The Epicurean influence works its way into the 
Utopians’ more fine-grained moral judgments. They define pleasure, in agreement with the 
Epicurean newborn argument, as “every state or movement of body or mind in which we find 
delight according to the behest of nature.”272 There are mental pleasures and bodily pleasures—
and, of bodily pleasures, some are pleasures of “immediate delight,” while others are pleasures 
of the “calm and harmonious state of the body.” As in Epicurus, the latter category, we might 
call them “pleasures of stillness” or katastematic pleasures, are said to be “the foundation and 
basis of all the pleasures.”273 The practical consequence of these arguments is, just as in 
Epicureanism, to deprecate all pleasures deemed unnatural or unnecessary. The Utopians label 
these “false” and “empty” pleasures (falsum . . . inanis voluptates), and give as examples delight 
in fancy dress, gemstones, ceremonial honors, and opinion of noble birth—as well as such 
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hobbies as gambling and hunting
274
 Hythloday goes on at particular length in his critical 
description of false pleasures, concluding: 
They often please the senses, and in this they are like pleasure, but that does not alter [the 
Utopians’] view. The enjoyment does not rise from the nature of the experience itself, but 
from the perverse habits of the mob, which cause them to mistake the bitter for the sweet 
[. . .]
275
 
 
The Utopians know better, of course, and they practice what they preach. Their lives embody the 
Epicurean moral teaching, with its view of pleasure rightly understood. They live simply and 
moderately, in keeping with the true understanding of man’s natural needs. A little work is 
sufficient to supply them with the necessities of life, while leaving substantial time for leisure 
activities (which include philosophy). 
It seems that one of More’s objectives—certainly one of Hythloday’s—is to cast light on 
and to criticize the pursuit of empty pleasures in contemporary European society. Hythloday 
makes no attempt to sugarcoat his indignation as he diagnoses the vice at the source of these 
misguided pursuits: 
I have no doubt that every man’s perception of where his true interest lies, along with the 
authority of Christ our Savior (whose wisdom would not fail to recognize the best, and 
whose goodness would not fail to counsel it), would long ago have brought the whole 
world to adopt the laws of this commonwealth, were it not for one single monster, the 
prime plague and begetter of all others—I mean Pride.276 
 
The blustering indignation of Hythloday in this passage should not distract from the fact that 
Utopia’s response to the pride and folly More saw all around him is deeply “Epicurean.” The 
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book as a whole recommends the adoption of Utopian views by presenting More’s audience with 
arguments based in calculating self-interest. Europe’s political communities would be happier 
and more secure if they imitated the commonwealth of the Utopians. Self-interest alone ought to 
persuade men that wealth-hoarding and status-seeking are both foolish and vain. And though 
More’s narrator declares that he “can hardly agree with everything [Hythloday] said,” yet he 
freely concedes that “in the Utopian commonwealth there are many features that in our own 
societies I would wish rather than expect to see.” Thus it appears that there are at least two ways 
in which More’s Utopia can be thought of as “Epicurean.” It depicts a commonwealth ordered, 
in many, if not all, respects, along Epicurean lines; and the work itself functions as a 
rationalistic-hedonistic critique of contemporary European practice, following the Epicurean 
therapeutic approach. 
Is Utopia, then, an Epicurean commonwealth? That would go too far. For one thing, we 
ought to recall Hythloday’s marked similarities to Plato, which highlight the role of Platonic 
political philosophy in Utopia. Plato’s influence is apparent in the Utopian practice of 
communism, which recalls the communism of Plato’s Republic. Epicurus had instructed his 
followers not to hold all things in common. The reasons the Utopians give for preferring 
communism to private ownership are, however, consistent with Epicurean principles. 
Communism is both a defense against human pride, and a means of ensuring bodily happiness 
for all. 
The Utopian commonwealth appears to mix Platonic and Epicurean elements. This is 
problematic, on its face. On what principle is the mixture made? Pleasure? Beauty? The good 
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and the just? Consider Adeimantus’ objection in Republic IV, and Socrates’ response.277 The 
Republic is a city “happy as a whole” in which none of the parts appear to be happy. This is 
different from Utopia, a city in which all of the parts appear to be happy. This suggests that the 
mixture of philosophies is made on terms not unfavorable to Epicurus. 
 
Machiavelli and Epicureanism 
In recent decades, scholars have begun to give greater attention to the question of 
Machiavelli’s relation to Epicurean philosophy. This is the belated result of a remarkable finding. 
In 1961, Sergio Botelli identified a manuscript copy of Lucretius in the Vatican Library as being 
in Machiavelli’s hand. It appears that Machiavelli transcribed the entirety of DRN sometime in 
the late 1490s. Machiavelli kept abreast of new developments in the study of the ancient 
Epicureans. He makes use of the 1495 Venetian text, and he incorporates emendations proposed 
by Michele Marullo, which did not make it into print until the 1512-1513 Giuntine edition. 
Machiavelli most likely copied the poem in 1497, the year before he was named Secretary of the 
Florentine Chancery.
278
 
Given these demonstration of interest, it is surprising that Machiavelli never mentions 
Lucretius or Epicurus by name in his writings. If we did not have proof that he had copied DRN 
by hand, it would be very difficult to establish that he had read Lucretius at all.
279
 Allison Brown 
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points out two considerations which help to explain his extreme, but not uncharacteristic, 
reticence. The first is Machiavelli’s loss of office and imprisonment following the Medici’s 
return in 1512. The second is the Florentine synod’s ban on Epicurean and Averroist philosophy 
in 1513, at the very start of Machiavelli’s writing career.280 It would seem that Machiavelli had 
ample reason to be circumspect. 
 
The philosopher of worldly things 
Niccolò Machiavelli does not openly announce that he is a philosopher. He does not give 
his books titles like On Nature (as Epicurus did) or On the Nature of Things (as Lucretius did). 
To the contrary, the books that he says contain “as much as I know and have learned” are entitled 
The Prince and Discourses on the First Ten Books of Titus Livy. These titles suggest that 
Machiavelli’s outlook is politically oriented in the narrow sense.281 There is nothing to contradict 
this view in the titles of Machiavelli’s other works: books such as The Art of War, Florentine 
Histories, and The Life of Castruccio Castracani of Lucca. To these we may add literary works 
such as the play Mandragola and the poem The Ass. An interesting and varied set of titles, to be 
sure, but they do not give us any clear indication of a philosophical predilection. 
The dedicatory letters of the Prince and Discourses help to describe the books’ content. 
The Prince is dedicated to Lorenzo de’ Medici, Duke of Urbino. (Does “dedicated to” mean the 
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same thing as “written for?” Consider Machiavelli’s letter to Vettori of December 10, 1513, in 
which he names a different potential dedicatee, even as he suggests that the particular dedicatee 
is not at all important.) He (and whoever else reads the Prince) will be enabled to understand in a 
very short time “all” that Machiavelli has “learned and understood.” The best part of 
Machiavelli’s knowledge is the “knowledge of the actions of great men,” which Machiavelli has 
learned from “long experience of modern things and a continuous reading of ancient ones.” Once 
again, this suggests that the book contains historically informed discussion of political action—
“politics” in the narrow sense. 
In a similar vein, the dedicatory letter of the Discourses states that the work contains “as 
much as I know and have learned through a long practice and a continual reading in worldly 
things.” We infer that everything Machiavelli knows he has learned through practice and reading 
of “worldly things.” In the expression we may detect a slight echo of Lucretius: are the “worldly 
things” (cose del mundo) equivalent to “natural things” or even “the realm of nature” (rerum 
natura)?
282
 Nothing would seem to exclude the possibility, although Machiavelli’s dedicatees, 
Buondelmonti and Rucellai, are said to be qualified to receive the work on account of their 
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“deserving to be princes,” which establishes the presumption that the knowledge Machiavelli 
here communicates is in some way political.
283
 
In the famous fifteenth chapter of the Prince, Machiavelli distances himself from what he 
calls “the orders of others.” Who are these “others”—Machiavelli’s “competitors?” Context 
suggests that one of them is Aristotle, who offered a list of eleven moral virtues and their 
corresponding vices, just as Machiavelli now offers a list of eleven pairs of “qualities that 
bring . . . blame or praise.” But the word “others” has a general referent: the “many” who have 
“imagined republics and principalities.” At the very least, this category includes not only 
Aristotle, but also Plato (who, after all, wrote “the” Republic), and quite possibly the whole 
tradition of classical political philosophy beginning with Socrates.
284
 The “many” who have 
“imagined republics and principalities” have guided men into ruinous error, since “it is so far 
from how one lives to how one should live that he who lets go of what is done for what should 
be done learns his ruin rather than his preservation.” Machiavelli dissociates himself from this 
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misguided effort. His own method will instead proceed by “leaving out what is imagined . . . and 
discussing what is true.”285 
In sum, the titles and overt intentions of Machiavelli’s works indicate an overriding 
concern with particular—and often narrowly political—objects. Even the Prince, which, by its 
title, seems to consider a general category, is in the end dedicated to a particular prince (although 
it may not matter which particular prince); to whom a particular course of action is 
recommended.
286
 The dedicatory letters of the Prince and Discourses suggest a focus on action 
and on practical politics—although Machiavelli does not delineate the bounds of his knowledge 
except to say that it concerns “worldly things.” The fifteenth chapter of the Prince disavows 
“orders of others” based on “imagined republics and principalities,” in favor of a search for 
“effectual truth.” 
On the basis of these considerations, it would seem that Machiavelli is not a philosopher. 
Additional support for this conclusion, were it needed, would seem readily available in 
Machiavelli’s use of sources. His references to philosophy and philosophers are few and far 
between. In the Prince—which he says “contains all [he has] learned and understood”—he refers 
once to “Marcus the philosopher”—that is to say, to the Roman Emperor Marcus Aurelius.287 In 
the ensuing discussion Marcus is considered not as a philosopher but as an Emperor. He is found 
to be a “fitting and glorious example” for one who seeks to “conserve a state that is already 
established and firm,” but Machiavelli concedes that “a new prince in a new principality cannot 
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imitate the actions of Marcus.” This would seem to suggest that philosophy cannot serve as a 
guide for Machiavelli’s primary subject: the “new prince.” Whether Machiavelli reaches this 
conclusion as a result of himself engaging in philosophy is not yet apparent. In the preceding 
chapter, Machiavelli makes his only reference to a philosopher by name in the Prince. Xenophon 
is named, but not as a philosopher; rather, as the biographer of Cyrus, whose biography enabled 
Scipio’s later imitation of Cyrus.288 
References to philosophy and philosophers are relatively sparse in the Discourses as well. 
book I, chapter 56, which discusses “signs” that “forecast great accidents,” mentions “some 
philosopher” who would have it that “this air is full of intelligences that foresee future things by 
their natural virtues.”289 He does not mention those philosophers who would deny the existence 
of “airy intelligences.” Given the scarcity of Machiavelli’s references to philosophy, it is 
reasonable to wonder whether he here intends to make a larger point—perhaps regarding 
philosophy as such. We note that Machiavelli here refers both to ancient and to modern examples 
of prognostics. He calls our attention to the difference between ancients and moderns, but he 
leaves us to wonder if the difference specifically pertains to the question at hand. 
As regards the question at hand, Machiavelli specifically mentions the modern 
prognostics of Charles VIII’s invasion of Italy, the death of Lorenzo de’Medici the elder, and the 
downfall of Piero Soderini, and the ancient prognostics of the “French” (i.e. the Gauls) coming to 
Rome. However, Machiavelli appears to dismiss the point before he has even made it, bluntly 
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concluding that we do not have “knowledge of things natural and supernatural.” We do not have 
knowledge; yet he concedes that “after such accidents extraordinary and new things supervene in 
provinces.” It would seem significant that Machiavelli does not adopt the Epicurean strategy, or 
that he does not dismiss the significance of prognostics out of hand. For Epicurus, we recall, 
dogmatism was a necessary means to ataraxia. Thus Machiavelli’s evasion of dogmatism 
implies his rejection of ataraxia as Epicurus conceived it. The problems of human action and 
choice are not to be resolved by “knowledge of things natural and supernatural.”290 
In chapter five of the second book of Machiavelli’s Discourses, he considers the 
cosmological question of the eternity of the universe. He calls to our attention to those 
“philosophers who would have it that the world is eternal” and points out a weakness in the 
arguments of their opponents.
291
 If the world were eternal, Machiavelli writes, “it would be 
reasonable that there be memory of more than five thousand years”—were it not that “memories” 
are “eliminated by diverse causes,” of which “part come from men, part come from heaven.” 
Aristotle and possibly Cicero are presumably the “philosophers” in question. Epicurus and 
Lucretius do not fit easily into Machiavelli’s schema. They maintained the eternity—not of the 
world—but of atoms and void, and the eternity of the universe as a whole; the “world” as we 
know it is a temporary accretion of atoms which was at one time generated and will be at some 
later time destroyed. Once again, Machiavelli’s own cosmological views remain obscure. 
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Finally, in book II, chapter 12, Machiavelli considers “certain moral philosophers” who 
wrote that the hands and tongue of men “would not have worked perfectly nor led human works 
to the height they are seen to be led to had they not been driven by necessity.” Machiavelli’s 
source for this claim has not been found. The tradition of classical political philosophy seems 
rather to incline to the view that the full development of man’s natural faculties (such as hands 
and tongue) does not belong among the necessary things.
292
 Machiavelli’s view bears some 
resemblance to Lucretius’ in book V of DRN, in which necessity is conceived as the driving 
force behind such things as the development of language and the useful arts. It seems from this, 
that, although Machiavelli has little use for Epicurean dogmatic cosmology, he may indeed have  
use for the Epicurean conception of necessity—particularly as it relates to human political 
development. 
Philosophy and philosophers are occasionally mentioned in Machiavelli’s other works. 
The Florentine Histories once mentions Boethius, “a most holy man.”293 In book V, the embassy 
of the Athenian philosophers to Rome (which so scandalized Cato, and which provided the 
definitive statement of ancient skepticism regarding justice) is briefly mentioned. Finally, 
Florentine Histories VII.6 mentions Ficino, the “second father of Platonic philosophy.” 
Machiavelli’s Life of Castruccio Castracani concludes with a list of sayings. Of thirty-
four sayings in total, thirty-one have been identified as coming from DL.
294
 The sayings come 
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from the “Lives” of Aristippus (nos. 2-16), Bion (nos. 17-18, 20-21), Aristotle (no. 19), and 
Diogenes the Cynic (nos. 22-32). None of the sayings come from the “Life of Epicurus,” which 
should give us pause. Could it be that Machiavelli failed to read book X? The possibility seems 
remote given Machiavelli’s interest in ancient hedonism and atheism—consider his predilection 
for choosing sayings from the Cyrenaic Aristippus and the “notorious atheist” Bion. It is perhaps 
safer to assume that Machiavelli for some reason chooses to direct our attention to more 
marginal figures in the “shadow tradition” of critics of classical natural right. Diogenes the Cynic 
could certainly be included in such a category, given his preference for nature over convention 
combined with his conviction that politics is a product of convention. Only one of the sayings 
(no. 19) comes from a figure within the natural right tradition. The list of sayings is of particular 
interest given Machiavelli’s extraordinary reticence concerning philosophy and philosophers. It 
might be said to be an instance of such reticence—the sayings of DL’s “Eminent Philosophers” 
are, with alterations, put into the mouth of a self-made political man who “rose from nothing.” 
Here we have another example of how Machiavelli tacitly substitutes politics for classical 
political philosophy. He takes a saying which, in the original refers to Socrates (no. 14), and 
instead makes it refer to Caesar. In summary, Machiavelli’s references to philosophy are 
extremely scanty. He could truly be said to abstain from philosophy “as much as is humanly 
possible.”295 But this makes his occasional expressions of interest for thinkers in the 
conventionalist tradition all the more intriguing. 
The conventionalist account of politics implies a particular view about the relationship of 
man to the natural world. The ancient conventionalists, to one degree or another, rejected the 
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view that nature is rational. The Lucretian account of the “swerve” is an example of this. This 
rejection took both a skeptical form (Democritus, the Sophists, Pyrrho, and the New Academy) 
and a dogmatic form (Epicurus, Lucretius). Machiavelli’s original contribution to the history of 
human thought is seen in his refusal to subscribe to either alternative. The ancient 
conventionalists were, without exception, modest and retiring. Machiavelli, too, is a 
conventionalist of sorts, but he is neither modest nor retiring. Prince XXV would seem to suggest 
that, in his view, the proper response to the rule of the “swerve” or “Fortuna,” is to dominate it. 
Machiavelli appears to disagree with the Epicureans as regards the character of individual 
self-interest. Epicurean hedonism regards withdrawal into a philosophical “garden” as the 
optimal way of life. As Epicurus put it, “we must liberate ourselves from the prison of routine 
business and politics.”296 Machiavelli would beg to differ—but it is important to understand 
exactly why. It is not that Machiavelli disputes the claim that “politics is a prison”—the Prince 
and the Discourses give ample indication that Machiavelli, too, saw politics as a realm of 
“necessity.” Rather, Machiavelli doubts the possibility that anyone—the Epicurean philosopher 
emphatically included—could ever liberate himself through “withdrawal.” Politics simply cannot 
be avoided. Human liberation, if it is to occur, will occur as a result of a political project. 
Necessity must be turned against necessity. To borrow the Epicurean metaphor, we must “rise up” 
and conquer the prison-guards. 
Another dimension of ancient conventionalism should be considered. In Epicurus and 
Lucretius, conventionalism is associated with the critique of religion. Machiavelli could not fail 
to be influenced by their naturalistic account of the pagan religion, which seems to be echoed in 
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his own description of Christianity as a “sect” among sects—that is to say, a human phenomenon 
with its own natural lifespan. But Machiavelli’s own attitude towards religion is colored by the 
changed status of religion in renaissance Europe. Christianity is revealed religion, and in that 
respect quite distinct from the pagan religion Epicurus and Lucretius criticized. Machiavelli does 
not seek to turn his readers into garden philosophers, like Epicurus and Lucretius. He does not 
seek to turn them into peaceable skeptics (as Lucretius seems to have hoped to do with his 
Memmius). Machiavelli contemplates the secular use of religion. In this way, his project 
encompasses Christianity. When he describes the Roman use of oracles, he anticipates a 
Christianity “put to use” by his new politics. 
Given the active interest in Epicureanism in Machiavelli’s time, and the manifest 
relevance of Epicurean texts to many of the issues which interested him, it should not be 
surprising that a close reading of Machiavelli’s writings reveals several important connections to 
the concerns of Epicurean philosophy. To show this, I offer a new reading of the opening 
chapters of the Discourses—a reading in which Machiavelli’s hidden dialogue with Lucretius is 
finally brought to light. Machiavelli is seen to follow a Lucretian precedent in his attack on 
political rationality. And although Machiavelli does not commit himself to any cosmological 
position, there is good reason to think he accepted Epicurean atomism as a sort of “working 
hypothesis.” Machiavelli gives Lucretius’ cosmology a radical turn: his attack on political 
deliberation is also an attack on the fundamental rationality of nature itself. Machiavelli’s 
political philosophy can be understood as an attempt to show how we might live in a world that 
is fundamentally fickle and irrational, in which he draws upon, but ultimately rejects, the “prior 
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art” of Epicurus. Thus we may say that Machiavelli offers an “internal critique” of Epicurean 
philosophy.
297
 
There is good reason to think that, if Machiavelli ever means to discuss Epicurean 
philosophy, he does so in the Discourses. First, his dedicatees are “potential princes” with 
sufficient leisure to engage in lengthy, digressive conversations. This distinguishes them e.g. 
from the dedicatee of the Prince. Second, in the Discourses, as opposed to the Prince, 
Machiavelli does not divide what he knows into “ancient things” and “modern things”: the 
ancient things are in a sense more immediately present in the Discourses. This might be expected 
to include ancient philosophy in all its forms, including the Epicurean. Third, Machiavelli alludes 
to his conversations with Buondelmonti and Rucellai in the Orti Oricellari. If it were not for 
these conversations, Machiavelli says, he would not “be forced to write what [he] would never 
have written for himself.” Did Machiavelli discuss the garden-philosophy of Epicurus with his 
friends in the Orti Oricellari? It would be not surprising, knowing what we know about 
Machiavelli and about the intellectual life of Florence in this time, if the Epicurean account of 
philosophical withdrawal came up in discussion—particularly as Machiavelli himself was 
suffering from a sort of unwilling “withdrawal” from political life during this period of time. 
The second chapter of the Discourses discusses “how many species are republics, and 
which was the Roman Republic.” The centerpiece of the chapter is an extended discussion of the 
cycle of regimes, which follows closely the discussion found in Polybius book VI. The cycle of 
regimes is discussed in many places by authors in the classical tradition; one reason Machiavelli 
chooses to prefer the account given in Polybius is that only there do we find a discussion of the 
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cycle, alongside a discussion of Machiavelli’s ostensible subject—Rome and Roman politics. 
Nevertheless, Machiavelli’s extended discussion of the cycle shows that his concerns extend 
beyond merely antiquarian interest in Roman political beginnings. There is good reason to think 
that he uses the present discussion of the cycle of regimes in order to call our attention to his 
major disagreements with the classical tradition. Lucretian Epicureanism plays an important role 
here. DRN, book V, gave an account of human political beginnings which in some respects 
overlaps the account given in Polybius and in the present chapter. Moreover, there appears to be 
an Epicurean logic to some of Machiavelli’s subtle departures from the text of Polybius VI. 
Machiavelli’s primary finding is an un-classical vindication of republics ordered by 
chance and accident over those ordered “by one alone and at a stroke.” We see in this a tacit 
deprecation of political rationality. It is notable that Machiavelli prefers to base his account on 
“accidents” or “necessity” in preference to human choice. Thus he says that variations in 
government arise by chance, where Polybius said that they arise by nature. Similarly, 
Machiavelli’s prefers a typology of three regimes as over Aristotle’s (and Polybius’) favored 
typology of six. Machiavelli would rather speak of the rule of one, a few, or the many, apart from 
any consideration of the common good, because the common good is a matter of contention and 
public debate. This foreshadows a more general attach on political judgment. In any case, 
Machiavelli prefers a sort of “mixed regime” not susceptible to the flaws of the simple regimes, 
and capable of improving by accidents. 
Furthermore, Machiavelli’s account of the origins of justice gives an “Epicurean” reading 
to that told in Polybius. As the ancient historian put it, when men see ingratitude towards parents 
or other benefactors, they are offended—their faculty of reason allowing them to distinguish 
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ingratitude, as other animals fail to do. Through imagination they put themselves in the place of 
the suffering benefactor, and they share the benefactor’s resentment. This results in a “notion of 
the meaning and theory of duty, which is the beginning and end of justice.” And similar terms, 
Polybius describes the origin of our ideas of noble and base. When men see one man who is 
foremost in defending his fellows from the onslaught of beasts, they distinguish his behavior 
from that of the man who avoids such responsibilities. They admire the one, and dislike and 
reproach the other. 
For Polybius, it is the faculty of reason which enables man to distinguish gratitude and 
ingratitude (he singles out the natural relationship of children to parents) and this directs men to 
knowledge of justice and injustice. For Machiavelli, on the other hand, it is the thought that the 
same injuries one sees done to another could also be done to one’s self. He omits the reference to 
children and parents, writing only that, 
[S]eeing that one individual hurt his benefactor, hatred and compassion among men came 
from it, and as they blamed the ungrateful and honored those who were grateful, and 
thought too that those same injuries could be done to them, to escape like evil they were 
reduced to making laws and ordering punishments . . . hence came the knowledge of 
justice.
298
 
 
This approaches in spirit the Lucretian account: 
Then also neighbors began to join friendship amongst themselves in their eagerness to do 
no hurt and suffer no violence, and asked protection for their children and womankind, 
signifying by voice and gesture with stammering tongue that it was right (aequum)for all 
to pity the weak.
299
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In sum, while Polybius locates the origin of justice in a feeling of indignation at natural 
ingratitude, Machiavelli, following Lucretius, locates it in a chance compact made out of 
consciousness of weakness in order to protect oneself or one’s own. 
Chapter three of the Discourses continues in much the same vein, critiquing choice and 
praising necessity. “Men can never work any good unless through necessity,” Machiavelli writes. 
“[W]here choice abounds and one can make use of license, at once everything is full of 
confusion and disorder.” It is characteristic of Machiavelli to reduce political rationality, or 
“choice” to “license.” 
 
Tumults 
Machiavelli Discourses I.4-6 introduces a powerful criticism of classical republican 
theory, whose ancient adherents professed such admiration for the internal harmony of the 
Spartan polity, and whose modern adherents tended to find in Venice the corresponding modern 
epitome of the well-ordered regime. Against their views, Machiavelli argues that it is Rome, with 
all its tumults, which ought to serve as the model “if someone wished to order a republic anew,” 
rather than the small but harmonious and long-lasting republics of Sparta and of Venice. The 
tumultuous republic is ordered “to expand like Rome in dominion and in power”, while the 
serenissima republic is forced to “remain within narrow limits.” Were it possible to remain 
within fixed limits, the Spartan or Venetian way might seem to be the more promising option: 
“the true political way of life and the true quiet of the city.” But this way is ultimately untenable: 
“all things of men are in motion and cannot stay steady, they must either rise or fall; and to many 
things that reason does not bring you, necessity brings you.” The Spartan or Venetian republic is 
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forced by circumstances, like the Roman republic, to acquire, but not having the Roman 
republic’s “great number of men, and well-armed”, its “expansion is poison.” As Machiavelli 
notes, “Venice lost everything in one day.”300 
Where does Machiavelli derive the claim, so crucial to his criticism of classical 
republicanism, that “the things of men are in motion and cannot stay steady”, but must “either 
rise or fall?” The ancient atomists were associated with a similar claim, advanced on a cosmic 
level: the world and all things in it are defined by their natural patterns of growth and decay. 
Even the cosmos (so claims Democritus) has a birth, a period of growth, an akmē, a period of 
decline, and an end.
301
 Living organisms follow a similar trajectory, and even human creations 
are governed by a similar pattern of growth and decay. Thus Lucretius muses on Rome’s demise, 
and even the collapse of the walls of the world. 
It is, I think, reasonable to surmise that Machiavelli was profoundly influenced by his 
reflections on the atomistic doctrines of growth and decay. And the conclusions he drew are not 
altogether surprising: Machiavelli’s criticism of Epicureanism begins from premises acceptable 
to Epicurean physics (and quite possibly inspired by them), but he uses these premises to reason 
to conclusions that undermine the Epicurean confidence in the very existence of a quiet, secure 
position, “fortified by the teachings of the wise.” And if there is no such place, then the 
conclusion Machiavelli reaches is a compelling one: if all things must rise or fall, take care that 
you and your city remain for as long as possible among the things rising. 
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Reading Discourses in this way, one finds in Machiavelli’s criticism of the Spartan or 
Venetian way allusions to—and criticisms of—the Epicurean philosophical position. Epicurus 
staked his philosophy on the possibility of finding, within the chaos of existence, a secure 
position from which the philosopher could gaze down on the tumults of nature and of politics. 
Machiavelli responds that those who settle “in a strong place of such power that nobody would 
believe he could crush it at once,” are only deluding themselves: sooner or later they will be 
compelled to engage in politics, and they will be crushed, or find themselves so ill-disposed for 
holding on to the gains they are forced to make that they will inevitably lose everything.
302
 
Similarly, Epicurus’ attempt to characterize himself and his followers as good citizens, observant 
of justice and the laws of the city, orthodox in religious practice, and so forth—and to seek safety 
in demonstration of the non-threatening and private character of their philosophy, is doomed to 
failure. It is true that one of the two causes why war is made on a republic is “for fear lest it seize 
you”—but the other, as Machiavelli notes, is “to become master of it.”303 
Sparta and Venice together represent the choice for quiet, as opposed to Rome, the choice 
for empire. Both represent the position that one ought to set limits to human acquisition. As 
“Sparta” stands for the tradition in political thought that, by its enemies, was criticized for its 
idealization of Sparta—the “men with cauliflower ears”—and which made virtue the ne plus 
ultra of the political community, so “Venice” stands for the tradition in thought that found a safe 
home “constrained by necessity . . . to live in places that were sterile, deformed, and devoid of 
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every comfort.”304 In no time at all they made these places “not only habitable but delightful; 
they established laws and orders among themselves, and . . . enjoyed security.”305 It is the 
tradition which made ozio, or indolence, the objective of political life and the reason for 
withdrawal from political life—the tradition of the Garden. 
 
Rolling one’s stone 
We return to the famous fifteenth chapter of the Prince. Machiavelli considers it “more 
fitting to go directly to the effectual truth of the thing than to the imagination of it. And many 
have imagined republics and principalities that have never been seen or known to exist in truth; 
for it is so far from how one lives to how one should live that he who lets go of what is done for 
what should be done learns his ruin rather than his preservation.” Again, this seems to be a 
statement of Machiavelli’s newness. In this case, he sets up an “effectual truth vs. imagination” 
dichotomy. He would class Epicurean withdrawal as among the “imagined republics and 
principalities. 
The garden is dismissed as a pipe-dream: just another “imagined republic or principality.” 
But in I.6, Machiavelli indicates that it is a choice. He does not think the option for Epicureanism 
is a respectable choice for a man. It is the option of a pig. In The Ass, Machiavelli alludes to this 
by putting Epicurean arguments in a pig’s mouth. 
Fittingly, the contrast between classical political philosophy, Epicureanism, and 
Machiavelli’s own views again comes to the fore in Discourses III.2—the only location in the 
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Discourses where Machiavelli refers to the sapiens or wise man. It is here that Machiavelli most 
directly confronts the question of whether it is possible to stand aloof from politics. 
[S]ome say that with princes one should not wish to stand so close that their ruin includes 
you, nor so far that you would not be in time to rise above their ruin when they are being 
ruined. Such a middle way would be the truest if it could be observed, but because I 
believe that that is impossible, one must be reduced to the two modes written above—that 
is either to distance oneself from or to bind oneself to them. Whoever does otherwise, if 
he is a man notable for his quality, lives in continual danger. Nor is it enough to say: “I 
do not care for anything, I do not desire either honors or useful things; I wish to live 
quietly and without quarrel!” For these excuses are heard and not accepted.306 
 
Machiavelli’s letter to Francesco Vettori of December 10, 1513 contains what may be an allusion 
to Lucretius. Machiavelli, suffering ozio in the form of an involuntary exile from politics, writes 
to his friend that he wishes to find employment with the Medici, even if he has to “roll a stone” 
at first.
307
 In this image, he recalls Lucretius’ negative depiction of the life of the unwise as a sort 
of Hades on Earth. The punishment of Sisyphus, in particular, is likened to the torment which is 
ever felt by the politically ambitious: 
To solicit power, an empty thing, which is never granted, and always to endure hard toil 
in the pursuit of it, this is to push laboriously up a hill the rock that still rolls down again 
from the very top, and in a rush recovers the levels of the open plain.
308
 
Machiavelli, however, would choose to “roll a stone” in preference to his unwilling ozio. This is 
suggestive of the way in which Machiavelli at once takes up elements of Epicureanism and 
challenges them. He has no use for the Epicurean wise man’s attitude of serene acceptance of 
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chance. There is no room in his philosophy for this mildness of spirit. He counsels us, not to bear 
up under bad fortune with equanimity, but to rise up and conquer it, as is seen in his treatment of 
the Venetians, and his ultimate rejection of a republicanism that attempts to find hiding-place 
secure from the tumults of nature and of human nature. Thus when the Lucretian metaphor of 
Sisyphus rolling his boulder reappears in Machiavelli, the implications are reversed: instead of 
being a symbol of the futility of politics, the myth of Sisyphus serves as a model for the 
Machiavellian project. 
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Chapter VI: Thomas Hobbes’s Political Hedonism 
In this chapter I argue that Epicurean political teachings—particularly the teaching lathe 
biōsas—make an important and distinctive contribution to the modern liberal idea of freedom. 
The Epicurean contribution can be most clearly recognized in the familiar notion of freedom as 
“being let alone.” But the similarity between lathe biōsas and freedom as “being let alone” 
should not distract us from the fact that Epicureanism is fundamentally a teaching as regards the 
ends to which freedom is best put to use. One seeks to be “let alone,” on the Epicurean account, 
in order to pursue the life of optimal pleasure, and this life is understood as a sort of union of 
higher and lower pleasures, or of philosophical and sensual forms of enjoyment. The Epicurean 
legacy in modern liberal thought is a sort of “rump Epicureanism,” detached from Epicurus’ own 
dogmatic notions about the purpose of life and the role of philosophy in the good life. This 
chapter thus engages in a twofold exploration: on the one hand, I seek to discover the legacy of 
Epicurean ideas in modern thought; on the other hand, we describe the “hollowing out” of the 
Epicurean theory of the good life into a sort of neutral and non-dogmatic “felicity.” 
There is yet another way to look at this issue. The revival of Epicurean philosophy in the 
early modern period coincided with a general revival of the philosophy of the Hellenistic schools. 
I argue that there are important differences between the idea of freedom as espoused by the 
Stoics (and the neo-Stoics of the early modern period) and the idea of freedom as espoused by 
the Epicureans. In brief, the Epicurean believes that certain minimal material conditions must be 
fulfilled in order to achieve freedom, while the Stoic believes that freedom need not take any 
account of material conditions, since it consists solely in the power to assent or not to assent. 
And whereas the Stoic contribution to early modern political philosophy is generally recognized, 
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the Epicurean contribution is, more often than not, ignored or conflated with that of its Stoic 
counterpart. 
One common theme in the introductory materials of sixteenth and seventeenth century 
editions of Lucretius is that we now see the recovery of the authentic teachings of Epicurus, as 
against the distortions and errors introduced by Cicero and centuries of Cicero-influenced 
scholarship. Along with this theme we sometimes see the argument, pioneered by the humanists 
discussed in the previous chapter, that Epicureanism, rightly understood, is no more 
unacceptable on Christian doctrinal grounds than any other pagan philosophy. Sometimes the 
argument is presented in such a way as to recall Augustine’s “spoliation rationale.” In a 
memorable passage, the Catholic priest and Epicurean Pierre Gassendi wrote: “It is surely 
undeserved, on account of a few evils, to expunge so many goods, and to destroy the rose garden 
because of the spines borne by the rose bushes.”309 This became the motto of the modern 
appropriators of Epicurean philosophy. 
Alongside this sympathetic appropriation may sometimes be seen a sort of fideism (one 
thinks, for example, of Montaigne): human reason suggests certain conclusions, some of which 
are compatible with Epicureanism, but one must always be skeptical of reason’s conclusions—to 
the degree that they can, and indeed must, be rejected when they come into conflict with matters 
of certain faith. 
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Thomas Hobbes and the anti-Hobbes literature 
It is sometimes said that Hobbes’s political philosophy does not depend upon his physics. 
This may mean, first, that his political philosophy does not depend upon premises established by 
physics; second, that it was developed independently of (and perhaps prior to) any of Hobbes’s 
physical speculations; or, finally, that it has a basis altogether distinct from the materialist 
account of the world given, for example, in the opening chapters of Leviathan.
310
 It is possible 
that all of these claims are true—or true to some degree. Even so, in the first part of this paper I 
will argue that our understanding of the intention of Hobbes’s political philosophy can be 
advanced by a careful study of Hobbes’s physical doctrines. Hobbes’s intention can be called 
“Epicurean” insofar as it draws upon the two main planks of the Epicurean philosophical project. 
Lucretius writes of Epicurus that he “put a limit to desire and fear”—finem statuit cuppedinis 
atque timoris.
311
 Thus, by way of establishing a starting-point for our investigation, we shall call 
Hobbes’s intention “Epicurean,” to the extent that he co-opts this project of “putting a limit” to 
human fears, on the one hand, and “putting a limit” to human desires, on the other. 
There is one obvious clash between Hobbesian and Epicurean physics, and it deserves to 
be noted here. Hobbes rejects the Epicurean view that there exists such a thing as “chance,” 
which can be described on the atomic level as a distinct movement or “swerve,” and that the 
microscopic “swerve” can in some way account for the macroscopic phenomenon of free choice. 
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One gathers that Hobbes believes this account to be grossly incoherent. Moreover, he believes it 
is quite simply unnecessary. On the one hand, it does not advance our understanding of man or 
the science of politics (which, he believes, can now get along pretty well without any assumption 
of freedom), and on the other hand, it stands to encourage political pretensions in subjects which 
threaten the common welfare. 
When did Hobbes first read Lucretius? Did Epicureanism play a role in his intellectual 
formation?
312
 Given the historical distance and Hobbes’s aversion to crediting (or even 
mentioning) other authors, it is difficult to answer these questions.
313
 Still, we know that Hobbes 
served as amanuensis to Bacon, who praised the ancient atomists very highly.
314
 Later in life, 
Hobbes tried to keep up to date on developments in the study of Epicureanism. He was a close 
friend and correspondent of Pierre Gassendi, the era’s leading Epicurean.315 And even Hobbes’s 
written references to Epicureanism, scanty as they are, give some evidence of close 
acquaintance.
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A promising avenue, hitherto insufficiently appreciated, for the study of the influence of 
Epicurean ideas on the physics and political philosophy of Thomas Hobbes is the anti-Hobbesian 
literature. A considerable amount of criticism was leveled at Leviathan and its author. This 
criticism was varied in its aims and methods; but for the philosophically and theologically 
minded, Epicurus and the ancient atomists emerged as important secondary targets, and, in some 
cases, as significant targets in their own right.
317
 It is safe to say that Hobbes has been dogged by 
charges of Epicureanism for as long as he has been widely read in English.
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 In tenebris metuunt: sic nos in luce timemus 
 Interdum, nihilo quae sunt metuenda magis, quam 
 Quae pueri in tenebris pavitant, finguntque futura. 
 
DRN II.54-7 (LS 21W6); see the discussion of this passage above, on page 115. 
317  
Samuel Mintz, in The Hunting of Leviathan, surveys the English anti-Hobbes literature. 
Charles T. Harrison “The Ancient Atomists and the Literature of the Seventeenth Century,” 
Harvard Studies in Classical Philology 45 (1934), pp. 1-79, remains the most comprehensive 
study of the anti-Epicurean texts; see especially pp. 23-56. It is illustrative of the convergence of 
the anti-Hobbes and anti-Epicurus strands of argument that John Smith, writing in 1651, could 
focus his whole attention on the ancient atomists, while his editor, John Worthington, writing 
just nine years later, makes allusion to the entry of Hobbes into the debate: 
He [i.e., John Smith] lived not to see atheism so closely and craftily insinuated nor lived 
he to see Sadduceeism and Epicurism so boldly owned and industriously propagated as 
they have been of late, by some who, being heartily desirous that there were no God, no 
Providence, no reward nor punishment after this life, take upon them to deride the notion 
of spirit or uncorporeal substance, the existence of separate souls, and the life to come.  
John Worthington, “To the Reader,” in John Smith, Select Discourses, pp. xx-xi. 
318  Nor were Hobbes’s links to Epicureanism ignored on the continent. Pufendorf, for 
example, states that Hobbes borrows his notion of justice as keeping of faith and observing of 
covenants from Epicurus. See The Law of Nature and of Nations I.vii.13, p. 81. Pufendorf asks 
the reader to compare Hobbes, De cive III.6, and Leviathan XV, with DL X. circ. fin. 
Interestingly, he cites Gassendi (Syntagma III.26-7) as asserting, like Hobbes, “a right of every 
man to all things.” 
161 
 
The anti-Hobbes polemicists were not always careful readers, and they were not always 
scrupulous in their scholarship. Often, categories were blurred. A representative case occurs in 
Bishop Samuel Parker’s A Demonstration of the Divine Authority of the Law of Nature. Parker 
argues, in essence, that there are only two possible philosophical positions: Epicureanism and 
Christianity, writing,  
If there be a Deity, there must be a Law of Nature; and if a Law of Nature, a future State. 
And on the contrary, if no future State, then no Law of Nature, and if no Law of Nature, 
no Deity.
319
  
 
In such a scheme, it is easy to see how Hobbes and Epicurus might begin to blur together. 
Elsewhere in the literature, similar tendencies can be observed. Sometimes a critic will 
misrepresent Hobbes’s views, perhaps out of a certain conviction of what his views ought to be. 
It is not surprising that more recent scholars have only rarely taken the claims of the anti-Hobbes 
literature seriously.
320
 Nor, for that matter, did Hobbes openly admit any debt to Epicurus. The 
few references that do appear are critical or disparaging in character.
321
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Samuel Parker, A Demonstration of the Divine Authority of the Law of Nature, p. xxii. 
See the discussion in Harrison, “The Ancient Atomists and the Literature of the Seventeenth 
Century,” Harvard Studies in Classical Philology 45 (1934), pp. 24-ff. One may compare 
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Mintz, The Hunting of Leviathan, p. 32 makes a single passing reference to the charge 
leveled on Hobbes of Epicureanism; Harrison, in “The Ancient Atomists and the Literature of 
the Seventeenth Century,” Harvard Studies in Classical Philology 45 (1934), pp. 1-79, discusses 
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of influence as specious. Leo Strauss’s recently published Hobbes’s Critique of Religion is the 
rare exception to this general rule of neglect. 
321  Hobbes’s correspondence complicates the picture slightly. Privately, Hobbes and his 
friends spoke freely in Epicurean allusion. Sorbière, for example, likens Hobbes to a new 
Epicurus, quoting Lucretius’ encomium (DRN I.62-74). As Malcolm notes, “reading literally 
between the lines, we find that Sorbière is implying that Hobbes has overthrown religious 
superstition.” See Letter 38: Correspondence, vol. I, pp. 121-3. On the other hand, the surviving 
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Still, the time may be ripe for a reappraisal of the arguments of the early critics of 
Leviathan. As Hobbes’s religious ideas receive greater scholarly interest, the arguments of these 
polemicists demand greater attention. At their best, the anti-Hobbes critics demonstrate a depth 
of theological learning that cannot be assumed among Hobbes’s later readers.322 Moreover, they 
often have a solid grounding in the “Aristotelity” of the schools—that is to say, Aristotelian 
metaphysics—and thus are well suited to identify specific points of disagreement with that 
tradition. In some cases, they are good guides to the grounds of that disagreement. 
 
Hobbes and Epicurean hedonism 
The first area which invites comparison is hedonism. To what extend do Epicurus and 
Hobbes share a common, hedonistic orientation? It is worth noting that many of the accusations 
of “Epicurean” leveled at Hobbes by his contemporaries (and subsequent near-contemporaries) 
are focused on this area. However, Philip Mitsis offers a compelling counterargument against the 
view that Epicurus and Hobbes share significant hedonistic common ground: Epicurus is more 
concerned that one have the proper desires than that one have satisfaction of whatever one 
desires; he is in this sense far more “objective” in his hedonism than either Hobbes or Callicles 
from Plato’s Gorgias. 323 A related question concerns the relations between the Epicurean and 
Hobbesian notions of pleasure. James Nichols discusses this point in his Epicurean Political 
                                                                                                                                                                                                    
correspondence between Hobbes and Gassendi is “curiously slight.” Hobbes, Correspondence, 
vol. I, p. xxxi. 
322  As is pointed out by Leo Strauss, “Review” of Mintz, The Hunting of Leviathan, p. 255. 
323  
Mitsis, Epicurus’ Ethical Theory: The Pleasures of Invulnerability, pp. 52-57. 
163 
 
Philosophy. He argues that Hobbes’s denial of felicity is, in effect, democratic. Only a minority 
of people (i.e. philosophers) have any chance of successfully ignoring kinetic pleasure in favor of 
katastematic pleasure. Hobbes’s response is to abandon the category of katastematic pleasure: 
“there is no such thing as [felicity, the] perpetual tranquility of mind.”324 True felicity in fact 
consists in a “continuall progresse of the desire from one object to another; the attaining of the 
former, being still but the way to the latter. The cause whereof is, that the object of mans desire, 
is not to enjoy once onely, and for one instant of time; but to assure for ever, the way of his 
future desire.”325 
On the other hand, there appears to be considerable common ground between the 
Epicurean and Hobbesian criticisms of political ambition. In Epicurus’ scheme, the pleasures of 
ruling are illusory and altogether artificial; “neither natural nor necessary.” One important 
service of Epicurean philosophy is to purge the soul of such “empty” desires. The “illusory” and 
“empty” aspects fit well with Hobbes’s notion of vainglory. It is notable that Hobbes proposes a 
practical, political remedy to vainglory in the form of the Leviathan. 
The modern notion of happiness runs into some problems which the Epicurean notion 
was not subject to. Unlike Epicurean happiness, which is based on restricting the desires to what 
is naturally necessary; the Hobbesian notion of happiness seems to imply necessary conflict, and 
thus some mechanism for resolving conflict. This mechanism is the Hobbesian “Leviathan,” and 
what this means is that the Leviathan, “King of all the children of pride,” takes the role of 
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Hobbes, Leviathan XI, p. 70. See the discussion in Nichols, Epicurean Political 
Philosophy, p. 184. 
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limiting desires that most men are not willing or able to limit for themselves. But here, again a 
difference appears with Epicureanism. The limiting principle is not “what is natural, and what is 
necessary,” as it was for Epicurus. Instead it is “what can be enjoyed, without disturbing the 
enjoyment of others.” This is Hobbes’s “public” formulation of the laws of nature all summed 
together, which he claims is intelligible to the meanest capacity. It is a sort of “negative” golden 
rule: “Do not that to another which thou wouldest not have done to thy selfe.” It may be 
understood as the synthesis of Christ’s teaching, namely, “all things whatsoever ye would that 
men should do to you, do ye even so to them,” and the Epicurean teaching, “live unnoticed.” 
 
Hobbes and Epicurean physics 
Hobbes’s early critics found ample material in his physics to support the allegation of 
Epicureanism. They pointed, first of all, to Hobbes’s mechanistic physics and his denial of 
incorporeal substances, which seemed to recall Epicurean atomism, and, like Epicurean atomism, 
seemed tantamount to atheism. 
When specific physical doctrines are examined and compared side by side, the charge 
that Hobbes owed his physics to Epicurus appears to lose some of its persuasiveness. Consider 
the charge of atomism. During this time, atomism itself had become the topic of heated debate.
326
 
But there is little in Hobbes to substantiate the polemicists’ claim of a link between Hobbes and 
Epicurean atomism. In fact, Hobbes’s longest and most significant discussion of Epicurean 
                                                             
326  See Harrison “The Ancient Atomists and the Literature of the Seventeenth Century,” 
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philosophy (the discussion of Lucretius in De corpore) definitively shows that he rejected the 
Epicurean description of the universe as atoms and void.
327
 And the attempt to tie Hobbes to 
Epicurus on account of mechanism likewise runs into insuperable difficulties. Simply put, 
Epicurus was not a mechanist. In fact, Epicurus’ account of human freedom as dependent on an 
undetermined “swerve” in the motions of certain atoms stands opposed to Hobbesian 
determinism.
328
 
More importantly perhaps, the basis of Hobbes’s physics is not the same as the basis of 
Epicurus’. While Epicurus is an ontological materialist, Hobbes avoids any ontological 
commitments. And while Epicurus argues that certain phenomena (for example, color) are not 
inherent in individual atoms, Hobbes goes much further. For Hobbes, it is crucial to remember 
that our perceptions are our perceptions, and nothing more. He rejects Epicurus’ suggestion that 
things really are more or less as we perceive them, a suggestion Epicurus took to notorious 
length when he stated that the sun is more or less the size it appears to us to be—that is to say, “a 
human foot.” 
Despite these differences, a certain resemblance between Hobbesian and Epicurean 
physics cannot be denied. Both were united in the notion that, as Lucretius put it, “everything is 
done without the working of gods.”329 Hobbes’s denial that God takes an active role in the world 
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Hobbes De corpore I.26.3. 
328  
Letter to Menoeceus, DL X.133-134 (LS 20A). Compare DRN II.251-ff (LS 20F). 
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DRN I.158; compare Samuel Parker, A Demonstration of the Divine Authority of the Law 
of Nature, pp. iii-ff. Leo Strauss, Hobbes's Critique of Religion, p. 66 notes the discrepancy 
166 
 
is particularly evident in his tenth objection to the Meditations, in which he goes through the 
Cartesian list of God’s attributes, on the one hand granting that God is (as Descartes claims) a 
substance, independent, and infinite, but on the other hand denying that there is any basis on 
which to claim that He is supremely intelligent, or supremely powerful, and concluding that 
“though all these things were demonstrated, it still would not follow that a creator exists.”330 
With regard to the role of God in the world, Hobbes, like Epicurus, approaches very close to the 
spirit of Laplace’s famous reply to Napoleon: Je n'avais pas besoin de cette hypothèse-là. 
 
The liberation from fear 
What Epicurus and Hobbes did have need of was a hypothesis—any hypothesis—that 
would support the project of liberating mankind from fear. Hobbes describes the natural science 
of his De homine in exactly these terms. In his Latin prose autobiography, Hobbes writes: 
But dreams and phantasms, which formerly had been held for spirits and souls of the 
dead, and were the bugbears of the coarse common people, it [that is to say, Hobbes’s De 
homine] altogether overthrew.
331
 
 
                                                                                                                                                                                                    
between Hobbesian determinism and Epicurean libertarianism, but refers both to the underlying 
intention of eliminating fear of the gods, and describing nature “in such a way as not to be 
troubling [i.e. fearful] to man . . . as [being] without riddle and secret in principle.” 
330  
See The Philosophical Writings of Descartes, vol. II, p. 131; Compare Thomas Tenison, 
The Creed of Mr. Hobbes Examined, pp. 52-3, who notes that “even Gassendus confessed the 
need for a Creator.” See also Leviathan XXXI, p. 247, where Hobbes derives the right of 
sovereignty of God, not from His creation, but from His omnipotence: “it is from Power, that the 
Kingdome over men, and the Right of Afflicting men at his [sic] pleasure, belongeth Naturally to 
God Almighty; not as Creator and Gracious; but as Omnipotent.” 
331  
Hobbes, Opera Latina I.xviii. See the discussion in Strauss, Hobbes's Critique of 
Religion, p. 67 n.149. 
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Similarly, the Epicureans made one of the goals of natural science the critique of dreams and 
phantasmata, with the ultimate aim of alleviating men’s natural fears of these things.332 
For Epicurus, this project necessarily extends to encompass the claims of religion, which 
by their nature tend to demand men’s prior allegiance over any claims of philosophy. The first 
objection Lucretius anticipates his addressee, Memmius, making, is that of impiety, and his 
response is that religion itself has brought forth criminal and impious deeds.
 333
 In place of the 
things that are believed by the multitude, Epicurus and Lucretius advance a conception of the 
gods as unconcerned with the world,
334
 and argue that one need not fear torments in the 
afterlife,
335
 because the soul is extinguished when the body dies.
336
 
Hobbes’s methods are complicated by the claims of the Christian religion, but many of 
his conclusions are remarkably similar, which induces us to ask whether his intentions might be 
“Epicurean” in some deep sense. The question, for Hobbes, is what is to be feared. And for all 
the notable role that the promotion of a certain fear—namely the fear of a violent death—plays in 
the functioning of the Leviathan, it is at least as significant, for the purposes of understanding 
Hobbes’s political theory, to note the way in which that theory is intended to relieve men from 
fear. 
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Leviathan chapter 12 suggests a distinction between philosophic religion (which 
originates from men’s desire to know causes—i.e. the root scientific desire, and which leads to a 
conception of a “first mover” but not to any conception of divine judgment or punishment), and 
fear-based religion (which originates in “opinion of ghosts,” “devotion towards what men fear” 
and “taking of things causal for prognostics,” and which leads to a still greater fear: the fear of 
eternal punishments—with pernicious political consequences). This fits well with the “Epicurean 
account” of De homine mentioned above. Hobbes finds in Epicureanism remedies for the fear-
based religion which he holds responsible for the civil unrest of his time. 
In Parts III and IV of Leviathan, Hobbes works to liberate mankind from fear by means 
of a strange and novel interpretation of Holy Scripture. As Hobbes’s critics were quick to note, 
the effect of this interpretation is to eliminate, as much as possible, the terrible and fearful 
aspects of traditional Christian doctrine. So far as is possible, Hobbes denies the active role of 
God in the world. He claims that the soul is material and naturally dies when the body dies,
337
 
and his discussion of the torments of hell and the “second death” leads to perhaps the least 
troubling depiction of hell that is compatible with orthodox Christian doctrine (or, if you like, a 
less troubling picture of hell than is compatible with orthodox Christian doctrine).
338
 Tenison 
draws the logical conclusion. Speaking of the “second death” that the wicked will suffer after the 
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resurrection, he says “that which you [that is, Hobbes] make as the top of their calamitie is to be 
reckoned as a priviledg” because it will bring all their torments to a conclusion.”339 
Was Hobbes a Christian? It is not my intention to reopen a debate regarding a point, 
which, in my own opinion, does not and could not admit of any conclusive answer, unless 
Hobbes were, like Plato’s Protagoras, to re-emerge from Hades (at least as far as the neck) and 
make himself subject to all of our inquiries. And perhaps not even then. Consider that, in his own 
lifetime, Hobbes was known as a skilled disputant and as one who had a particular talent for 
hedging his claims—a talent which we can still see shining through in his written works. 
That said, if Hobbes was a Christian, he was a Christian of a most unusual sort—a 
Christian who, as a reader and interpreter of scripture, unfailingly identified and expunged from 
his own personal profession of faith all those elements of Christianity which, in the received 
Christian tradition, had tended to promote fear of God, and in particular the fear of God’s 
judgment. This, I think, is indisputable. Can such a one be a Christian? 
 
Security in Epicurus and in Hobbes 
The first fact we note is that, for both thinkers, “security” is associated with the idea of 
fear. Epicurean security is fundamentally “security against fears”—that is to say, the subjective 
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feeling of safety that accompanies the rational certainty, imparted by Epicurean teaching, that 
even the most intrinsically distressing experiences cannot stop the wise man from enjoying 
ataraxia, and, thus, true happiness. 
The Epicurean claim can be broken down further. It implies, first of all, a particular 
account of human happiness and unhappiness, an account which begins by locating the primary 
causes of human unhappiness in fear—i.e. not in scarcity, false opinion, or so forth. Compared to 
other animals, human beings have an exceptionally large number of reasons to be fearful. They 
are rather poorly provided for by nature, having none of the natural weapons or defenses that 
other animals can typically rely upon. In primitive circumstances, they have tended to serve as 
prey for beasts. But human fear is not merely the product of human weakness (which men, in any 
case, can and have managed to ameliorate through social organization and technological 
innovation, a fact Epicurus readily grants); human fear is, in fact, much more the product of the 
human power of imagination. The best way to see this dimension of human fear is to recall DRN 
II.54-57: 
For just as children tremble and fear all things in blind darkness, so we in the light fear, at 
times, things that are no more to be feared than what children shiver at in the dark and 
imagine to be at hand.
340
 
 
Incidentally, we know that this passage was important for Hobbes; his posthumously published 
“Concerning Heresy and the Punishment Thereof” takes it for an epigraph. The chief of these 
imagined fears are the fear of divine rewards and punishments, and the fear of an afterlife. But a 
detailed examination of the Epicurean strategies against religious fear is beyond our present 
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purposes; suffice it to say that, with regard to the fears instigated by religion, Epicureanism and 
Hobbesianism are profoundly in sympathy. 
The Epicurean response to religious fears is thoroughly rationalistic; by knowing the true 
nature of the universe and the nature of the gods, one is freed from the fear of divine rewards and 
punishments (since the gods are revealed to be blissful and disinterested in human affairs), and, 
at the same time, one is freed from fears regarding the afterlife (since the character of the soul, 
and its mortality is firmly established). But note that Epicurus does not seem to be entirely fair to 
religion. He counts up the fears inspired by religious belief, but ignores all of its consolations. 
The Epicurean response to the fears brought about by human weakness is equally 
rationalistic. To be sure, it is the case that social organization and technological innovation 
remove the primitive fears of starvation and of being eaten; nevertheless they introduce new (and 
arguably worse fears (think of tyrannical persecutions and of the terrible clashes of armies). The 
chief virtue of social organization and technological innovation is not the amelioration of the 
human condition, but rather that they enable the emergence of true philosophy, i.e. Epicurus. 
Epicurean security is fundamentally security against fears, since fears prevent the mind 
from achieving the intrinsically desirable state of ataraxia. In contrast, Hobbesian security is, to 
some extent, a consequence of fears: the fear of violent death leads, upon reflection, to the 
imperative to contract away one’s natural right in favor of peace, when peace is offered. Thus it 
can be said that fear is not something for philosophy to dispel, but rather something for 
philosophy to appropriate and direct. 
This apparent contrast conceals the fact that there is also room for the “Epicurean 
approach to security” within the Hobbesian system: fear of a violent death is not the only, nor 
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necessarily the strongest of human fears. Hobbes states that the fear of invisible spirits is 
potentially at least as strong.
341
 
Epicurus recognizes fears which originate in human weakness, and he recognizes fears 
which originate in the human power of imagination. Of these two, the latter are by far the more 
troublesome. Man, by his own effort, can reduce the former to tolerable levels; the latter, 
however, can only be remedied by the practice of philosophy. 
Epicurus’ division of fears seems to be compatible with Hobbes’s theory: the fears of 
weakness include the (quite rational) fear of a violent death in the state of nature; the fears of 
imagination include the “feare of spirits invisible.” Philosophy can provide a remedy for the 
latter, but Hobbes, like Epicurus, considers it a remedy only for a few philosophers. 
A second argument involves an internal critique. Epicurean physics is in fact in tension 
with Epicurean ethics, and even tends to undermine it. Lucretius is fond of using war-metaphors 
to describe the motions of the atoms—and this is not merely poetic license. Lucretius uses the 
metaphor of armies fighting on a distant plain to argue that, though seemingly discrete wholes 
(such as armies) may seem to be at rest, in fact everything is in violent motion.
342
 
All perceptible things and many that extend beyond our perception—e.g. the cosmos 
itself—are “mixed bodies” produced by inter-atomic collision. As conglomerates, they are weak 
and subject to disruption by every wandering atom that passes their way. It is in the nature of 
every mixed body to eventually perish from this disruption. As human beings, you and I are no 
different. Our death is inevitable, and the human soul (being a particular structure of atoms 
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within the body) is just as fragile—or even more fragile—than the human body. Our cosmos, too, 
will one day die. The whole contains innumerable such cosmoi, scattered in an infinite sea of 
atomic flux. The ceaseless hail of atomic projectiles will annihilate them all, while others 
randomly emerge from chaos to take their places. In all the entirety of things, no object of human 
attachment can survive forever. 
Given that this is the sort of world we live in, the Epicurean predilection for calm and 
moderation may seem somewhat baffling. Machiavelli similarly assumed that “all things of men 
are in motion and cannot stay steady, they must either rise or fall,” but this did not lead him to 
counsel moderation, in politics or in life.
343
 The possibility must be considered that, as Cicero 
argued, Epicurus was a better man than his opinions entitled him to be.
344
 Hobbes’s project, then, 
can be seen as an attempt to vindicate political justice, under very inhospitable physical 
circumstances. 
 
The account of political origins 
In general, Hobbes’s critics seem to have regarded his state of nature as being equivalent 
to the Epicurean account of human origins in DRN, book V. This is certainly the view of 
Tenison. In his dialogue, the “Student of Theology” presses “Mr. Hobbes” to say whether he 
really believes, as Epicurus did, “that Mankind arose, at first, out of the fortuitous Concretions” 
of matter, and whether he believes that the first men were born from “certain swelling bags or 
wombs upon the earth, which brake at last, and let forth Infants,” as Lucretius had claimed (and 
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as Gassendi reliably transcribes). Unfortunately for us as readers, “Mr. Hobbes” evades the 
question and answers with a restatement of his teaching on the state of war.
345
 Similarly, 
Clarendon argues that the men “who first introduced the opinion, that nature produced us in a 
state of war” must have been the ancient atomists, that is to say, those “philosophers who could 
imagine no other way for the world to be made, but by a lucky convention and conjunction of 
atoms.”346 Indeed, it may be with regard to Hobbes’s account of the state of nature that the 
charge of “Epicurean” is most frequently raised.347 
Recall that, in the Epicurean account, the way of life of the first humans is not described 
as being anything resembling a “war of all against all.” Clarendon is simply wrong when he 
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insinuates that Epicurus and Hobbes are similar on this account.
348
 In fact, as Lucretius presents 
the Epicurean position, there is no suggestion that competition with other men comprises any 
part of primitive man’s concerns. The life of primitive man is not altogether idyllic—it is lived in 
conditions of material scarcity (but, generally, material sufficiency
349
), however the primary 
danger for these first men is the danger posed by wild beasts. Hermarchus (who would have been 
known to Hobbes through Gassendi) amplifies this point: the first humans, he suggests, came 
together for the sake of mutual protection against wild beasts: “man would not have been able to 
survive without taking steps to defend himself against animals by living a social life.”350 
 Clarendon’s mistake is an illuminating one, however. It invites us to compare the 
differences of the Epicurean and Hobbesian accounts of man’s earliest state. One difference is of 
overriding importance: while Epicurus presumes that primitive man’s natural needs are easily 
satisfied (as Lucretius notes, those needs are minimal; also, in keeping with Epicurus’ analysis of 
the desires, “natural necessaries” are said to be easily obtained); Hobbes on the other hand argues, 
in essence, that men are naturally insatiable, because reflective. 
[B]ecause there be some, that, taking pleasure in contemplating their own power in the 
acts of conquest, which they pursue farther than their security requires; if others, that 
otherwise would be glad to be at ease within modest bounds, should not by invasion 
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increase their power, they would not be able, long time, by standing only on their defence, 
to subsist.
351
 
 
We must—Hobbes asserts against Epicurus—concern ourselves with more than just the natural 
necessities, because others will not be satisfied with the natural necessities. And again: 
For every man looketh that his companion should value him, at the same rate he sets 
upon himselfe: And upon all signes of contempt, or undervaluing, [man] naturally 
endeavours, as far as he dares . . . to extort a greater value from his contemners, by 
dommage; and from others, by the example.
352
 
 
In a sort of “inverted golden rule,” every man demands that “treat me as you yourself would 
want to be treated” become the maxim of his neighbors’ every action. Even worse, he demands 
“regard me every bit as highly as you would regard yourself” and he demands evidence of this. 
Hobbes’s reasons for conflict in the state of nature—namely competition, diffidence, and 
glory—have virtually no place in the Epicurean account of primitive man. First, there is no 
indication that available resources are insufficient to provide for man’s natural and necessary 
needs—which are very meager prior to civilization.353 Second, there is no reason for diffidence 
and preemption in the state of nature, since, for Epicurus, it is not supposed that men will have 
the desire to “contemplate their own power through acts of conquest.” The Epicurean account of 
ambition seems to ascribe its origin rather to the misguided desire for security.
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deny that “contemplating one’s own power” is naturally pleasant; it is, rather, an acquired taste. 
And for this reason, Epicurus would deny that the desire for glory obtains in the state of nature. 
Hobbes, so to speak, eternalizes the “now” of desire; in contrast to Epicurus, who finds 
the complete satisfaction of desire in “eternality” as such, and in contrast to the resolutely 
unreflective hedonist, like Aristippus, who feels no compunction to tie together a string of 
passing moments, each with their passing desire. 
 
The account of political ends 
Some sense of the transformation Hobbes has effected in political thought can be 
obtained by revisiting earlier views. Augustine, building on Cicero, had claimed that the political 
community, or res publica, was an association of men united by a common love. Thus, while 
Cicero’s spokesman Scipio had declared: 
[A] commonwealth is the concern of a people, [est . . . res publica res populi] but a 
people is not any group of men assembled in any way, but an assemblage of some size 
associated with one another through agreement on law and community of interest.
355
 
 
Augustine took and transformed this “agreement on law and community of interest” into a far 
reaching “agreement on the objects of love.” 
[J]ustice is found where God, the one supreme God, rules an obedient City according to 
his grace . . . where this justice does not exist, there is certainly no ‘association of men 
united by a common sense of right and by a community of interest’. Therefore there is no 
commonwealth; for where there is no ‘people’, there is no ‘weal of the people’ [. . .] If, 
on the other hand, another definition than this is found for a ‘people’, for example, if one 
should say, ‘A people is the association of rational beings united by a common agreement 
on the objects of their love’, then it follows that to observe the character of a particular 
people, we must examine the objects of its love.
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What Hobbes does, then, is to decisively transform political philosophy by taking the traditional 
notion of the best regime and detaching it from—one is tempted to say, from any notion of a 
people. Certainly, from Augustine’s notion of a people as an “association of rational beings 
united by agreement on the objects of their love.” To the contrary, Hobbes introduces (as the 
working assumption of all modern politics) society-wide disagreement regarding the proper 
objects of communal love. 
Nor does Hobbes return to Cicero’s definition of a people as “an assemblage of some size 
associated with one another through agreement on law and community of interest.” It is true, 
Hobbes keeps a “community of interest” of a sort, but it is not the classical community of interest, 
but rather a sort of “communal denial of interest,” or communal cession of natural right. And 
Hobbes certainly does not wish to assume an agreement on law. One is tempted to say that the 
Hobbesian definition of logos is “the human faculty which divides people.” 
 
Return to Hobbes’s physics 
Stewart Duncan writes, regarding Hobbes’s physics: 
Overall then, something of a puzzle remains. Hobbes clearly was a materialist about the 
natural world, but the explicit arguments he offers for the view seem rather weak. 
Perhaps he just had a good deal of confidence in the ability of the rapidly developing 
science of his time to proceed towards a full material explanation of the mind. Just as his 
contemporary William Harvey, of whom he thought very highly, had made such progress 
in explaining biological matters, so too (Hobbes might have thought) might we expect 
further scientists to succeed in explaining mental matters.
357
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This is where Hobbes’s scientific materialism verges on the rhetorical—he hopes to persuade 
with the strength of his confidence that materialism will in due course be vindicated. In other 
words, Hobbes’s “Napoleonic strategy” belies his own awareness of the inadequacy of current 
arguments for materialism. Nevertheless, Hobbes hopes to prevail with a combination of the best 
current arguments and his own rhetorical conviction. And to what end? To the end of excluding 
“powers spirituall” from the temporal politics of his time—and from the temporal politics of all 
subsequent times. 
We might summarize the preceding by saying that Hobbes pioneered the mixture of 
scientific materialism, rhetorical self-confidence, and political secularism that would soon come 
to be known under the title of “radical enlightenment.” If Hobbes did not invent this mixture, he 
at the very least gives it its first classical formulation.  
Blaise Pascal offered perhaps the deepest reflection on man’s new “freedom” when he 
wrote, not without evident anguish, that the new “nature” is nothing more than “an infinite 
sphere whose center is everywhere and circumference nowhere.”  The indifferent and 
purposeless universe described (or presumed) by modern natural science appears to have the 
political and moral consequence of putting every individual at the absolute center. Resort to such 
a notion of nature debunks the claims of any received order. The Hobbesian restoration of order 
may be said to begin from the premise, “every individual his own center.” 
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